School Safety, Security and Emergency Preparedness
Assessment Report for
Spokane Public Schools, Washington
June 2019

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1. Introduction

Spokane Public Schools (SPS/the District) selected Safe Havens International (Safe Havens) to conduct a school safety, security, and emergency preparedness assessment for all 47 schools in the District. The project included a combination of on-site assessments and an off-site review of the District’s emergency management plans as well as available information on safety and security policies and student disciplinary data. The assessments were focused on identifying opportunities to improve those areas at the District.

Findings from both assessments were incorporated into this detailed written report. The report summarizes key findings with options for consideration for improvements in the areas of school climate, culture, safety, security, and emergency preparedness. The report is supplemented with a complete site assessment checklist with more specific assessment results for each assessed school.

The reader will note that this report is comprehensive and detailed, which results in a lengthy document. Our intent is not to overwhelm the reader with options that should be taken as mandates nor as actions that should be immediately instituted. Instead, our experience has been that a steady but thoughtful approach by our clients to select a combination of enhancements over a reasonable period will result in a safer school environment over time.

We are very impressed that SPS leadership team have been open to this level and depth of external audits for the District’s approaches to safety, security, climate, culture and emergency preparedness. Though we make reasonable efforts to seek out, identify, quantify, and highlight successes for all our assessment projects, due to the nature of these types of assessments, problems tend to be highlighted more than positive aspects. At the same time, we see this process as highly positive. This is not only because of the successes and achievements identified in this report but also because of the eagerness of the District's leadership to find, confront, and address opportunities to improve the level of safety, security, climate, culture, and emergency preparedness at the District. Few things demonstrate the professional level of care and concern for the safety of our children more than enhanced school safety, security, climate, culture and emergency preparedness measures. We applaud the desire of the leadership team at SPS to question school safety to this depth and to do so in a proactive manner rather than in reaction to a safety incident.

As school leaders naturally focus a great deal on test scores and other key measures of school effectiveness, it is very common for people to underestimate the connections between safety, security, and emergency preparedness with these primary goals. Our analysts feel that implementing the improvements outlined in this report will not only bear valuable fruit through a reduction in risk to life safety, but will enhance school climate and academic achievement by reduction in loss of time on task for teachers, lost instructional time for students, and loss of time spent by administrators responding to safety issues. Seeking out and addressing the opportunities for improvement in school safety will not
only improve school security, climate, culture, and emergency preparedness, but will also improve the public image of even the most highly regarded of public schools over time.

As the reader will see, our analysts found the efforts at the District to be impressive. The District leadership team has clearly established safety of students, staff, and visitors as a high priority and made valuable, thoughtful, and impactful efforts to steadily improve the safety, security, and emergency preparedness for students, staff, and visitors in recent years. We also observed an impressive and passionate desire on the part of employees who work in various support departments and in different schools we interviewed to find additional ways to enhance safety at the District. Making improvements in school safety, security, and emergency preparedness can be far easier when school employees are receptive to improvements. Conversely, no security equipment can overcome apathy or lack of support by school employees. This makes the commitment of the employees we interacted with an invaluable asset to Spokane Public Schools community.

This report also includes a variety of potential resources to assist the District in its continual efforts to improve the level of safety for staff, students, and visitors. Please see Appendix VII for sources of available school safety resources. Administrators who require any clarification of any opportunities for improvement, gaps noted, or possible corrective approaches in the report may contact Safe Havens Executive Director Michael Dorn at mike@weakfish.org for free clarification and/or technical support.
2. Methodology and Limitations

A team of seven Safe Havens analysts conducted the assessments for the District. The biographies for the analysts are included in Appendix VIII. The assessments included a combination of off-and on-site evaluation in a manner designed to leverage our extensive experience in this type of work.

2.1. Off-Site Assessment

Safe Havens Executive Director Michael Dorn conducted a review of the emergency plans and documents related to school safety for the District. The review of emergency plans compares the plans against the recommended all-hazard, four-phase school crisis planning model. In contrast with the on-site school safety and emergency preparedness assessments described in the next section, this off-site assessment was intended to analyze how well employees in the schools were prepared to implement the crisis plans under actual field crisis conditions. This is a critical aspect as most K-12 school employees do not fully appreciate the powerful effects of stress on the human mind and body that a major crisis event can create, and the damaging effect it can have on their performance in life and death situations.

2.2. On-Site Assessment

Seven Safe Havens analysts visited the District to conduct on-site assessments for all 47 schools in SPS. The analysts performed the assessments at the school level and the district level.

2.2.1. School-Level Assessment

Five Safe Havens analysts visited all SPS schools to conduct the school-level assessment. The assessment included the following:

- Traffic safety during arrival or dismissal time
- Perimeter protection measures
- Front entry/security vestibule design concepts
- General playground safety and security (this is not a certified playground inspection)
- General security measures and practices
- The use of natural surveillance, positive territoriality and natural access control in keeping with the principals of crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED)
- Access control systems, procedures and practices
- Crisis communications systems
- Camera surveillance systems, procedures and practices
- Intrusion detection systems, procedures, and practices
• Visitor management systems, procedures and practices
• Interior space management policies and practices
• Presence of potential targeting identifiers that can aid an attacker in locating a victim
• Potential common safety hazards
• Emergency evacuation maps and routes
• Food and beverage security practices
• School climate and culture

When applicable and practical, this type of assessment included the school grounds, building exteriors, main office areas, library/media centers, cafeteria/food preparation areas, auditoriums, gymnasiums, locker rooms, shower areas, offices, science labs, utility areas (e.g., boiler rooms, storage areas, mechanical rooms, etc.), and a representative sampling of classrooms as well as other unique and/or relevant spaces.

The analysts also used a customized software tool to interview building administrators and support staff to evaluate the following core competency areas at each school:

• Emergency drills and exercises
• Staff development
• Emergency plan distribution and training
• Documentation of safety efforts

The analysts also used a series of video and audio crisis scenarios to evaluate the level of preparedness of staff members at the schools.

2.2.2. District-Level Assessment

In addition to school-level assessment as described above, Safe Havens Executive Director Michael Dorn and Analyst Phuong Nguyen conducted a series of district-level meetings with key District personnel as well as with representatives from law enforcement agencies to obtain a better understanding of safety concerns and issues in areas such as:

• Preparedness for emergency situations
• Public safety response capabilities in the District
• School resource officer/security staffing and deployment for schools during school hours, after-hours as well as at athletic events
• Approaches to utilization of security technology
• Staff and student training and drills
• Approaches to student bullying and suicide management
• Student threat assessment approaches
• Anonymous threat management approaches
• Student disciplinary approaches
• Approaches to background check for employees, volunteers, and contractors

2.3. Limitations
It should be noted that the assessments in this project were limited in scope to general safety, security, and emergency preparedness issues. The assessments did not include:

• Fire code inspections
• Building code compliance inspections
• Inspections of hazardous materials storage or chemistry lab compliance
• Formal playground inspections
• Environmental health and OSHA compliance inspections
• Environmental safety evaluations
• Structural facility integrity or engineering inspections
• Information technology security assessments (such as firewall protection)
• Nighttime security lighting studies
• Safety inspections of specific types of systems or equipment (such as boilers and electrical systems)
• Other specialized types of inspections

Though we may occasionally note obvious gaps in some of these areas, this should not be seen as the result of Safe Havens having formally evaluated those areas. Finally, while Safe Havens makes a reasonable and good faith effort to be thorough, accurate, and comprehensive in our assessments of schools and school districts, it is not possible for any assessment of this type to identify every possible hazard during this type of evaluation. Safe Havens has no control over new risks that may occur after our assessment visit. Safe Havens also recommends that schools be assessed at least one time annually as the potential for risk can change.

Although the focus of this report is on the areas where improvements can and should be made, we would be remiss if we did not point out a number of the positive practices our analysts observed at the District. Even though the District must address a substantive increase of at-risk students and significantly slow non-emergency response times from the Spokane Police Department (SPD) caused by challenges in recruiting and retaining high quality police officers, the District, the SPD, and other community partner agencies and organizations have been working diligently and collaborating effectively to implement improved approaches to address these challenges. We feel that it is important for the reader to understand from the beginning of the report that in many cases, addressing these concerns results in an increased demand on district and community partner agency personnel. For example:

1. Though more effective intervention measures can and often do result in greater efficiency for staff and school performance, the wide array of prevention approaches that have been implemented by the District consume considerable staff time for training, documentation, and application of the approaches.

2. As we are seeing with law enforcement agencies in most regions of the nation, the challenges the SPD faces in having to recruit, screen, train and equip larger numbers of officers each year due to turnover consumes a great deal of staff time. The pre-employment screening processes and training programs used by sophisticated agencies like the SPD eliminate a far greater percentage of candidates who meet the basic criteria for employment than is the case for K12 education, manufacturing, retail sales and most other types of employment outside of a few sectors such as military combat personnel, intelligence organizations and commercial aviation. Our experience has been that it is not unusual for pre-employment screening (criminal and driver history checks, interviews with neighbors, psychological and polygraph screening, etc.) to eliminate 70-90 percent of otherwise qualified applicants for police officer positions. It is also not unusual for up to 50 percent of personnel who are able to make it through the screening process to be washed out of the police academy and field training officer programs for large police agencies.

The combination of the above and other factors all demonstrates the importance of the many positive enhancements relating to safety, security, climate, culture, and emergency preparedness that have been implemented by the SPS in the past several years. The following are some of the prevalent positive practices and features observed during the assessments in different areas. Please note that they are not in the order of importance. We should also point out that this should not be viewed as an all-inclusive list of positive practices at the District.
3.1. The District leadership team and the school staff we worked with during the assessment all exhibited a desire to create and maintain a safe school environment.

We found the personnel we worked with to be professional, courteous, helpful in answering our questions, and eager to learn improved ways to enhance the many positive safety measures they have already implemented. We found the personnel we interacted with to be very open to questioning how things are currently done and saw no signs of defensiveness in our discussions. While SPS, like every school we have worked with, faces challenges when it comes to implementing changes which will require significant cultural changes for staff, students and parents, the discussions we had relating to these typical challenges were very logical, professional and focused on achieving effective safety enhancements in a properly balanced manner. This is a highly impactful asset to SPS.

3.2. A wide variety of District officials as well as the Spokane Police Chief and members of his command staff all reported an excellent relationship with the Spokane Police Department.

During the assessment, our analysts had a chance to meet with representatives from the local police and fire departments. We observed indicators of a high degree of commitment to support the mission of District on the part of the representatives we interacted with. We noted that the Chief of the SPD and member of his command staff expressed very clear and strong support for the District. SPD staff are concerned that as with many law enforcement agencies in Washington State and other regions of the country, the SPD has experienced difficulty in attracting and retaining high caliber sworn personnel.

Like most other agencies, the SPD has opted to operate with vacancies rather than to lower hiring and performance standards. As we have seen in many communities nationally, this results in lengthy delays for non-emergency calls. In the case of the SPD, response times for non-emergency calls can range from 50 to 55 minutes depending on call volume and the number and type of calls being received at a given time. The SPD and Campus Resource Officers (CROs) we interviewed all expressed concerns about this. While SPD response times for life-threatening emergencies would be much faster, officers and our analysts are very concerned that many instances of averted violence with weapons on school campuses involve intervention by armed officers at the non-emergency stage of the event. While many citizens focus on police response time during active shooter events, the reality is that the best opportunities to save human life usually occur before, rather than after a gun is fired by an attacker. While many of these successful interventions involve student threat assessment and management processes, many other successful interventions occur because an armed officer can intervene before the individual pulls and begins to use a weapon.

The Chief of the SPD expressed a willingness support the District in its efforts to improve approaches to law enforcement services for schools and support facilities. For example, the Chief advised that if the District desired to arm select law enforcement personnel, the SPD would provide the same type of oversight and review of the use of force by District personnel that has been approved by the United States Justice Department for SPD officers. This review process is robust and was developed by the SPD with the assistance of the Justice Department to create a mechanism to proactively protect the public.
from law enforcement personnel who might be more prone to resort to any form of physical force. This approach would provide the District and the public with a high degree of external oversight for the use of force by CROs using the same high standards developed by the SPD.

The Chief of SPD and the command staff of the CROs demonstrated an excellent working relationship and expressed a willingness to collaborate regardless of the approach to law enforcement services determined to be the most practical by the District.

We do note two opportunities to further strengthen the excellent relationship between the District and SPD which would benefit both organizations while also increasing student as well as SPD officer safety. The first opportunity would involve the District asking the Chief of SPD if he would consider having his new officers conduct a brief walk-through of each of the District schools by building this activity into the SPD field training officer (FTO) programs. This can provide a structured mechanism for the officers to become familiar with District’s campuses and building layouts. This increasingly popular approach would also provide the District with additional no-cost random law enforcement patrol coverage of the campus. This approach would also provide increased random visits by SPD officers creating additional deterrent effect. At the same time, these visits will improve ability of SPD officers to respond safely to emergency situations because of their familiarity with school layouts.

The second opportunity is for the District to offer the use of its empty facilities for law enforcement officers to conduct tactical training during periods of time when the schools are closed, such as during evenings, weekends, holidays, and summer months. This will further increase the familiarity of officers with the campuses and facility layouts. In our experience, law enforcement agencies often seek new environments to allow their officers to practice active assailant tactics and other tactical training approaches.

If the District has not done so, the District may want to ask the SPD and the Spokane County Sheriff’s Office (SCSO) to consider having their new officers conduct a brief walk-through of SPS schools by building this activity into the field training officer (FTO) programs. This can provide a structured mechanism for the officers to become familiar with SPS campuses and building layouts. This increasingly popular approach would also provide the District with additional no-cost random law enforcement patrol coverage of the campus. The District could also offer the use of its empty facilities for law enforcement officers to conduct tactical training during periods of time when the schools are closed, such as during holidays. This will further increase the familiarity of officers with the campuses and facility layouts. In our experience, law enforcement agencies often seek new environments to allow their officers to practice active assailant tactics and other tactical training approaches.

3.3. We note a number of highly positive efforts and capabilities of local public safety agencies which improve their ability to support the SPS.

In addition to the strong commitment of support demonstrated by the SPD Chief of Police, command staff, field supervisors and line personnel, interviews with area public safety personnel indicated that
with some exceptions involving the relationship between the SCSO and the SPS, the local public safety community has implemented many measures that enhance the safety of SPS students and employees. These include but are not limited to:

- A number of efforts to increase interoperable communications capabilities between CRO and SPD personnel.
- A number of efforts to increase the interoperable communications capabilities between the various area public safety agencies.
- A very high degree of increased capability for tactical emergency medical services. This can be extremely important in reducing loss of life in crisis events that result in injury to large numbers of victims. Local officials report good capabilities for law enforcement personnel being issued trauma kits, tourniquets, and hemorrhage control training for law enforcement personnel. Several events including the terrorist attack at a training center in San Bernardino California have demonstrated that these approaches can significantly reduce fatalities in these types of incidents. We were advised that all emergency medical services personnel and some SPD personnel have been certified in these areas. We also note that an increasing number of public-school systems are training personnel in hemorrhage control measures and providing tourniquets and other critical supplies. This has been particularly noticeable in school systems where active assailant events have occurred. We therefore see it as a highly positive finding that the SPS has been moving to implement Stop the Bleed training for CROs, school nurses and some other school personnel and has been buying hemorrhage control supplies even though no such event has occurred in the SPS.
- The SPD reports that the agency began providing active shooter response training to officers in the late 1990s when this type of training first became widespread in the United States. The SPD also reports joint interdisciplinary active assailant training. Many of the challenges identified in the Governor’s MSD Commission report during the response to the Marjorie Stoneman Douglas High School shooting provide examples of the importance of this type of training. For example, serious problems resulting from the inability of officers from different agencies to talk to one another on a common radio frequency and the extended delays in getting emergency medical personnel to the victims are two examples of the type of problem that is often identified and corrected when multi-agency and multi-disciplinary active assailant training occurs. We note that CROs and SPD officers have also been cross trained for active assailant events.
- The Spokane County Emergency Management Agency (SCEMA) has also coordinated multi-agency and multi-disciplinary meetings and exercises involving not only active shooter event scenarios, but for improvised explosive device events and other attack methods that have often been overlooked in other communities. The SCEMA has also provided live training on the National Incident Management System to SPS personnel and has offered to provide increased NIMS training for the District at no cost. We suggest the SPS consider this generous offer.
note as a positive that approximately 80 percent of building principals have completed the basic NIMS 100 for Schools Training. Though we suggest that all department heads, building administrators and cabinet officials also complete this training and that additional live NIMS training be provided, this is a significant achievement which has occurred through the support of the SPS leadership and the SCEMA. The SCEMA has also offered to provide additional reinforcement of the NIMS training via tabletop exercises and other activities at no cost to the SPS.

- We note that the SCEMA has also conducted community risk assessments documenting the need for the SPS to address region specific hazards including high winds and freezing conditions, wildfire, Hazardous materials incidents relating to rail lines and earthquake risk. We suggest the SCEMA as well as local fire service and law enforcement personnel be asked to help the SPS update emergency procedures on an annual basis.

- Of considerable importance, the SPD has thus far been able to train and equip an estimated 50% of officers with patrol rifles. While people who are not familiar with firearms tend to think of patrol rifles as being adopted because they are more powerful, the reality is that police service handguns are far less accurate than patrol rifles and have traditionally been carried by American law enforcement personnel because they are far more convenient and comfortable to carry, easier to protect while subduing suspects and less frightening to the public. While law enforcement personnel in many parts of Europe, Latin America, the Caribbean, Africa, the Middle East and many other regions have often carried openly carried submachine guns and patrol rifles for more than fifty years, this has not been and is still not a common sight in most parts of the United States. While we typically do not recommend our U.S. clients to have officers carry patrol rifles while deployed in day to day roles for a variety of tactical reasons, hundreds of major incidents in the United States have demonstrated how much less safe it is for officers and the public they protect when patrol rifles are not available for officers responding to active assailant events and terrorist attacks. Gunfights lasting as long as several hours have occurred because no officers with patrol rifles were available. Conversely, a number of active assailant events have been quickly ended when suspects surrendered (the Jonesboro Arkansas middle school shooting), killed themselves (the Aztec High School attack and Sandy Hook Elementary School attack) or were neutralized by responding officers equipped with patrol rifles (the San Bernardino attack).

3.4. The District has created an active, comprehensive, and diverse School Safety Task Force to augment the efforts of the district-level safety team and school-level safety teams.

We find this to be a very positive approach. In our experience, many districts only have either school-based teams or district-level teams. Our Executive Director Michael Dorn were invited to participate in one of the early meetings of the Task Force and noted many good observations and suggestions for safety and security at schools in the District. The formation and operation of the Task Force indicates...
significant efforts from the District, parents, and its community to enhance the safety and security at SPS.

3.5. The District has been steadily implementing a wide array of social and emotional support prevention programs using a Multi-Tiered System of Support (MTSS).

The MTSS includes but is not limited to:

- Trauma informed school approaches
- A restorative justice model
- Positive Behaviors Intervention and Supports (PBIS)
- Social and Emotional Learning approaches
- Culturally responsive concepts
- Suicide and self-harm prevention measures
- Tailored special education approaches
- Safe Schools training
- Health care plans for students
- Increased efforts to prevent harassment, intimidation, and bullying (HIB)
- A new and highly structured student threat assessment and management process
- Improved instructional practices
- The Gonzaga University AVID College Readiness System
- Self-care training for SPS employees has been offered when requested.
- Self-harm prevention training for all SPS mental health staff with periodic sessions for other SPS personnel as requested.
- The District is developing a professional development catalogue to more effectively communicate the types of training available for staff.
- The SPS has developed a training on LGBT Youth using the Safe Schools portal.
- Of considerable importance, the Student Services Department serves as a checkpoint for high-stakes topics such as bullying prevention, self-harm and student threat assessment. This is important because there is a wide array of training programs, speakers, trainers, training videos, web courses and other staff development options that are either not evidence-based or in some cases, use approaches that have been demonstrated to be harmful. We note later in the report that the SPS should consider having a single point of
contact within Student Services for each of the high-stakes topical areas with adequate budget and time allotted for these resident experts to attend regular training so they can remain current on available approaches, new research and new techniques.

While as with many prevention approaches for K12 schools, there have been differing views expressed by school safety experts for some of the above approaches, we find that this array of approaches that has been developed and implemented by the District is in alignment with many current leading practices for K12 schools. The District has done an excellent job of recognizing and acting to address the difference in needs the diverse and rapidly changing student population served by Spokane Public Schools. We also note that while physical security measures are important, school climate is among the most important ways to prevent violence. In our experience, a comprehensive array of support systems such as those listed above are not only extremely important protective components but offer protection that physical security measures do not provide. For example, metal detectors in schools do not provide any protection for a wide array of types of weapons and attack methods that have been used in some of the most deadly K12 attacks globally and the two most deadly U.S. K12 attacks to date (attacks). Student threat assessment and management and suicide prevention measures are of particular importance in this regard.

As the reader will see, the District has also used a combination of other protective measures to create a more comprehensive and reliable violence prevention strategy. This is important because a number of major acts of school violence have demonstrated that even robust multi-tiered support systems can fail to prevent school violence. Finally, we note that when these types of approaches are properly implemented, they also contribute much to the primary goals of K12 school systems. While our focus in discussing the benefits of these approaches has been on violence prevention due to the nature of our assessment, the primary benefits of most of these efforts is to increase the effectiveness of the District’s efforts to provide quality education for the communities’ children and youth. We find it to be especially beneficial when these important goals can be achieved while also reducing the risk of violence.

3.6. The District has thoughtfully implemented highly structured student threat assessment and management approach.

The District has student threat assessment tool adapted from Salem-Keiser Public Schools in Oregon to guide the threat assessment team on how to conduct an assessment. The Salem Keiser model has become very popular in Oregon and Washington states as well as in other regions in the U.S. The model is very highly structured and formalized and addresses many of the challenges encountered in the K12 setting. As the model is developed specifically for K12 schools, it addresses specific issues relating to regulations governing the rights of special needs students, privacy concerns for student records and other K12 specific realities that must be addressed for a practical approach to threat assessment that is compliant with statutes and regulations.

As with any viable approach to student threat assessment and management, the Salem Keiser model is focused on determining whether a student poses a threat rather than whether or not they
communicated a threat. This is a foundational principal of effective student threat assessment approaches. In addition, the model also includes approaches to help school officials more effectively manage a threat if an assessment determines that a student actually poses one. The use of this type of model is important from a standpoint of fairness and most importantly, effectively reducing the risk of some of the most serious forms of planned school violence. While the overall per capita rate of homicides on U.S. K12 school campuses appears to have dropped significantly over the past four decades, many school safety practitioners, school violence experts and government agencies that help address school violence have cautioned that the risk for active assailant events has increased due to a variety of factors including the “contagion effect” resulting in the extensive media coverage of these attacks in the past two decades.

The assessments are also conducted by school-level multi-disciplinary assessment teams, which typically include personnel from different disciplines such as school administrators, school mental health officials, and law enforcement or security personnel. Though this statement is not specific to this particular model, the multi-disciplinary student threat assessment and management approach has been used to successfully avert numerous school shootings and bombings. The concept of multi-disciplinary student threat assessment was first utilized by the Bibb County Georgia Public School System in Macon Georgia in the early 1990s. After the approach helped avert planned shootings and a planned bombing of a middle school, it has been advanced significantly by a series of federally funded research projects and lessons learned from the threat assessment teams of many school districts.

The fact that the District’s approach to student threat assessment and management is highly structured, multi-disciplinary and formally trained combined with the fact that the approach is not focused on any single weapon type and attack method make this an especially valuable enhancement when the wide array of types of extreme violence that have been carried out in U.S. schools as well as in schools in other countries is considered. The risk for acts of violence carried out by a student exists in any K12 school. For example, students in good standing who have undiagnosed mental health issues or who are improperly medicated can become dangerous because of these situations. We note that this is a high-stakes, high-liability area for schools. While there are opportunities for improvement in the current approach, the development and utilization of a structured student threat assessment tool and multi-disciplinary threat assessment teams indicate the District’s efforts and moving towards the right direction in student threat assessment and management.

3.7. While there are some opportunities for improvement in the current approach in student bullying prevention strategies as detailed later in this report, the District has a structured approach to handling bullying reports and allegations for school staff.

The District has established written procedures and guidelines for staff on how to handle and investigate students’ reports and allegations of bullying, harassment and intimidation. Bullying prevention efforts, training and other bullying prevention efforts must be cleared by Student Services personnel in order to prevent ineffective and harmful programs from being introduced at the school level. as mentioned
elsewhere in this report. Staff report considerable training of personnel on the prevention and investigation of bullying, harassment, and intimidation, we suggest the SPS periodically review and update approaches to this critical area.

3.8. The District conducts regular student surveys which contain questions relating to school safety and climate.

We find this to be a very important and valuable approach to improving, measuring, and documenting school safety efforts. We do note that the District reports that past surveys have not typically provided students with an opportunity to write in general comments to allow them to elaborate on various survey topics. This approach can also be beneficial. The District could consider other mechanisms to capture this type of feedback such as the use of student focus groups. There are also some excellent supportive software survey programs that can be used to provide even more detailed feedback from students, school employees and parents. The District reports exceptional success with a program called Thought Exchange which is specifically geared to K12 school districts and is now in use by many school systems. This has allowed the District to seek additional narrative feedback while continuing to use the current survey tools so “apples to apples” comparative data could still be collected. Safe Havens analysts have reviewed considerable data from the Thought Exchange discussions generated as a part of the SPS School Safety Task Force in reaching our findings and recommendations.

3.9. The District has Safe Routes to School program for elementary schools.

According to the description of the program on the District’s website, the purpose of the program is to promote safe walking and biking for elementary students in the District. This is a community program which receives funding from the Washington State Department of Transportation and support from SPS staff, community partners, and parents. As part of the program, students can volunteer to be Crossing Guards. These Crossing Guards are provided with standardized training based on national standards and state traffic laws. The Crossing Guards are also issued with and required to wear proper safety apparel. During the assessment, our analysts observed all student Crossing Guards consistently wearing high visibility vests. We see this Safe Routes to School program a very positive practice. In comparing and contrasting deaths from active shooter incidents, school violence of other types and school related traffic fatalities for his research, Safe Havens analyst Steve Satterly found that while 51 students and 13 school employees have been killed by active shooters in K12 schools between 1998 and 2008, 1,564 people were killed in school-related transportation incidents alone in the same time period.1

3.10. The Transportation Department reported many positive safety, security and emergency preparedness measures for the bus fleet.

Representatives from the Transportation Department reported the following positive safety, security and emergency preparedness measures:

• School bus personnel must comply with the SPS Employee Code of Conduct

• All SPS school buses are equipped with cameras. The standard camera array includes four cameras with audio on each bus including a camera in the bulkhead facing back.

• The Transportation personnel reported an excellent practice of the contract bus service spot-checking bus security cameras and documenting that this has been done. We do suggest the team consider retaining footage to further document the spot checks.

• All school buses have been equipped with two-way radios. While this is fairly standard in most public-school districts, we still encounter some situations where school buses are not equipped with these valuable emergency communications devices.

• The SPD computer aided dispatch system has been programmed to prompt dispatchers to notify the CROs whenever a call relating to a school bus is received.

• All drivers are now receiving training in student management techniques. The SPS has indicated that more training in this area be provided to drivers.

• Each bus also has written emergency protocols which bus evacuation procedures. We do suggest that drivers be provided with an all-hazards emergency plan which correlates with the school district plans.

• The bus fleet conducts three bus evacuation drills annually. These drills are only conducted with bus riders and a verbal review for special needs students. We suggest the District consider having staff as well as students who do not ride the bus participate in drills to prepare them for emergencies on a bus during field trips and other special activities.

• The SPD has done tactical school bus rescue training for its officers.

We did see some opportunities for improvement in the transportation area. For example, we were advised by Transportation personnel that they allow parents to view security camera footage of bus incidents involving their children but do not allow parents to copy the footage. We note that it is becoming increasingly uncommon for parents to be allowed to view this type of footage due to privacy concerns of other children in view on footage. We suggest the SPS consider having their legal counsel re-evaluate this practice. We were also advised that as is the case in many communities, recruiting and retaining high-quality personnel for school bus driver positions has been a challenge.

3.11. The Athletic Directors we interviewed with during the assessment reported some positive practices to enhance safety and security for SPS athletic events.

While there are still opportunities for improvement in the current approach to safety and security coverage for athletic events in the District, as detailed later in this report, we also noted some positive practices in the current approach. For example, the Directors reported the following positive practices:
• Lightning detectors are used for outdoor athletic events. The District also reports that it follows the National Federation of High School guidelines for lightning detection monitoring and stopping events.

• The District has an Emergency Action Plan (EAP) for the schools that have athletic events or training activities. While there are opportunities for improvement in this EAP, as detailed later in this report, the current EAP does contain some good content. For example, the EAP for Rogers High School includes emergency contact information and building access direction for individual athletic areas at the school, such as athletic training room, gymnasium, gymnastic room, etc. The plan also includes contact information for the school’s key athletic personnel (such as Athletic Director and Athletic Trainer), nearby hospital, etc. The plan also includes some suggestive action steps for staff during an emergency. District staff also report the positive practice of requiring coaches to sign to acknowledge an annual review of the EAP at an annual coaches meeting prior to the start of the school year.

• The District also reports another positive practice of requiring all teaching coaches to be certified in Cardio-pulmonary Resuscitation and Automatic External Defibrillator (CPR/AED) and to be recertified every two years. Athletic staff did express a significant concern that portable AEDs are not available at events unless the individual school purchases the units. This is of considerable concern as mentioned elsewhere in the report regarding the overall lack of AEDs in the SPS.

• The District also reports that full-time coaches are trained in a standardized concussion protocol program. Athletic staff did express a concern that part-time out of school district coaches have not had access to the Safe Schools Concussion training program. Staff indicated that they would discuss this with the Human Resources Department to try to resolve this issue.

3.12. The District has licensed a robust school safety web training program.

We learned that the District has licensed SafeSchools, a robust web-based school safety training platform. Having authored more than a dozen courses for the company, we are quite familiar with SafeSchools and have had good feedback on the company from many of our clients. The SafeSchools web-based training suite offers more than 100 courses with a wide range of training topics. This web-based training platform also allows schools to create and add their own customized courses. As detailed later in this report, we suggest the District make much wider use of this web-based training suite. This training resource will put the District in an excellent position to improve its staff training approach. As mentioned above, the District also makes use of the anonymous tip reporting system offered by SafeSchools to provide an anonymous reporting mechanism for students.
3.13. The District has a written Prevention-Mitigation Plan component.

Unlike many other public-school systems, SPS does have a Prevention-Mitigation plan component that reflects the numerous efforts in place in the District to prevent and mitigate risks to students, staff, and visitors. This is the first in a four-phase school safety plan and is a requisite to a comprehensive approach to school safety. Every public school system and private institution can benefit from the development a formal written prevention/mitigation plan to include strategies to reduce risks to students, school employees, and visitors. This plan section is designed for the prevention of instances where people may be harmed or property damaged through accidents and intentional acts. A Prevention-Mitigation plan offers many benefits, such as:

- Addresses particular potential hazards
- Creates a consistent foundation for prevention efforts
- Provides a solid framework and a system for integrating school safety efforts
- Allows school officials to readily demonstrate to parents, students, media and the general public that school safety issues have been properly addressed
- Reduces civil liability by documenting reasonable efforts made by school officials to reduce risk
- Helps to demonstrate to the community that the school is within standards of current best practices

Since the District has in place many more positive measures to improve the safety, security, and emergency preparedness at its schools, as detailed in this section of the report, the District should consider updating the current plan to reflect those numerous positive measures once this project is completed. This plan component should be updated annually as this can help identify further opportunities for improvement and spot any inefficient redundancies.

3.14. Though can be improved, as detailed later in this report, the current Significant Event Response Plan (SERP) does include action steps for some key job roles.

The SERP includes action steps for key school job roles (such as school staff and Principal/Site Manager) as well as district personnel (such as Safety, Risk Management & Transportation Director, Director of Communications and Community Relations, the Superintendent, etc.) consistently in all emergency protocols. While the plan can be improved to include more key job roles (such as school bus drivers, custodian staff, food service staff, etc.), the inclusion of other key job roles in the current SERP is a significant advancement in the District’s emergency planning compared to many other public school systems we have assessed.
An important planning concept to remember is that action steps in crisis situations vary for roles performed by different types of employees. The Superintendent, a school administrator, teacher, and food service personnel all have different responsibilities and action steps for the same crisis situation. Each person’s actions can be crucial, and their efforts must be integrated while achieving the role specific capacity to act to save human life and restore stability under fast paced conditions. Attempting to guide each of these highly diverse job functions with the same procedures in one document has proven to be highly ineffective in school crisis situations.

Providing employees with enhanced role-specific plan components will reduce the likelihood of poor performance under the extreme pressure of a major crisis situation. This type of approach to emergency preparedness will provide employees with a more realistic set of tools to help them make key decisions quickly under actual crisis conditions, thus help significantly improve the ability of the key decision makers to provide. This means that at the strategic level, the Superintendent and executive level personnel will be far less likely to miss critical action steps because the guidance they rely on is in a more detailed written format that is more closely integrated to the action steps being taken at the site level. While this approach will still require considerable staff time, the District will not be properly prepared for crisis situations unless this approach is taken, or far more time- and resource-intensive regular staff training approaches are incorporated to prepare employees of various categories to perform properly under stress.

3.15. SPS generally has good public address (PA) systems.

According to our interviews with school personnel during the assessment, all SPS schools have functioning internal and external PA systems. The PA systems in the areas prone to loud noises such as gymnasiums and cafeterias at most of schools in the District are also loud enough for staff and students to hear announcements when the areas have loud activities. All classrooms and offices are also equipped with a phone that allows teachers and staff to have a direct two-way communication with the office. Additionally, office staff at the majority of schools in the District can make school-wide announcements from more than one location.

In our experience, internal and external PA systems are one of the fastest and reliable emergency warning systems. While many districts are installing automated emergency warning systems which use pre-recorded messages, we are skeptical of the higher error rates we have seen when testing personnel on their ability to respond to scenarios by using these systems. While the automated systems do have benefits, they require significant training and practice to obtain a reasonable degree of reliability in contrast to public address systems and the use of plain-speak.

We suggest that our clients conduct an intercom audit at least once a year where staff are asked to report any issues with being able to hear and understand inside and external public address communications at times where their environment is prone to loud noises, such as gymnasiums, cafeterias at peak lunchtimes, kitchens, weight rooms and other loud environments.
3.16. All schools in the District have a buzzer access control with integrated camera and intercom system, such as Aiphone, for the main entry doors.

Buzzer access control systems that have integrated intercom/cameras, such as the Aiphone system, for front office staff to screen visitors before allowing entry into the schools can significantly improve access control for schools. With a buzzer access control with integrated camera and intercom system, office staff can:

- Speak to visitors via the intercom.
- View visitors remotely via camera.
- Attempt to stop or at least delay visitors from entering the building if a potential threat is perceived via a remote electronic locking system.

We suggest the District consider periodically checking the system to see if integrated cameras were installed in a way that not only a portion of the visitor’s face, but the person as a whole is also visible for front office staff. Our analysts noted at some schools that the camera integrated with the Aiphone did not show the face of a visitor very well. Some of our school clients add a camera at the main entry doors, so office staff can see a full view of the visitor. By viewing the entire person—face, apparel, held objects and demeanor—the front desk staff can make a more thorough evaluation of the person and, if needed, ask relevant questions about their state purpose for visiting the school before allowing them into the visitor lobby. This screening process can be very helpful in reducing the chances that a potentially dangerous person will be able to gain access to a school. Additionally, just as other security technologies, this is also . Therefore, the SPS should maintain .

Like other security technologies, these systems are still reliant upon school staff to not only properly screen visitors but on other staff not compromising access control by propping open doors, opening doors for unidentified visitors, etc. as well. During the assessment, our analysts noted that while office staff did ask visitors for their names and the purpose of the visit, it seemed that those are all the questions office staff asked visitors. Proper screening of visitors may require more interaction with visitors than only a few questions regarding the visitors’ names and purposes of the visits. Staff should be trained to be particularly alert for signs that a potential visitor is extremely angry, intoxicated, or incoherent/unstable. While many people who are angry, intoxicated or who have emotional difficulties are not dangerous, in our experience, many attackers exhibit one or more of these behaviors prior to attacking school employees or students. We suggest that employees be trained to slow down the process and if needed ask additional questions if they detect these types of behaviors. We have seen a number of attacks where these indicators were observed and ignored by staff who were afraid of offending someone. While live training is preferred, the District could consider the use of a web-delivered training program.
Staff should be aware that not admitting a visitor immediately is not the same thing as permanently barring them from a school. We do point out that while mental health experts caution that most people who are mentally ill are not dangerous, it is generally not possible to determine whether a mentally ill visitor is dangerously mentally ill in a brief conversation absent blatant physical actions or statements regarding violence. Staff should be empowered and supported in not admitting a visitor if they feel that additional screening is needed. This may involve delaying admission until an administrator can provide assistance and/or additional questioning of a potential visitor. In our experience, dangerous individuals often exhibit subtle cues that can be detected by alert school staff. A number of violent attacks in schools have been averted because staff did not ignore these types of cues. Staff should also be empowered to implement a lockdown and call for police assistance if they are concerned that someone seeking admission to the school or support facility may be dangerous.

We note that the District office building does not have this buzzer access control system. The District should consider this, especially since the District does not routinely have a staff member to greet visitors at the main entrance.

3.17. The District reports and excellent capability for facilities personnel to be able to [RCW 42.56.420/Safe Schools Planning].

While the ability to [RCW 42.56.420/Safe Schools Planning] is important, the ability of school systems to be able to [RCW 42.56.420/Safe Schools Planning] can be incredibly important if an [RCW 42.56.420/Safe Schools Planning] occurs in the community. These types of incidents can result from [RCW 42.56.420/Safe Schools Planning] as well as due to individuals or groups that want to harm others [RCW 42.56.420/Safe Schools Planning].

In addition to having the [RCW 42.56.420/Safe Schools Planning], appropriate staff must be trained on written emergency procedures and appropriate drills and tabletop exercises should be conducted periodically to test how this type of danger is rapidly communicated and the appropriate action steps implemented once notification is made. Additionally, just as other [RCW 42.56.420/Safe Schools Planning], therefore, the SPS should maintain protection measures relating to [RCW 42.56.420/Safe Schools Planning].

3.18. All schools in the District have proximity card access readers for exterior doors to enhance access control, and during the assessment, our analysts observed the exterior doors at most of SPS schools were secured during school hours.

The District is using the [RCW 42.56.420/Safe Schools Planning] a robust suite of high-performance software that allows customers to design and operate any number of doors where card access is required. If used properly (e.g., staff and students do not prop doors open or open the doors for strangers, etc.), the utilization of proximity card readers can help enhance access control.
Additionally, during the assessment, our analysts observed that at 84 percent of SPS schools were . Our analysts also noted that the few schools that had classes. For those schools, we suggest the District consider the feasibility of using to to use to . This approach will allow the schools to keep all classes. This will help improve . While this approach is dependent on , it can offer an enhancement of security that is above .

Additionally, if or when funding becomes available, and if not have done so, the District may also wish to consider adding other technologies such as door position sensors (DPSs), which will alert when a door is unlatched (for example, when an exterior door does not close fully when someone exits), and request to exit sensors (REXs), which will signal when a door is opened from the inside, to the current proximity card access control system to further improve access control. When a door opens without permission, the REXs will send an alert to the integrated access control system, which will then send a notification to the school personnel assigned to receive those types of notification. When a door has been propped open for too long, a similar notification process can also be made. We find in many schools where door propping is a chronic problem, an alarm sounder could be added to the door. For situations where special needs or younger students evading and leaving the school have been problematic, there are systems that create a short delay combined with an audible alarm if someone tries to open an exterior door that has been designated as an emergency only exit. For example, as can be seen in many airports, doors can often be equipped with panic hardware that works in this manner. This option should be carefully vetted with fire code enforcement personnel before being installed. We also note that this type of equipment is typically fairly expensive in contrast to typical emergency egress hardware.

Exterior access control is extremely important for physical security in schools. This is particularly true for SPS as our interviews with school administrators during the assessment showed that 51 percent of schools in the District have commercial establishments nearby (e.g., banks, liquor stores, pawn shops, houses with regular gang and/or illicit drug activities, etc.) that could pose an increased risk to the schools and that 59 percent of the schools had experienced problems with trespassers or intruders on campus.

The reader should keep in mind that an aggressor needs only a single open door to gain access to and victimize students and/or staff. Such incidents have already taken place in schools around the nation with fatal consequences. We have spoken to many educators who recalled tragic personal stories of staff and students being abducted, seriously injured, and killed because doors have been left unsecured.
Here are three examples of serious security incidents at schools that were the result of exterior doors being left unsecured:

- A dangerously mentally ill man who was a school teacher from another community entered an unlocked side door at an elementary school in Pennsylvania and brutally attacked a group of kindergarten students with a machete and attacked the school’s principal when she tried to stop the attack.²

- A student attacker entered Arapahoe High School in Colorado via an unsecured exterior door to conduct his planned attack. He was able to kill one student.³

- A dangerously mentally ill man entered an unlocked side door in a Georgia elementary school and struck a student in the head with a metal hammer, causing permanent brain damage.⁴

- A man entered a Vermont elementary school through an unlocked exterior door and shot two teachers.⁵

3.19. **All SPS schools generally have a viable surveillance camera system.**

While the surveillance camera system at all SPS schools can be expanded to cover additional areas if there is funding available, all schools generally have a viable camera system. All schools have interior and exterior cameras, and the cameras are IP (Internet Protocol) cameras, which have better image quality and work more efficiently than traditional analog cameras. While surveillance cameras have limitations, when they are used properly, they can provide exceptional benefits in improving a school’s prevention approaches. To make the best use of surveillance cameras, we advise our clients to develop effective student supervision approaches, capture these being properly utilized by staff in brief video segments captured by the school’s security camera footage and then use this footage as a training tool to visually demonstrate to staff how they are supposed to properly supervise students for specific situations such as student supervision during student arrival or dismissal. By documenting that individual staff have been shown these 2-3-minute videos, the school can create increased compliance with its developed procedures, document proper training of staff, and clarify what the school’s procedures are should a safety incident occur in spite of positive and effective safety measures.

We also suggest that school officials periodically spot check and document staff supervision efforts. After working out appropriate procedures and documenting their proper application with the training video footage described, school leaders can periodically grab short 2-3-minute segments of staff who are tasked with supervision duties to document whether or not staff are performing as instructed. If staff are performing as expected, the video footage should be saved, and the employees commended.


via e-mail to help document the activity. If on occasion, the footage shows that one or more staff members are not following safety guidelines, appropriate actions to redirect the employee should be documented, the footage saved, and they should be spot checked at a later date to document that they have been effectively re-directed. This approach is one of the most inexpensive and time-efficient means to obtain high levels of performance of staff but saving both types of documentation demonstrates a high degree of integrity for the school’s safety and security approach. Saving both types of documentation provides evidence of integrity and fidelity of the school’s student supervision approaches.

It should be noted that school staff should be clearly cautioned that while security cameras can be an invaluable component of the school’s security strategy, cameras should never be relied upon to supervise students or to deter bad actors. They should also be advised that security cameras can be used by attorneys to document negligence on the part of individual staff. Conversely staff should be comforted by the fact that the school’s security camera system can prove to be invaluable in documenting appropriate staff safety efforts to help protect them in the event a safety incident occurs while they are supervising students.

Care should be taken not to use signage or language in school documents that suggests that cameras are continually monitored. We suggest that schools use language that do not imply monitoring of cameras such as “security cameras are in use” or “cameras are used for investigative and quality control purposes.”

If or when funding becomes available, we suggest the District consider adding cameras to the areas that can benefit from cameras but currently do not have them. The following are our generally recommended camera placements.

### Surveillance Camera Placement (Immediate Priority Areas)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elementary School</th>
<th>Middle School</th>
<th>High School</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RCW 42.56.420/Safe Schools Planning — Content Redacted Here, If Disclosed, Would Identify Specific Safety Vulnerabilities</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### Surveillance Camera Placement (High Priority Areas)

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<tr>
<th>Elementary School</th>
<th>Middle School</th>
<th>High School</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RCW 42.56.420/Safe Schools Planning — Content Redacted Here, If Disclosed, Would Identify Specific Safety Vulnerabilities</td>
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</tbody>
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### Surveillance Camera Placement (Long-Range Areas)

<table>
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<th>Elementary School</th>
<th>Middle School</th>
<th>High School</th>
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RCW 42.56.420/Safe Schools Planning -- Content Redacted Here, If Disclosed, Would Identify Specific Safety Vulnerabilities
We should note that the recommended surveillance camera placements in this table, even for the “long-range areas,” is not at the high end of what some of our public-school districts have in place. For example, the

than we suggest in this section. We took this approach because our analysts find that there are other, more impactful opportunities for improvement to prioritize over adding camera coverage beyond what is suggested at this time.

We should note that there can be other areas where individual schools could benefit from additional cameras due to unique situations, design features, and academic programs. We suggest that the CROs who are trained in Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED), IT personnel, facilities personnel and building administrators be consulted before adding cameras. We note that a number of the CROs have advanced training in CPTED, are familiar with specific problem areas and how important camera placement in relation to trees that will grow to eventually block camera views. As with CROs, building administrators are typically familiar with difficult to supervise areas and areas where interpersonal conflict most often occurs. IT personnel should be involved not only for technical reasons, but because of the critical concerns relating to cyber-attacks on cameras.

We also suggest that student feedback using the techniques Safe Havens Executive Director Michael Dorn trained the District’s CROs in August 2018 be solicited. As explained during the training, group activities with a cross section of high and middle school student representatives of the diversity of each school has helped school administrators achieve significant reductions in disciplinary infractions, vandalism, gang activity, bullying and other problematic behaviors. For example, the Clark County Nevada School District (CCSD) reported a 50% reduction in these types of behaviors using the Clark County Metropolitan Police Department’s GIS crime mapping system with students trained to mark areas in their schools by type of behaviors and the times they had typically observed them. Using the data provided by students, CCSD administrators increased student supervision in the “hotspots” identified by students. In some cases, security cameras were added to help achieve a dramatic reduction in reported incidents, self-reported incidents measured by anonymous student surveys. As a result, the CCSD was able to increase safety while decreasing the number of student who were arrested, expelled, assigned to alternative schools and assigned to out-of-school suspensions.

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We also suggest the District consider using video surveillance systems in schools. They can be used as an added layer of security. With the increasing number of incidents where schools have been targeted by criminals, they can also be used as a deterrent. For example, if a threat is detected, police can be notified immediately.

As cameras are upgraded over time, the District may also wish to consider the use of video and audio analytic software to help make the video surveillance system more efficient and reduce the workload on security and management staff. When video analytic software is set to link with alert notification systems, it will send alerts when the software detects something that meets its search criteria. Video analytics software for security cameras can be installed on cameras, on NVRs, or as third-party software. Video analytics can be used for fence climbing, loitering in stairwells and other out of the way and difficult to supervise areas, to detect individuals or groups of people running to or away from situations, after-hours motion detection, and license plate reading, loitering behaviors, etc. While our clients typically report that facial recognition analytics available to schools still have reliability issues, the ability of camera analytics programs to detect specific people who may pose a danger such as a past or current domestic partner who has threatened to kill a staff member or student. While there has been considerable inaccurate media coverage about these systems being used to “profile” specific people or groups of people based on ethnicity or other factors, these analytics are actually designed to flag specific human behaviors such as climbing a fence, loitering in a hidden area for a specific time frame etc. These systems require personnel to monitor them to obtain full benefit from them but significantly help achieve the full value of security video by making IP camera systems more intelligent.

As with any other type of security camera system, proper policy and oversight can reduce the chances that personnel who have access to use to these systems will be abuse their access to the systems. In fact, proper fidelity testing by pulling security camera footage can instead help to reduce the chances that personnel will intentionally or unintentionally rely on bias to perform security duties. For example, review of security camera footage of visitor management processes can help determine whether or not staff are more thoroughly screening individuals of particular ethnicities than other visitors.

As detailed later, we also suggest that our clients create an emergency response plan. Many of our clients are reporting increasing and significant concerns relating not only to school safety but also to mental health issues. For example, districts have reported an increase in incidents involving mental health issues.

For example, someone recently attempted to enter a school...
In another case, an attack being thwarted because the attacker did not expect to hear the sounds of an attack from the hallway. Additionally, school security and administrative personnel can enter this type of restroom when in fact, protection.

While Safe Havens does not perform and did not perform as part of this assessment, we do have a level of familiarity with these types of risks and the need for districts to develop a systemic way to address them. While feedback from District personnel was that most bathrooms with open doorways by design or practice to increase natural surveillance.

### 3.20. The results of our interviews with school administrators during the assessment indicate that 43 percent of SPS schools have.

The use of open doorway designs or practices for student bathrooms can be safer than the alternative practice of locking student restrooms. While there are some situations where restrooms should be locked when not in use (e.g., restrooms in out of the way areas which are used during athletic events), our experience has been that open entryways can improve safety. Bathrooms with open doorways can have a deterrent effect because an aggressor knows that people can hear the sounds of an attack from the hallway. Additionally, school security and administrative personnel can enter this type of restroom without the sounds of a door being opened announcing their entrance.

### 3.21. During the assessment, our analysts noted that 88 percent of SPS schools have student bathrooms with open doorways by design or practice to increase natural surveillance.

The use of open doorway designs or practices for student bathrooms can be safer than the alternative practice of locking student restrooms. While there are some situations where restrooms should be locked when not in use (e.g., restrooms in out of the way areas which are used during athletic events), our experience has been that open entryways can improve safety. Bathrooms with open doorways can have a deterrent effect because an aggressor knows that people can hear the sounds of an attack from the hallway. Additionally, school security and administrative personnel can enter this type of restroom without the sounds of a door being opened announcing their entrance.
3.22. All but one of the stairwell doors noted at SPS schools have magnetic holdback devices so they can be propped open to increase natural surveillance for the stairwell areas while still meet fire code.

Magnetic holdback devices keep fire doors in the open position but will release the doors, so they will close automatically if the fire alarm is activated. The use of magnetic holdback devices allows for hallway, corridor, and stairwell doors to be kept open to increase natural surveillance while still in compliance with fire codes. This approach provides multiple safety and security benefits, including but not limited to:

- Increasing the students and staff’s ability to hear indications of a safety situation in other parts of the school. For example, if an unsupervised child were to fall and hurt themselves and cry for help, open hallway and/or stairwell doors increase the likelihood that other students and staff could rapidly detect and react to the situation. This can be of critical importance in an active assailant event as well as it can allow staff and students throughout the building to hear the sounds of gunfire or breaking glass more clearly and in distant parts of the school.

- Increasing natural surveillance for the stairwells and reducing the chances that stairwells become locations for illicit and unwanted behaviors such as bullying, drug use, and sexual assaults ranging from sexual touching to rape.

- Reducing the transmission of germs and the spread of colds and other illnesses as students and staff move through the school each day because the number of doors touched is reduced.

- Perhaps most importantly, this practice can improve student supervision on a daily basis because staff can see and hear students in areas where these doors are in use.

When they can be utilized, we find magnetic holdback devices on doors to be extremely beneficial in enhancing safety, security, and emergency preparedness. However, it is sometimes not practical to use this type of devices on some stairwell doors or hallway fire doors. For example, in some instances, a buildings heating and air system will be overtaxed if the stairwell doors are kept open.

3.23. at most of the assessed schools have.

During the assessment, our analysts noted that at 88 percent of schools in the District have staff and students who are areas. An  staff and students in the In fact, there has been at least one such attack learning. These types of attack have become more common in recent years firearms or edged weapons
with a  While are generally not an adequate , we have seen instances where . When carefully sited , additional protection can be achieved. For more reliable protection, can be considered. A good resource for design options for is the RCW 42.56.420/Safe Schools Planning – Content Redacted Here, If Disclosed, Would Identify Specific Safety Vulnerabilities.

3.24. All of SPS schools were generally clean and well-maintained, fostering an inviting, warm, and caring school environment.

All of the assessed school buildings were generally clean and well maintained. The school floors were noticeably clean and free of excessive debris. The excellent work of the facilities personnel (such as custodial and maintenance staff) is an important contribution to school safety, security, climate and culture. Research including that relating to the “broken windows theory” demonstrates that maintaining clean grounds and facilities serves to help deter criminal activity. This is because trash on the floor and grounds portrays a discouraging message from the school that care and consideration of property are not a priority. As a result, this contributes to staff and student perceptions of the campus.

When combined with the other efforts of school staff to create a warm, caring and connected environment, this attention to cleanliness forms a strong and important foundation for a safer school. Though many people may take the relevancy of building maintenance and its aesthetics for granted, we find that many of our low-performing school clients have fundamental problems in these areas. In fact, when working with schools that have chronic security issues, high dropout rates, and low test scores, we often see considerable chronic decline in the cleanliness of buildings and grounds along with other problems that appear to have a causal effect. The custodial staff and other employees in the SPS that create this positive achievement are to be commended for their part in making the District’s schools safer. These efforts have an impact on situations ranging from bullying to serious crime.
4. Key Opportunities for Improvement in Emergency Management Plans, Training, and Drill Programs

This section is our review of the following documents submitted by the District for this project:

- Spokane Public Schools District Significant Event Plan (DSEP) (dated September 14, 2018)
- Significant Event Response Plan (SERP) (dated August 2018)

Generally, while these two emergency plan documents do have some very good content, we note significant opportunities for improvement in some critical content, missing emergency protocols and formatting. In reviewing the documents, we see that the current procedures could prove to be inadequate in the event of a major catastrophic event. The procedures could even prove to be unreliable during challenging but lower level crisis situations such as an angry parent or intruder threatening staff with a knife. As detailed later, our emergency preparedness evaluation using 631 video and audio school crisis scenarios with 108 school employees, including staff and administrators, at all schools in the District during the assessment showed that the participants missed 1,000 out of 2,273 recommended critical action steps that should have been implemented during the first 30 seconds for these scenarios. On average, the participants missed 1.58 critical action steps per crisis scenario, completing 44 percent of recommended action steps.

The following are the inadequacies of the District’s emergency management planning.

4.1. It appears that the DSEP and SERP submitted for review in this project are not congruent with each other.

It is not clear how these two documents are related to each other. There is no mention of the SERP in the DSEP, and vice versa. While the “District Communications Plan” and the “SPS Emergency Guidelines” are referred to as “Response Resources” for school personnel to use throughout the SERP, it is unclear if these resources are the same as the “Spokane Public Schools Emergency Communications Plan” and the “Incident Action Plan (IAP) Guidelines” included in the DSEP. Even if those resources are included in the DSEP, it is unclear how some key school personnel referred in the SERP, such as Principal/Site Manager and school staff, can get access to those resources as it does not appear they are issued with the DSEP – these school personnel are not included in the DSEP plan holder list.

Additionally, while the position “Associate Superintendent” is used throughout the DSEP, this position is not used in the SERP, but the position “Asst. Superintendent” (short for “Assistant Superintendent”) is used instead.

Options for Consideration: The District should consider revising the DSEP and SERP to address the concerns above.
The DSEP and SERP, as well as other related documents, should be clearly specified how they are related to each other, when staff should use which document, etc. to avoid confusion, particularly during the extreme stress of an emergency. To be effective and useful documents, it is necessary the DSEP and SERP be clarified on their purposes, how and when to use them, etc.

4.2. While the current DSEP has some good information, there are significant opportunities for improvement in the document.

The DSEP submitted for review has viable information. For example, the document includes a Prevention-Mitigation Plan component. As detailed in Section 3 above, this plan component contains a lot of good information. However, the document has significant room for improvement in both the content and format. For example:

- It is unclear on when the plan holders of the DSEP should use the document. The document is a lengthy document with a great deal of information related to various topics such as event management, prevention and mitigation efforts, checklists for various key district job roles such as the Superintendent, Associate Superintendent, Legal Counsel, Director of Human Resources, Director of Facilities Maintenance, etc., and local public safety partners (i.e., fire and police departments). At the same time, it is not clear on what each of these plan holders is supposed to use the document for, when they should use the document, if they are supposed to review and study the entire document or only the sections that are relevant to them, etc. For example, section “2.6 DSET Incident Action Plan (IAP) Guide” includes information about what an IAP is, what should be included in an IAP, and steps in the planning process to develop an IAP. It is unclear if the information is intended for use by all plan holders, such as Superintendent, Legal Counsel, Director of Human Resources, Director of Campus Safety, Director of Student Services, etc. or only the specific personnel who are responsible for developing emergency plans for the District. We typically suggest that our clients separate all emergency plan content from other safety planning information that is not specific to emergency preparedness. In our experience, combining the various plan components found in the DSEP creates a situation where the reader is often overwhelmed by the mass of information. When this occurs, school staff are typically not familiar with the content in the plan.

- While the checklists for the District Significant Event Team (DSET) include the list of action steps for “Immediate,” “Intermediate,” and “Extended,” there is no explanation on what each of these terms means and when staff are supposed to follow the action steps in each list.

- It is unclear if the “Significant Event Management Checklists” under Section 2 (“Significant Event Management”) is the same or different with the “Significant Event Checklists” under Section 3 (“Hazard, Department, and Facility-Specific Response Plans”) as the latter is not included in the document but in the Table of Content (TOC) only.
• There seem to be missing sections in the DSEP – there are some sections listed in the TOC but not included in the document. For example, the sub-section “Significant Event Checklists” under Section 3, as well as sub-sections “Preparedness Plan” and “SPS Ready Community Education & Training Program” under Section 6 are listed in the TOC but are not included in the document. As another example, the document stated that there are eight sections (page 3 of “Section 1 – Main Plan”), but there are only 7 sections listed in the TOC and only 6 sections included in the document. The entire Section 4 “Event-Specific Protocols” on page 9 of Section 3) has no content except two sentences briefly describing what Section 4 is about.

• The document mentions the “SPS Emergency, Disaster & Crisis Response Plan (aka “Red Book”)” as well as “SPS emergency guidelines” (page 11 of Section 2). However, it is unclear as to the differences between these two documents, who should be issued with the documents, as well as when staff should use which documents. These documents are not submitted for review in this project, so we cannot review their content.

• It appears that the DSEP is intended for online use only because the TOC includes hyperlinks to certain sections in the document but not page numbers for those sections. Hyperlinks only work on a computer, not on a hard copy version. As another example, the document includes a hyperlink to “5.2 Threat Assessment Protocol” but the hard copy version submitted for review does not include this 5.2 section. Since the DSEP is a massive document, with several hundred pages, with the current format of the TOC, it is quite challenging to navigate any section in this document from a hard copy. It would be even much more challenging to navigate the document under the stress of an emergency. At the same time, the document is supposed to be “‘active’ resources; that is, they are designed to be actively utilized while responding to the event” (page 3 of “Section 1 – Main Plan”).

• Each of the main Sections of the document is started with number one, making it extremely difficult to locate a certain Section or sub-sections of a certain Section as one will need to locate the Section by flipping through the thick document to find the end of the preceding Section.

• There is a mismatch between the items listed in the TOC and the sections actually included in the DSEP document. For example, the included in the document is.

Options for Consideration: The District should consider improving the DSEP to address the concerns above.

To make the current DSEP a viable document, the District should consider revising it to address the issues related to the content and format of the document as specified above.
4.3. While the current SERP has many important emergency protocols, there are still opportunities for improvement in some protocols as well as opportunities to add new protocols.

In reviewing the SERP, we see that the document contains a variety of important and helpful protocols. For example, the SERP includes important protocols such as full lockdown, modified lockdown, medical emergency, missing student, active shooter, bomb threat, earthquake, explosion, etc. At the same time, many of the protocols in the current plan should be improved to properly and effectively prepare SPS staff for a wide range of emergency situations. For example:

- The ______ protocol is very weak and needs significant improvement. For example:
  - The protocol as the action steps to guide themselves and other students and staff (such as ______, etc.) – it appears that it is assumed that the ______ and is ______.
  - The protocol also instructs school staff to ______, and is ______.
  - The protocol instructs school staff to ______. This can be dangerous as staff taking ______ and the entire building. For example, as many attacks, building occupants and staff and students who are ______ attack.
  - The protocol instructs school staff to ______. While the staff and students, the reality is that there has ______. While the attacker in the school ______. The highly inaccurate social media and media discussions combined with the use of emotive descriptions and wildly inflated data on ______.

Washington Statute RCW 42.56.420.

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The protocols, both for high school students and teachers who are in the school, when it is not open, or after the school is closed, etc. Without clearly instruction, under these circumstances, staff may not be prepared to do so.

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- The school protocols, both for high school students and teachers who are in the school, when it is not open, or after the school is closed, etc. Without clearly instruction, under these circumstances, staff may not be prepared to do so.
There is no clear instruction on when staff should use which of the protocols. Without clear instruction, staff may not be able to apply the protocols properly or effectively.

While the protocol does instruct school staff to use the protocols, there is no instruction on how to use these protocols. There is no instruction on when staff should use which of the protocols. Conversely, this level of school crisis events. For example, as proven in the , a school incident review of this had not been properly trained and empowered to react worse. An important planning concept to remember is that the first employee to encounter a life or death crisis situation must be prepared to immediately and independently implement appropriate critical action steps. Deaths have occurred at schools around the nation when school staff members did not know how to react to various crisis situations without asking for help from an administrator. Empowerment of employees to implement life-saving protective actions is an extremely important point. We urge our clients to think in terms of seconds rather than minutes for the communication and implementation of life-saving emergency protective actions.

There is a list of “Response Resources” in each protocol, but these resources are not included in the SERP. It is unclear on how and where school staff and administrators can get access to these resources or when staff should use these resources (i.e., during drills or during the incident, etc.).

In addition, the current emergency preparedness plan does not include some critical and common emergency protocols such as:

- The protocol: While the plan is not included in the nor submitted for review in this project. An is very important as it helps
• **protocol**: This simple but valuable protocol allows a school to instruct students, staff, and visitors to rapidly leave a classroom, lunchroom, auditorium, gymnasium, or office area and move to a safer area when it is appropriate to clear a room but would not be appropriate to direct them to evacuate the school. We suggest that both staff and students be trained on the written protocol and that schools be required to conduct room clear drills (which can be done for individual areas without drilling the entire building from time to time).

• **Room Clear protocol**: While not extremely common events, these types of situations do occur with enough regularity to make it practical to address them in the plan. For example, children. We suggest the District address this concern in the emergency plan.

• **Death on campus protocol**: While many people tend to think of deaths from school shootings, most deaths on K12 campuses occur from other causes such as medical emergencies and accidents. The victims in these cases are often transported to a hospital before the actual death occurs. Naturally, these are difficult and impactful case. Unfortunately, we have seen many instances where school officials have made significant mistakes in these situations because they had not planned in advance for these types of events.

In addition, the current plan contains verbiage that could pose challenges in litigation. The words such as “ensure” and “all” are absolute terms that make statements very hard, if not impossible, for schools and school districts to prove. These types of language can at times commit school officials to a standard of care that is not realistic.
Options for Consideration: The District should consider revising the current emergency preparedness plan to address the concerns identified above.

The District should consider revising the protocols in the current emergency plans to make it clear to staff that they are empowered and expected to take immediate steps to protect themselves and students by starting to lockdown their work area and initiate the lockdown for the entire school building if they are able to, or to notify the office so the rest of the building can be secured. Empowerment of employees to implement life-saving protective actions is an extremely important point that is backed up by research into crisis decision-making.

It is unrealistic to base school crisis plans on the concept that the building administrator will immediately know that a crisis exists and will direct the actions of all school employees. In reality, it is more common for a delay of one to several minutes to occur before a building administrator is aware of a crisis. Staff were often not fully prepared through plan components, training, drill and exercise processes to know what action steps to implement, including the key action step of quickly initiating emergency protocols while notifying the front office. The reader should understand the tremendous negative effects of life and death stress on decision making that caused the tragic incident. Though this tragic incident is our forensic work today. As there are no absolutes when it comes to school emergency preparedness, schools can be more effective if the focus is increasing the probability that proper decisions will be made.

4.4. It appears the District does not have a plan. The documents submitted for review in this project do not include a plan for SPS. A plan outlines what to do provides preventive measures to help reduce the risk of occurrence and also provides information on what to do if an accident or event occurs. The plan also helps reduce the risk of accidental and intentional violence as well as addresses the issues of student population.

Options for Consideration: The District should consider developing a plan.

The District should consider the development of a plan that contains information specific to the needs of the student population, that helps prevent accidental and intentional violence as well as addresses the issues of student population, etc. The United States Department of Education, the American School Health Association, etc. provide planning resources as well as samples of models of their school planning, graphics, and other.
4.5. It appears the District does not have a viable mental health recovery plan.

While the SPS contends that there is an adequate mental health recovery plan and a robust recovery team capability, the documents we were provided for review and the interviews we conducted do not support the existence of the level of capabilities in this area we suggest for our clients. While there is a section listed in the TOC of the DSEP, this section, as well as many other sections listed in the TOC, were missing from the document. Student Services personnel we interviewed expressed concern about the lack of this plan. They were also very receptive to our suggestions that they be tasked by the SPS to select a model and have members of their staff attended formal training in a recognized model. As with other areas that are normally tasked to school mental health personnel, the SPS should consider the impact this activity will have on available staff time. A mental health recovery plan is designed to provide recovery and crisis team members with an effective method to help students and staff address and recover from the stress and emotional disruption experienced after a crisis. Most students and staff do recover with the support and assistance of caring educators and mental health professionals. However, death in the form of suicide and drug overdose (due to increase substance abuse typically following a crisis event) can result from a failure to properly address mental health recovery issues. Multiple deaths of this type have occurred in the wake of at least one school crisis event. Therefore, a mental health recovery plan can play a significant role in violence prevention efforts.

Options for Consideration: The District should consider developing a robust mental health recovery plan.

A proper mental health recovery plan should assist a school/school district accomplish the following objectives:

- Prepare crisis team members to respond effectively in a crisis situation.
- Manage the crisis recovery activities in an organized and effective manner.
- Limit the emotional impact of any crisis situation.

A recovery plan should be tailored to provide an effective method that can be used by school/school district recovery and crisis team members to control the activities associated with the crisis situation in a...
pro-active manner and to lessen the potential negative impact with the media and the community at large. The plan should include:

- Clearly identified roles and responsibilities of the mental health crisis response team
- Procedures and checklists that will be used to manage and control the situation following an emergency or crisis occurrence
- Crisis intervention activities and forms that will be used to document activities
- A debriefing model used by the district (i.e. PREPARE, NOVA, CISM, etc.)

In any event, the mental health recovery plan is one element of developing a strategy. The plan’s success depends upon:

- Implementation of the recommendations made by a group of local experts to include community mental health officials, emergency management personnel and public health representatives.
- A training program for those directly involved in the execution of the plan.
- An education and awareness program to ensure district-wide understanding and adoption of the plan, covering internal and external stakeholders, i.e. employees, students, and parents. This awareness should extend to parents and other stakeholders upon whom the school depends or has influence in both normal and crisis operations.

Finally, the District’s plan should be updated annually, exercised and should be readily available to authorized personnel.

4.6. It appears the District does not have a [Redacted] (Redacted) that outlines how event, etc. would be handled. A [Redacted] outlines measures for how a school district will respond to an incident happen that causes damage to school property (Redacted), information (Redacted), etc. We were not provided with any document related to this type of plan for review.

Options for Consideration: The District should consider developing a [Redacted] for its schools and support facilities.

Areas that should be covered in a [Redacted] include:
4.7. **We are concerned that are not under control of staff but are schools.**

While is rather popular among public and non-public schools around the nation, it should be reconsidered. There have been at least sophisticated attacks had . Fortunately, in each case, the attack . We also note that the attacker in the as well as the highest rate of mortality . In this case, the attack. We are concerned that a bad actor could a crisis event.

**Options for Consideration:** The District should consider re-evaluating the benefits as well as potential pitfalls of the current approach in .

While school staff emergency, this approach. We suggest the District consider re-evaluating the.

4.8. **There are opportunities for improvement in the drill and exercise programs at the assessed schools.**

To more effectively measure how well the District has prepared employees to make life and death decisions independently, we conducted a scenario-based evaluation process developed by Safe Havens with sample staff members at each assessed school. In this process, each of the participants, in a private setting, was shown a three-minute video clip that explains the process and then presented with a series of video and audio school crisis scenario simulations. For each scenario, the participant was
asked to articulate the actions they would initiate for the situation in the first thirty seconds of the simulated crisis. We focus on the responses during the first thirty seconds because most critical action steps, such as initiating a lockdown, must often be started within this period to protect students and staff from life-threatening danger. While an employee might eventually think of action steps that are omitted in the first thirty seconds, the value of those actions will be lessened as time passes and the window of opportunity to prevent serious injury and death closes. We construct the crisis simulation process in this way to mimic the real-life crisis stress and time constraints that staff members would experience in an actual crisis. The responded action steps were recorded and compared to some key actions that should be considered for each scenario. By conducting these scenario simulations with a representative sample of employees and analyzing their responses, we can more effectively gauge how well the personnel are likely to perform under the first critical moments of a crisis situation.

Our emergency preparedness evaluation used 35 video and audio school crisis scenarios with 6 staff members from the three assessed schools. The results revealed that staff members missed 39 critical action steps out of 113 recommended critical action steps that should have been implemented for these scenarios. These action steps include implementing a lockdown, calling 911, or an SRO, notifying the front office of a crisis, etc. On average, school staff missed 1.11 critical action steps per crisis scenario, completing 65.5 percent of recommended action steps for the selected scenarios. As a specific example, school staff missed the opportunity to:

- 21 percent of the time when
- 68 percent of the time when
- 53 percent of the time when
- 34 percent of the time when it would be appropriate

These evaluation results indicate that school staff at the assessed schools were very not properly prepared to make appropriate as well as other protective actions. The scenarios selected in our evaluation represent typical school crises of a moderate difficulty level as well as very difficult and statistically rare event such hostage situation and active assailant. Though these real-time simulations are challenging for school staff, they are far less stressful than actual crisis events where lives are at risk. For this reason, we note that actual performance of employees under life-threatening conditions can be lower than what we observed in the simulations. Significant research in the field of human performance under stress reveals that the performance of these employees would likely be even less effective under actual field conditions.7 Our interviews with school staff also show that all of the assessed schools can improve in the area of drills and/or exercises. While all schools have conducted fire drills and lockdown drills, most of the schools have not conducted a wide variety of drills to create a

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sense of empowerment in decision-making for school staff. For example, 96 percent of the schools have not conducted severe weather drills.

When a school does not conduct an appropriate variety of emergency drills and exercises, it fails to prepare its staff to perform under a wide enough variety of situations. For example, a reverse evacuation drill that ends with a lockdown or sheltering in place for a hazardous materials incident will help school staff be prepared to more effectively implement a lockdown, shelter in place, or other emergency protocol if staff and students are outdoors when a crisis occurs. If an armed aggressor approaches the school when staff and students are outdoors, a reverse evacuation will be required to move them indoors promptly so they can move into a lockdown. This type of drill can be more important than a lockdown or other types of drills because students and staff must be prepared to quickly return to the school to take shelter from aggressors, severe weather events, hazardous materials incidents or other threats located outside the school. When the school does not conduct this type of drill, its staff will not be well prepared to implement all of the necessary action steps when quick decision making is essential.

**Options for Consideration: The assessed schools should have a more robust progressive drill and exercise program.**

We suggest that the District should consider a combination of the following options for an expanded and refocused staff development approach for the assessed schools:

- Development of an internal facilitator training program
- The use of web-based training approaches
- The use of stock and custom training videos of short duration (two to three minutes in length)

We feel the District would find that a combination of several of the above approaches would be the most effective from the standpoint of time, cost and retention. All school staff, including contract personnel, substitutes, support staff, and volunteers should be made aware of and be required to participate in this type of training. Standardized documentation of training content as well as attendance records for all participants should also be maintained.

**4.9. During our interviews with the District’s leadership team advised us that they were trying to determine whether or not they should adopt the Run, Hide, Fight (RHF) training approach to train personnel for active shooter events.**

At this time, we are unable to recommend the RHF training program nor any of the “options-based” or “multi-option” active shooter training programs for a variety of reasons. Though it is an extremely popular training options-based active shooter training approach RHF is not evidence-based and has not been validated as reliable through independent testing. We also note that personnel from the local Texas homeland security agency that developed the RHF approach have gone on record as opining that
the RHF approach is not suitable for K12 schools. In addition, the United States Department of Education has recently reversed its position on RHF and no longer endorses RHF for use in K12 schools. In fact, our analysts have noted some concerning results when running controlled simulations with school employees who have been trained in the RHF approach, including:

- They usually miss more life-saving action steps than school employees who have not completed RHF training. We feel that proper supplemental training could improve the ability of staff to perform more effectively to both scenario simulations and actual incidents.

- They are prone to choose the “Fight” option and throw objects or attack persons who are depicted as brandishing a gun and threatening people but not firing, threatening suicide but not threatening to harm others, taking hostages, and even opt to leave children unattended to travel off-campus to attack a subject with a gun who is not firing when they are close to an entrance door to the school. Though the results appear to vary somewhat based on how the program is taught by individual instructors, about 25% of RHF trained school staff we have tested nationally opt to “fight” when it would clearly be more dangerous to do so.

- We have also noticed a pronounced tendency for school staff who have been trained in the RHF approach to attack. For example, school staff gunned down an attacker when responding to scenarios when it comes to the decision to fire. We note that the attack as has occurred in One prime example of how dangerous this type of mistake could be is in the . In this case, school staff attacker was killed. Had a lethal attack.

For these reasons, we do not feel that the RHF approach will meet the standard of care for emergency preparedness training for school employees. We also note that there have been some instances where personnel who were trained in and attempted to apply RHF have been killed without disrupting the attack. While we have also seen instances where the fight and run approaches have reduced casualties, our experience has been that the way RHF and commercial approaches based on it have often not adequately prepared school employees on when using the run and fight options will increase rather than decrease the risk of death. In addition, the focus of the active shooter training such as RHF has
been on reacting to rather than trying to prevent these deadly types of attack. Efforts focused on the prevention of as well as preparedness and response to active shooter incidents should be balanced.

**Options for Consideration:** The District should consider drill, exercise and training programs that are based on a more comprehensive all-hazards approach to school safety, security and emergency preparedness and appropriate fidelity testing to properly evaluate and measure outcomes.

As there are currently no active shooter training programs that have proven to be safe and reliable enough for us to suggest to our clients, we suggest the District update their current plans and adopt the approach to staff development, fidelity testing and the drill process we have developed where staff have to react in real-time fashion to scripted and audio scenarios to initiate school-level drills when prompted by administrators. While we do suggest that approaches authorize personnel to use the options of running and using force to stop an attacker, current approaches we have tested typically do not address the above concerns. In our opinion, opening the door for the use of these options while providing cautions on when they can increase danger is at present, the safest approach.

The District should also consider using an evaluation approach similar to that used by our analysts in this project to continually test and measure how well employees have been prepared to make high-stakes decisions while under time pressure and provided with only limited information. This will bring fidelity to how well-prepared individual employees are to make the types of life-saving decisions that school staff must often make in the critical first seconds of an emergency and when there is no time to confer with a supervisor or public safety official before taking life-saving action. Safe Havens Executive Director Michael Dorn provided training for many of the District’s CROs which included information on how fidelity testing using scenarios can be conducted.

In addition, we suggest the District regularly utilize an on-going, progressive exercise program to test its emergency preparedness concepts, plans, procedures, technology, and equipment. Though the District has worked with community public safety partners to conduct a variety of exercises, we suggest a more robust utilization of the progressive exercise approach. Briefly summarized, the progressive exercise program involves four basic types of exercises:

- **Drills** – These are typically single agency exercises designed to allow staff and students to practice specific life-saving procedures such as fire evacuation, lockdown, reverse evacuation, room clear, sheltering place for hazardous materials incidents and severe weather sheltering.

- **Tabletop exercises** – This type of exercise most typically involves a group of people working through a crisis scenario that is presented in written, audio or video format. This type of activity is usually conducted in a meeting room or emergency operations center.

- **Functional exercises** – This activity is very similar to a tabletop exercise but usually involves working through the scenario in a real-time fashion using message interjects to provide increasing challenges to participants.
• **Full-scale exercises** – This is a fully simulated exercise utilizing role players and equipment. For improved safety and effectiveness, we suggest a minimum 12 to 18-month timeline using the prior three types of drills and exercises to build up to a full-scale exercise. There have been deaths and serious injuries during improperly conducted full-scale exercises including one death at a K-12 school in Texas. While extremely beneficial for a school district, full-scale exercises should be planned, coordinated, facilitated and evaluated by properly trained emergency management officials. The District should be able to receive free assistance in planning, conducting and evaluating full-scale exercises from both local and state emergency management agencies. This phase of the exercise process should not be initiated until plans have been revised and staff have been trained on the update plans.

4.10. **Like the majority of public-school systems and non-public schools we assess, the SPS does not have a comprehensive fidelity testing system in place to continually evaluate the level of alignment between actual practices and written policies, plans, programs, staff development approaches, drills and exercises.**

A relatively new approach developed by Safe Havens and other organizations we have been working with, fidelity testing involves the use of real-time video, audio and scripted scenarios and pre-mortem exercises to measure how well the organization has prepared individual school employees as well as functional teams to understand and to be able to apply the “paper” life-safety concepts under field conditions. As one example of fidelity testing in this report, the real-time school crisis scenarios our analysts ran with SPS employees helped us to measure how well a cross section of personnel were able to use the District’s emergency plans, training and drill processes to respond in a one-on-one fashion to emergency situations with limited information and very short time spans. As noted in this report, this testing revealed a number of opportunities for improvement in aspects of the District’s written plans, procedures, training and drill processes while also documenting areas where current approaches were working well. The SPS now has identified specific options for consideration and once the decisions regarding which options should be implemented are made, improvements completed and personnel have been properly trained, the SPS will be able to conduct its own internal version of the process we used to repeat the testing, document progress and continually test to measure alignment between what the District has in place and how well personnel can implement the tools and guidance the SPS has provided.

One specific area the SPS should consider focusing on is the District’s approach to student discipline relating to the types of behaviors that are predictive of increased risks of future violence. In our experience, the number of fights, assaults without serious injuries, threats to commit violence against others and gang-activity are among the most reliable indicators of increased risk of fatal assaults using hands, fists, feet or other “personal” weapons as well as for assaults with edged weapons, blunt objects, firearms and other weapons in K12 schools. In fact, our experience has been that the rates of these types of behaviors are at least as important as the number of students who are caught with guns, knives
and other weapons commonly used to seriously injure and kill others. It is important to understand that two things must be present for an assault with a weapon on school property such as a stabbing or shooting to take place:

1. The possession of or ready access to a weapon such as knife, box cutter, claw hammer, fist, foot, heavy wooden nameplate, or a pair of sharp scissors on a staff member’s desk (we have worked a number of school and/or school bus assaults that resulted in severe permanent injury or death that involved all of the above as well as other types of weapons).

2. The desire on the part of one or more individuals to use a weapon to injure or kill others.

Schools that provide approaches to address both of these prerequisites to school violence with weapons are less likely to experience a fatal act of violence. Our analysts noted conflicting perspectives as we interviewed SPS personnel on what is described in SPS documents and actual practice. For example, while we were told that middle and high school students who physically assault other students or staff are referred to the court system, a number of SPS employees told us that this was not consistently applied in actual practice. In fact, one of our analysts noticed obvious injuries to the face of a district employee and clear indications of distress during an interview with a school employee. When the analyst inquired to see if the staff member was comfortable in proceeding with the interview, the employee related that a student had attacked them and caused the injuries. When asked if the student had been arrested, the employee told the analyst that no charges had been or would be filed against the student. We also saw many indications that this type of inconsistency may not be a regular pattern in the District. For example, this concern did not show up as a prevailing concern in survey data and in many other interviews with staff as we would expect if this was a widespread problem. However, the fact that there have been many instances of students attacking other students and school employees after being involved in multiple fights and/or assaults prior to attacking others and causing permanent brain damage, sever life-threatening injuries and in a number of instances nationally, killing victims, we caution our clients to closely track and properly address patterns of repeated involvement in fights, assultive behaviors and threats to injure or kill others.

This has been a particular problem in school districts that have misapplied restorative justice concepts. According to Pepperdine Law Professor Dr. Bernie James, there have been at least eight instances where students who have exhibited patterns of these types of violent behaviors have attacked students and/or school employees with a gun or edged weapon who had been deferred from prosecution, alternative placement programs and/or expulsion prior to the attack and their school districts have been successfully litigated. Safe Havens personnel have provided post-incident assistance for one of these attacks and for several others that involved death or injuries resulting in permanent and severe disabilities.

We also noted some significant opportunities for improvement in the language used in the District’s restorative justice program. For example, the verbiage intended to spell out that a list of very serious
violent crimes such as (rape, kidnapping, etc.) that should not be handled via the District’s restorative justice program had been accidentally reversed through a simple grammatical error. Though intended to demonstrate that students who committed these offenses would not be eligible for the restorative justice program, the language of the document stated that they would be handled by this approach.

We also suggested that the SPS review the revised PROMISE (Preventing Recidivism through Opportunities, Mentoring, Interventions, Support & Education) program developed by the Broward County Public Schools (BCPS) in Florida. In our experience, the PROMISE program is by far the most thoughtfully developed restorative justice program of hundreds that we have reviewed for our clients. Though the program was heavily cited as one of the causes of the shooting at Marjorie Stoneman Douglas High School and did have several significant opportunities for improvement that have since been addressed, it is important to note that the chairman of the Governor’s Commission to investigate the shooting has gone on record multiple times opining that while there were some significant flaws in the program as noted above, the investigation had determined that the PROMISE program had not been a factor in the attack. As we have publicly stated during public meetings in the BCPS, after having thoroughly vetted the PROMISE program during our post-incident assessment for the District, we encouraged the BCPS to continue to use the PROMISE program with the modifications we and the Commission suggested. Though there has been a concerted, highly organized and determined campaign to try to force the BCPS to drop the program in the wake of the shooting, the BCPS has continued to utilize the improved version of the program.

Options for Consideration: The SPS leadership team should work with leaders in the various different functional areas to develop, implement and continually analyze the results of these fidelity testing approaches used in life-safety areas across the district.

The SPS has already begun developing a variety of fidelity measurement approaches to supplement those that were already in place prior to our assessment. The District is now well-positioned to build on the fidelity testing approaches that were in place prior to the assessment as well as those that individual departments have already begun to develop and in some instances, are already utilizing them. For example, Safe Havens personnel have trained CROs in the use of scenarios for fidelity testing of emergency plans and training programs and Safe Havens is providing free access to a number of our video scenario sets. Interviews with district mental health and transportation personnel indicated a desire to move forward with using some types of fidelity testing. As another example, transportation personnel indicated that they desired to enhance the positive fidelity testing using spot checking of school bus cameras by now capturing and retaining the video segments reviewed at the time of the assessment to bolster documentation of these highly positive efforts. District mental health professionals we interviewed were very interested in the use of pre-mortem exercise by assessment team personnel to measure how threat assessment and self-harm assessments are actually being conducted. A simple, inexpensive, and powerful technique, the pre-mortem exercise involves having the personnel who work in a specific functional area review an actual process as part of a hypothetical
group activity where it is assumed that the process failed, and a tragedy has occurred. This approach forces participants to look at their own process with a critical eye to identify gaps in the process. The researchers that developed this concept. In an article by noted in the September 2007 issue of the *Harvard Business Review*, researcher Dr. Gary Klein described the benefits of pre-mortem exercises:

> Research conducted in 1989 by Deborah J. Mitchell, of the Wharton School; Jay Russo, of Cornell; and Nancy Pennington, of the University of Colorado, found that prospective hindsight—imagining that an event has already occurred—increases the ability to correctly identify reasons for future outcomes by 30%. We have used prospective hindsight to devise a method called a premortem, which helps project teams identify risks at the outset.

As Klein points out in several of his books on high-stakes decision-making, when properly applied by internal personnel, this approach can identify opportunities for improvements that can easily be missed by outside experts (like Safe Havens) because internal personnel are much more intimately aware of cultural organizational factors such as silos, communications challenges and other factors that can impact how events are resolved in real life. Our experience is in agreement with Klein’s opinion on this. In our experience, the many internal subject matter experts on staff at the SPS are quite capable of taking the observations of our team and then identifying and developing ways to even more effectively address opportunities for improvement in plans, procedures, processes, tasking, resource allocation, staff development etc.

We have provided a number of specific examples of fidelity testing concepts the SPS can consider in different areas of this report. We suggest the District also use custom audio scenarios for periodic fidelity testing of representative categories of SPS employees such as teachers, building administrators, custodians, food service personnel etc. to measure how well staff have been trained to understand and apply prevention policies and procedures relating to life-safety concerns such as bullying, suicide prevention, SPS incident reporting policies, boundaries invasion, mandatory reporting, etc. To be clear, fidelity testing is focused on how well the organization has prepared its personnel rather than being a “test” of individual employees who respond to the scenarios.

4.11. Like the majority of school systems we assess, the SPS would benefit from training of personnel on pre-attack indicators, visual weapons screening, pattern-matching and recognition, how to recognize behaviors related to pre-attack surveillance by outsiders, and other behavioral training approaches.

Our assessment results indicate that SPS employees can benefit from additional training on pre-attack indicators based on behavioral approaches. While there are differing viewpoints as to how pervasive the tendency of people to suspect others due to ethnicity, perceived social status, gender, manner of dress, sexual preference and other factors, the fact that bias can and does influence how common it is for individuals and organizations to allow both negative and positive bias to influence how others are viewed as being either potentially dangerous or conversely, not posing a risk of danger. This issue is of
considerable concern to many parents, students, school officials, law enforcement agencies and society at large. This concern has been raised in relating to the SPS and considerable efforts to address the concern have been made by the District in collaboration with the local criminal justice system. Concerns that future efforts to enhance school security not create problems related to bias and disparate treatment have been expressed by members of the force, members of the community and by SPS personnel and have been carefully considered by Safe Havens personnel during this assessment.

**Options for Consideration:** The District should consider strategies to provide additional training on pre-attack indicators based on behavioral approaches for its employees.

One specific problem which results in outcomes driven by unintentional bias is that many school personnel are often not provided with training on the specific behaviors that can when viewed in proper context, indicate that one or more persons poses a risk of harm to themselves or others. This can easily result in school employees failing to pay proper attention to “what I say and do” rather than “who you think I am and what I look like.” For example, a person may observe another person of a particular race and inaccurately view them as being suspicious and even dangerous based on a variety of factors.

As one example, during an assessment for a school system where metal detection with hand-held wands was being piloted at football games, one of our analysts noted that school district employee was barely scanning patrons who were white, Latino as well as African American patrons who were middle-aged, individuals in groups of teenage females, as well as male and female couples of any racial makeup. However, the staff member clearly spent far more time scanning groups of African American male teenagers. The staff member repeatedly asked these groups of teens to empty their pockets and spent 30 to 45 seconds screening most of these teens while often scanning other patrons for only five to ten seconds each. These observations were noted over a time period of more than 30 minutes of direct observation. We also note that the staff member who we were observing was African American. When we reported this observation to our client, we noted that while we did not feel the employee did not like African Americans, nor teenagers in general based on how he interacted with patrons as a whole, it was quite obvious that the staff member was basing his screening measures on a combination of race, age, sex and being part of a group teens who were of a similar race, age and gender. We advised our client of the situation and explained how proper policy, training and fidelity testing could dramatically reduce the chances not only that people would be subjected to extra screening due to negative bias, but also that a dangerous person would be able to carry out an attack due to positive bias of screeners.

This type of situation illustrates several important points:

- Properly developed security practices can reduce the potential for negative and positive bias of this type to occur. For example, we have found that schools that do not follow the practice of requiring all staff to wear photo identification and all visitors to wear time-sensitive visitor badges are less likely to detect an intruder and that specific categories of people are more likely to be reported as being “suspicious.” One reason for this serious gap in security and unfair
situation is that school employees and students in schools where only 70, 80 or 90 percent of adults are properly identified are forced to continually pass judgment on adults in the school based largely on what they look like. With proper access control combined with consistent staff and visitor badging, any student or staff member can recognize that an adult has not been properly badged creating a tangible rather than highly subjective assessment of the individual.

- Proper behavioral detection training can also bring increased tangibility to the processes used by school employees to try to determine whether an individual may pose a risk to themselves or others. For example, visual weapons screening training is very focused on specific and observable physical behaviors. For example, the fact that the fabric lies flat and rigid on one side of a person’s coat while the other side of their coat moves freely combined with a visible and straight “ridge” running down the length of the coat can be an indicator that a person may be concealing a rifle or shotgun under the coat. This specific indicator is gender, age and racially neutral. For example, this indicator can be is more likely in our experience to be readily detected when the person concealing the firearm is clean-cut and is wearing high-end business attire.

- It is extremely important that personnel be trained to tune out what people look like and to focus instead on what they say and do. This not only helps to reduce negative bias, but also reduces the chances that positive bias will result in specific communications and physical behaviors that can indicate increased risk of self-harm or increased risk of harm to others being ignored.

- Training approaches must emphasize the importance of context and patterns of behaviors rather than a “checklist” approach. Context can and often does dramatically influence how specific statements and behaviors.

- Proper fidelity testing using defined parameters can help to spot and correct the influence of bias.

There are a number of sources of the types of patterns of behavior such as the results of the FBI study of pre-attack indicators based on careful review of more than 60 active shooter events. The guide the FBI produced does an excellent job of helping to illustrate how ineffective and unreliable it is to focus on factors such as gender, ethnicity, age, social status, mental health and other factors to help detect a person who is on a pathway to violence so attacks can be averted.

We also note that in our experience, properly conducted training of this type serves to make school employees more aware of a host of other behaviors that do not indicate any danger but can indicate that a student or adult is in need of assistance. For example, a teacher who has been provided with this type of training may detect a student or an adult who is experiencing a medical emergency in a crowded...
cafeteria in time to take life-saving actions because the students behavior does not fit the context of the
time, place and setting that she has observed during each lunch period for the past five years.

We provided the SPS with two of our video training sets (one for school-based personnel and one for
school bus personnel) that contain a number of videos depicting examples of pre-attack indicators. We
also provided the SPS with copies of the Secrets of the Weapons Violator Exposed video. This video
contains a three-minute segment on specific physical gestures and behaviors that can when viewed in
context help school personnel recognize indicators that a person is carrying a concealed firearm.

For easy follow-up, findings in this section are grouped into sub-sections. Please note that the sub-sections as well as findings are not in the order of importance because the impact of each finding may vary due to numerous factors, such as facility design, school location, etc. We often suggest our clients prioritize options for consideration based on their available resources. School officials should view our report within the context of the overall options rather than focusing intently on individual options.

5.1. Student Welfare and Behavioral Prevention Measures

5.1.1. As is the case with many of the public school systems we work with, SPS personnel from a variety of departments, functional areas, and school based administrators expressed concerns that while the SPS has dramatically increased training, resources and formalized approaches to address the challenges of youth exposed to significant risk factors, current resources, tasking and approaches have not been able to keep pace with significant societal and community risk factors.

While personnel from different levels and functional areas in the SPS acknowledged steadily increasing and concerted efforts to address the needs of students with increased risk exposure, many SPS personnel we interacted with communicated that the SPS efforts have been unable to address what they perceive to be significantly increased risk exposure among the overall student population served by the SPS. Interviews and interaction at the site level with a significant number of elementary, middle, and high school building administrators indicated that they perceived that:

- Student populations have been changing significantly in recent years. Particular concern relating to children and youth described as being “unwanted” in their home environments was expressed.

- Administrators expressed concerns that the negative behavior of many students has become more severe, more frequently so and is being seen at younger ages.

- Administrators noted that the number of group homes in the community has expanded in relation with increased housing costs.

- SPS administrators expressed that the severity, depth, and complexity of trauma being experienced by significant numbers of students has increased significantly in recent years.

- Administrators expressed concerns of dedicated teachers and support staff who become traumatized, who become burned out and who often seek to transfer out of schools with higher
risk populations due to the depth of needs of many of the students they serve. One administrator reported an increase of staff turnover between 80% and 100% over the course of five years which he attributed to these pressures. The administrator advised our personnel that it becomes a matter of how long staff can take the stressors before they reach a threshold.

- As mentioned elsewhere in the report and by personnel from a variety of functional areas, administrators often expressed to our analysts that the increasing number of students with substantive mental health issues and substance abuse problems is consuming tremendous amounts of staff time. SPS personnel from multiple functional areas reported that this in turn is having a negative effect on other important areas including but not limited to instructional services.

- SPS personnel expressed concerns that there has been a significant movement in the state foster care system to send severely traumatized students into public school systems that are not properly equipped to serve the needs of these students. Personnel also reported that the District is not provided with background information that would enable the District to more effectively assist these students. We note that Safe Havens clients are expressing similar concerns in Oregon, Georgia, and many other states. Clients report this type of dynamic with state juvenile justice and mental health systems. Personnel from one mid-sized Oregon school system advised us that a small number of students who had previously been under the direct care of physicians in secure facilities now account for more than 90% of all serious disciplinary and criminal incidents on school campuses and school buses.

- In light of the above reported challenges, a number of administrators and support personnel expressed that the expanded services by the SPS still do not provide adequate special programs and proper facilities for some programs. We were also advised that teachers are increasingly being tasked to become experts in “brain science” and that the SPS does not have an adequate support system for students who re-enter District schools from criminal justice, mental health and other external programs and situations. While we heard considerable praise for many of the strategies that the SPS has implemented, the array of improved options and especially the significant efforts by the SPS to avoid “cookie-cutter” approaches, our analysts had concerning feedback that the SPS is still under-resourced, under-budgeted and at times influenced too much by public and political pressures.

We find it important at this point in our report to take the reader back to our observations early in the report that while we sometimes perceive school personnel we interview to be quick to complain and or appearing to try to capitalize on the assessment process as a means to try to obtain funding for additional staff that may not in reality be critical, we did not have that impression in our interviews with SPS personnel. We noted that many of the SPS personnel who expressed some of the deepest concerns were also individuals who were quick to acknowledge and commend their peers, personnel in other
departments, the SPS leadership team and elected school board members for achieving many improvements. We also noted that we often heard SPS staff express that there was a need for additional resources for other departments rather than their own. For example, on multiple occasions, building administrators we interviewed told us that other schools faced particular challenges that merited additional intervention resources.

Though these are subjective perceptions, our impression of those who offered the most critical observations was that they were made from a standpoint of passion, compassion, and a professional desire to more effectively serve students. SPS personnel repeatedly acknowledged that many of the most challenging concerns related to increased numbers of students coming from high-risk settings and that the SPS leadership was working hard to best utilize the very limited fiscal resources to address challenges driven by many societal factors that originate beyond the schoolhouse walls. We also found that SPS personnel who expressed the deepest levels of concern were typically also quick to try to offer constructive solutions and that these suggestions were not limited to those options that involve additional personnel or fiscal resources.

**Options for Consideration:** We suggest the SPS continue the efforts of the School Safety Task Force and the feedback mechanisms already in use to guide this discussion combined with a series of frank, thoughtfully organized internal multi-disciplinary discussions to identify ways to address these concerns.

Our analysts find that SPS and community partner agency personnel, data we evaluated from the District as well as risk data from the community we evaluated present a compelling case for additional personnel resources in a number of functional areas as mentioned elsewhere in this report. While we encourage the SPS to work to identify ways to fund these much-needed resources, we also see opportunities for the SPS to build on and improve the array of enhancements that have been diligently implemented in response to these and other increased challenges in recent years. We also note that these challenges should position the SPS to be able to document significant need if competitive grant funding opportunities become available.

In the meantime, based on very positive and helpful feedback we received from SPS personnel, we suggest the SPS engage a cross-section of key personnel and stakeholders to focus as a team specifically on the concerns expressed above. We suggest that this team include:

- The Superintendent
- Representatives from the Accounting, Human Resources, Teaching and Learning Departments as well as the Secondary School Director
- The same cross section of building administrators, Student Services personnel and CRO management personnel that met with us during the district-level assessment
• The principals from SPS schools serving student populations with the highest risk factors (community crime rates, violence rates, gang activity, suicide rates, poverty, homelessness, etc.)

• Other key personnel as determined by the Superintendent

We suggest that this team be specifically tasked to re-evaluate:

• How the District strategically utilizes its significantly limited fiscal and personnel resources.

• How to best allocate the limited support personnel and how to attract and retain the most qualified and talented personnel to work with the students with the greatest needs.

• If there are any possibilities to create a community partnership to provide increased mental health services for students who do not qualify for Medicare.

• To attempt to identify ways to more accurately determine what the actual fiscal costs of the SPS efforts to serve the most vulnerable students are. The goal for this objective is to see if the most impactful resources are properly aligned with the students most in need of them as well as to provide the SPS leadership with more powerful documentation of need should future grant funding or other funding opportunities become available to more effectively address them.

Staff we interviewed during the assessment told us that they felt this discussion could identify improved alignment of the limited resources and the needs of students. They also expressed that further improvements in communications could identify opportunities to leverage enhancements that have already been implemented. Though all personnel we had these discussions with noted that there are many ways the SPS leadership solicits feedback, they told us that a discussion narrowly focused on these specific areas would be beneficial. We also found the outlook of the majority of these personnel to be one of a strong desire for collaboration with those in other schools and departments and believe this approach could be highly productive.

5.1.2. **We are concerned that the SPS currently has too many important functional areas housed under the Safety & Transportation Department.**

Over time, the transportation department function, risk management function, OSHA/WISHA (the federal Occupational Safety and Health Administration/the Washington Industrial Safety and Health Act of 1973) compliance function, and the school safety, security and emergency management function all have been placed under the Safety & Transportation Department. Currently, the Director of the Safety & Transportation Department provides oversight on those important life-safety areas. With a student population of nearly 30,000 students and numerous safety challenges described throughout this report, the lack of a separate department to be responsible only for the area of school safety, security and emergency management and a full-time single point of contact who has adequate staff time and is qualified to provide oversight for this important life-safety function creates increased risk and is of
significant concern. This deficiency limits the ability of the SPS to mitigate risk and this situation is compounded with a lack of adequate number of CROs, supervisory positions, and management structure for the CRO function.

In our experience, a number of the opportunities for improvement that we have identified in this report are likely related to this structure. For example, we were surprised to encounter a school district, let alone a school district of the size of the SPS, where some schools do not have an AED – a very basic, standardized, and critically important life-saving device that any public place must have. In our experience, a school system risk manager would likely be very concerned if some schools in their district did not have AEDs. However, when there is only one person tasked with oversight for the array of those critical responsibilities as currently at SPS, it is not surprising that the personnel might not spot and/or be able to address pressing needs in so many functional areas.

**Options for Consideration:** We suggest the SPS consider restructuring and properly staffing for the oversight of these critical functional areas is provided.

Addressing this challenge will likely not be easy because additional staffing will be required unless tasks can be reassigned to exiting personnel with the knowledge, skills and abilities required. For example, our understanding is that the oversight of the contracted pupil transportation services was previously provided by three employees who were experienced in this field. While it may be possible that one highly qualified employee with adequate clerical support dedicated solely to this highly technical function would suffice, we are concerned that this crucial function is shared with several others for a school district the size and complexity of the SPS. While re-alignment of some of the above functions structurally would likely help, we suspect that other departments in the SPS where the risk management and transportation functions might reside are similarly overtasked.

The SPS could use a variety of options to accomplish the restricting of oversight responsibilities. We suggest the SPS try to identify ways this could be accomplished along with an approach that would spread the duties among an increased number of personnel. We realize that when combined with the concerns that staffing levels for CRO, school nurses, and student services personnel we have raised pose even greater challenges for the SPS. The fact that increases in staffing require ongoing annual budget commitments poses even greater challenges.

While the leadership of the SPS will have to consider these needs holistically and prioritize how limited fiscal resources would be used to address these concerns, the increased challenges relating to the student population served by the SPS described in this report underscore the importance of adequate staffing of these critical areas. While Safe Havens can and will provide general guidance for developing these priorities, the SPS has a much better grasp on the ability of the District to allocate recurring funding for these life-safety areas.
5.1.3. The current approach to providing law enforcement services is inadequate for the size, complexity, and risk level of the SPS and the student population it serves.

One life-safety area we were asked to devote considerable attention to during the assessment was how the SPD should provide law enforcement services for the SPS. While one of the most pressing and debated aspects of this involves the question of whether the SPS needs to arm police officers assigned to protect students and staff, questions of the staffing level and structure of this function have also been of considerable interest to many students, school employees, parents and local public safety officials.

For our analysts, the basic question of whether or not the SPS should have some form of at least some armed security or law enforcement personnel is clear. Currently, the SPS does not have any armed police personnel assigned at or designated to regularly patrol its schools and support facilities. While survey results and the staff that our analysts interviewed have been fairly evenly divided on this issue, the opinion of our analysts is that the SPS has a significantly increased risk of violence involving weapons and also has a significantly increased civil liability risk exposure because there are no armed officers dedicated to protect SPS schools. We have no choice other than to advise the District that we cannot recommend continued reliance solely upon unarmed personnel for all District schools and support facilities. Our analysts do not, however, suggest that all schools, or even that all middle and high schools, in the District must have a full-time armed officer assigned to them.

While we are not familiar with the practices in every single school district in the United States, we have worked with hundreds of school districts in the United States in recent years and our analysts are only aware of one school system of comparable size to the SPS that does not have any armed security or law enforcement personnel. This school district was the Baltimore Public School System. In January 2019, the School Board voted unanimously not to allow the district’s certified school district police officers to carry firearms due to concerns expressed by students who were members of a student advocacy group.8 The same week the school board voted not to arm its officers, a shooting occurred at Jewish Synagogue in Baltimore. Two weeks after the board voted not to arm its officers, a 25-year-old man came to Frederick Douglas High School and shot one of the district’s special needs assistants.9 Approximately one month after the unanimous vote not to arm the school district’s police officers, the school board reversed its position with an 8-2 vote to support legislation which would authorize school police officers to carry service handguns in certain situations.10

Of considerable concern to our analysts is the fact that currently, CROs perform many duties that are extremely dangerous for an unarmed officer to perform. For example, CROs currently search students for weapons without an armed SPD officer being present. There have been numerous shootings of

unarmed school personnel who have been shot when attempting to search students for weapons. For example, three school administrators were shot while attempting to search a student for a gun in Jacksboro, Tennessee and two administrators were shot while attempting to search a student for a gun in Pinellas Park, Florida. While many people are focused on active shooter events in relation to questions about having armed officers on school property, most shootings and knife attacks in K12 school bear little resemblance to these tragic and catastrophic events.

While many incidents in public, charter and Christian in the United States and other countries have demonstrated, active shooter events can occur in any type of school, in any community and in fact, anywhere in the world, the reality is that most attacks in schools do not involve active shooter events. For example, a recent event in Eugene, Oregon, demonstrates how an attack can occur in a school from more common scenarios. In this case, a man attempted to sign out his child in violation of a court order and became aggressive and disruptive. Two school resource officers responded to the school and attempted to get the man to leave. When the man continued to act in a disruptive and aggressive manner, the officers attempted to take him into custody. The man pulled a very large handgun and fired two shots in an attempt to kill the officers before being shot and killed by one of the officers. If this same man had come to an SPS school and acted in the same manner, it is extremely likely that he would have shot and perhaps killed the CRO(s) who would be designated to respond. With a 55-minute average response time for the badly understaffed SPD, there are hundreds of common scenarios which could easily escalate into an armed act of aggression currently being handled by unarmed CROs every year. One experienced local law enforcement officer accepted a position with the SPS but resigned fairly quickly because he felt that it was unsafe for an unarmed officer to handle so many of these situations.

To put it another way, none of the Safe Havens analysts who have served in the capacity of school district police officer would accept any position as a CRO with the SPS at any salary level without there being any armed personnel to handle these types of situations. We also note that these types of situations are most typically handled by armed officers and do not result in the use of a firearm by a suspect nor an officer every year. However, the reader should remember that many people do not attempt to use a weapon because an officer is armed. And in many instances, suspects have changed their mind and have not pulled a gun, have dropped a gun, knife or other weapon when challenged by an armed police officer in the K12 setting.

Our experience has been that although there are easily thousands of situations on K12 school campuses where officers must make a decision to draw or hold the weapon in a “low ready” position or less frequently forced to point their weapons at suspects, it is in reality very rare for officers in the K12 setting to actually fire their weapons in relation to the number of armed individuals they encounter. While armed officers in Mexico, Trinidad-Tobago, Germany, South Africa, Vietnam, and many other nations can and often do shoot civilians for non-compliance with verbal commands (e.g., “take your hand out of your pocket” or “stop”), statutory and case law in the United States prohibits officers from
using deadly force so freely. For this reason, armed officers in the United States face more situations where they must determine whether a person who is non-compliant is trying to kill the officer or is simply belligerent, which is most often the case.

It is very important for civilians with oversight of armed security and LE personnel to understand this critical dynamic. While the average person may perceive that typical use of force decisions made by armed personnel in the K-12 setting are most often related to active shooter incidents where it is clear that the officer should use deadly force if they can do so without endangering innocent bystanders, the reality is that the overwhelming majority of use of force decisions will involve situations that are far different than those we see on the national news. In fact, it has been the collective experience of the Safe Havens analysts who have served as school security directors and school district police chiefs, that the overwhelming majority of use of force decisions made by armed officers in K-12 settings do not involve instances where a suspect has discharged a firearm. In fact, every one of these analysts has been threatened by armed suspects but have been able to diffuse the situation without firing their service weapon.

For example, Safe Havens Executive Director Michael Dorn encountered 16 incidents in his 20 years of campus law enforcement experience in which someone made a significant attempt to attack him or another person with a weapon. The following are a few examples of these incidents that took place while he was serving as a university police officer, and later, as a school district police chief:

- While serving as a Mercer University Police Officer, Dorn was attacked by a very large woman armed with a military bayonet as he exited his patrol car to check on a minor situation at the Walter F. George School of Law. The woman was pursuing and trying to kill her boyfriend because she had just found him cheating on her. When her boyfriend approached Dorn to seek assistance, the woman tried to stab Dorn so that she could continue her attack on her boyfriend. Dorn was able to avoid shooting the woman through the use of a police impact device to keep the attacker at a distance while drawing his service revolver and pointing it at the woman, convincing her to stop the attack. Dorn is quite certain that he would have been forced to shoot the woman if he had not been trained and equipped with a police baton.

- In another instance, while he was serving as a university police officer, a custodian became irate at what he incorrectly perceived as an insult by a student. The custodian pulled a knife and threatened the student with it in a crowded area. Dorn was able to de-escalate the situation and avoid shooting the custodian.

- Fifteen days later, a man who was in an argument with another man tried to attack Dorn with a pocketknife as Dorn walked around the corner of a house at Mercer University’s main campus to investigate the situation. Again, the attacker had tried to kill Dorn, so he could, in turn, kill the man with whom he was having an argument. Again, Dorn did not have to shoot this attacker because he rapidly drew his service revolver and pointed it at the man, who immediately stopped the attack and fled the scene.
• While he was on patrol at Mercer University, two young men who were in the process of breaking into a student’s apartment fired six shots from a .25 caliber handgun at Dorn and his partner when their patrol car drove into the area. Dorn and his partner were not aware of the crime and were on routine patrol when the shots were fired. Dorn did not fire at the men because they fled the scene before he could locate their position.

• While serving as the Chief of Police for the Bibb County School System, Dorn had to draw his service pistol to stop a school system custodian who was attempting to enter Alexander II Magnet Elementary School to kill his wife with a .38 Special revolver. The normally mild-mannered custodian, who had no previous criminal or disciplinary record, was improperly medicated that day, and became convinced that his wife, who was also a custodian in the district, had been cheating on him. When Dorn drew his service pistol and challenged the man, he surrendered without incident.

• In another incident during his service as a school district police chief, Dorn had to make another difficult use of deadly force decision. In this case, a fifteen-year-old student fired a handgun in a high school parking lot as patrons were leaving a basketball game. The student had no criminal record, had no prior serious disciplinary infractions, and was attempting to scare three gang members who intended to physically assault him. The student did not see Dorn approaching to assist him when he fired the weapon. When Dorn identified himself and ordered the student to drop the weapon, the student fled the area. During the ensuing foot pursuit, the student spun around and was bringing up the gun to shoot when he realized that Dorn already had his service pistol pointed at the suspect. The student dropped the gun and surrendered.

• In another case, while Dorn was serving as the Bibb County School District Police Chief, a fifteen-year-old student attempted to pull a handgun and shoot Dorn when Dorn ordered him to stop as he was fleeing his campus because the student had learned that another student had seen the gun he was carrying and had reported him to a teacher. As in the earlier incident with another fifteen-year-old, this student surrendered when he realized that Dorn was pointing his service pistol at him and that a second officer was arriving on the scene. This student was a special needs student.

• In another incident, in the Bibb County Public School System, a 6’4” tall uncle of a student who was highly agitated that his nephew was being suspended for smashing a trophy case approached Dorn while brandishing a baseball bat. When Dorn drew his service pistol, the man immediately dropped the bat. Further investigation revealed that the man had brought the bat to help “control” his nephew, who had a lengthy history of violence (and who later carried out several drive-by shootings in Knoxville, Tennessee).

As these eight examples and the other incidents where Dorn was confronted by an armed individual intent on using the weapon they possessed to attack him demonstrate, most situations where armed officers in the campus setting have to make a ‘shoot-no shoot’ decision in a matter of a few seconds do
not resemble the type of catastrophic active shooter incidents that frighten us the most and, therefore, receive intensive media coverage. We note that all three of our analysts who have served as school district police chiefs, have had to draw their duty weapons when a suspect attempted to physically attack them with a gun, knife, or other weapon. School district police officers under their command have also survived attacks by students and non-students armed with a claw hammer, a machete, handguns, and a screwdriver. We note that none of these officers have been forced use a firearm to end these confrontations. The experiences described above are illustrative of the most typical encounters with armed individuals that officers in the school setting often face. Dorn also points out that he was far better trained with a firearm than most local, state, and federal LE officers in the United States. He credits a number of his decisions not to shoot suspects with a high degree of confidence with his service weapons and extensive use-of-force training.

For this reason, we typically suggest to our U.S. clients that SROs and police personnel employed by school districts receive more advanced use-of-force training than is standard for the majority of local law enforcement agencies. As our experience has been that generally, the more proficient and confident an officer is with their service weapon, the less likely they are to fire the weapon in the field. This view is based on the personal collective experience of several hundred years of police work among our analysts. The logic behind this viewpoint is that an officer who is confident that they will be able to incapacitate an attacker, is less likely to discharge their weapon out of fear that they may not hit and neutralize the aggressor. While there are many situations in a nation of more than 300 million people where any properly trained officer has to use deadly force, these analysts have all personally held their fire on multiple occasions because they were so well-trained and proficient with their weapons under extremely stressful and challenging training conditions.

We also typically suggest that our clients set firearms qualification standards that exceed those of minimum state standards. While any military veteran or law enforcement officer who has experienced being shot at can attest that the toxic effects of these situations can dramatically degrade the ability to shoot accurately, high quality advanced firearms training using a variety of types of simulation can help to improve the ability of an officer who is forced to use a firearm to stop an armed attacker.

We were also asked by the SPS to review data from research on the effectiveness of armed law enforcement officers in the K12 setting, the likelihood of the risk of violence being increased or decreased risk of violence resulting from the assignment of armed police officers to schools. We reviewed a number of “studies” and found that in most cases, the organizations that conducted, requested or funded the “studies” had an expressed desire to contest or support the use of officers in schools. We also note that the assignment of law enforcement officers to K12 schools has been and is a controversial issue of great importance to many people who both passionately favor and oppose the approach. As with other controversial issues of this type, it has been our experience that many people with strong convictions relating to this topic tend to accept data supporting their position while rejecting research that supports opposing viewpoints.
For example, studies cited by the National Association of School Resource Officers (NASRO) whose membership is comprised primarily of school resource officers often support the effectiveness and value of having properly trained school resource officers in creating safer schools. Just as research referenced by the National Association of School Psychologists (NASP) might be likely to show the need for more positions for school psychologists to be funded, it is not surprising to an unbiased observer that the data cited by NASRO would likely indicate the benefits of school resource officers which could in turn generate more dues paying members of the association. Meanwhile, research created, funded, or cited by civil rights groups that have historically been concerned about abuses of police authority could be expected to cite research and data which they believe demonstrates that the assignment of armed officers to schools is more likely to cause problems than to provide benefits. University undergraduate and graduate programs in research methodology teach students to consider the potential for bias of this type. We note that Safe Havens analysts have collaborated with both NASSRO, NASP, and multiple civil rights organizations on multiple occasions over the past two decades.

We note a scarcity of viable research on the effectiveness and or potential dangers of school resource officers utilizing reliable methodology, and which does not involve a constituency that could indicate a tendency for bias. As author Joel Best points out in Damned Lies and Statistics Understanding Numbers from the Media, Politicians and Activists asserts, there are three questions anyone should ask when evaluating data from research:

1. Who created the statistic?
2. Why was the statistic created?
3. How was the statistic created?

Best and other authors on this topic caution that bias is very common in research and data produced for, by and cited by professional organizations, advocacy groups and government agencies. Having reviewed hundreds of studies relating to school safety, we find the questions listed above to be incredibly important. In our experience, the prevalence of inaccurate and biased data relating to school safety as well as the misuse of data by individuals and organizations that twist the meaning of data to support whatever product, service, or ideology they want to advance is severe. From vendors who use alarming and frightening data to try to sell products and services to groups on opposing ends of contentious debates such as the need to ban firearms or the opposing viewpoint that teachers should be armed, it is not difficult to find data to support or negate almost any viewpoint that is controversial. With these concerns in mind, two of the research studies that appear to be the most objective and to have used viable methodology that we identified are:

- School Resource Officers: Law Enforcement Officers in Schools published by the Congressional Research Service in June 26, 2013 and;
Assigning Value to Peel Regional Police’s School Resource Officer Program prepared by two professors from Carleton University in January 2018.

We note that in the first study, the researchers note the dearth of reliable research on the effectiveness of SROs and indicate that this limited their ability to effectively opine on the topic. Neither of these studies has produced strong evidence to support the view that all schools need armed law enforcement officers or that few if any schools should have armed officers assigned to them. We also note that while people who oppose the assignment of armed officers to SPS schools often cite the shooting at Marjorie Stoneman Douglas High School as an example that armed police officers are not effective in preventing or stopping active shooters, the fact is that dozens of school shootings have either been stopped by armed officers assigned to schools or more commonly, successfully averted before the attack is commenced. Safe Havens analysts who worked on this project have personally been directly involved with a number of these situations.

We also note that while some people who oppose the presence of armed officers at SPS schools feel that the SPD can respond rapidly enough to situations where an individual with a weapon becomes violent, the reality is that in most of people who were shot in the 17 planned K12 school shootings our analysts have provided post-incident assistance for have been shot in the first 60-90 seconds of an attack. For example, the report of the governor’s commission to investigate the shooting at Marjorie Stoneman Douglas High School states that 24 victims were shot in the first 120 seconds of the attack. We, therefore, base our observations on considerable experience working with thousands of American schools on projects where we have tailored our approaches to fit client needs. We note that while we have a responsibility to our clients to advise them in a manner that we feel is in alignment with the standard of care and what we have found to be more effective and safer, we do not use a cookie cutter approaches. While there are those in our field who perhaps out of an abundance of caution advise that all schools must have an armed officers we do not automatically suggest that for our clients. We have in fact, advised some clients that they should instead use limited resources to hire mental health personnel and/or school nurses because our opinion is that in their situation, this would be the most logical option.

We note that the array of options we provide the SPS in this section reflect this level of customization. We reviewed similar sections from the reports for several other projects where the type, number and deployment and tasking of armed security and or law enforcement personnel was a primary concern and in one instance the only aspect we were tasked to evaluate. However, aside from the section describing the actual use of force decisions experienced by Safe Havens Executive Director Michael Dorn, almost all of the content for this section was written specifically for this report and the options presented are not the same as any previous school assessment report we have prepared. While there are some common themes, the approaches we provided are highly customized to attempt to address the many conflicting concerns, viewpoints, challenges and most importantly, the security needs of this specific school system.
Options for Consideration: The SPS should consider developing an approach to provide armed prevention coverage of District schools, support facilities and as appropriate, athletic, and special events.

We note again that our analysts also do not find that and, in fact, would not recommend that all current CROs be authorized to carry firearms for several reasons including:

- Some CROs have expressed that they do not want to carry a firearm. We do not recommend that anyone who does not want to carry a firearm or that does not feel confident that they could use a firearm to protect themselves or others should carry a gun. As noted in a chapter on the question of whether or not it is appropriate to carry a gun for protection of self and others in our latest book as well as in a companion training video we have produced, the decision to carry a firearm for this purpose is a very serious one and no one who does not feel confident that they could take a human life if forced to do so to protect themselves or others should carry a gun for protection.11

- Concerns that some CROs have not exhibited the temperament and judgment required to carry a duty firearm were raised by a variety of school system employees including CROs, teachers, building and district administrators as well as SPD personnel. While the majority of these individuals who told us that they were in favor of the SPS opting to have some form of armed law enforcement personnel said that they have a high degree of confidence in many of the CROs generally, many also expressed that they had concerns about some particular CROs they had interacted with over time.

- There is a lack of appropriate supervisory and middle management positions to provide proper oversight and accountability for CROs in the Safety & Transportation Department. Regardless of whether or not any CRO personnel are authorized to carry firearms, the current structure is not adequate for the scope and complexity of the duties currently carried out by CROs.

- While CRO performance and operating guidelines are spelled out in a detailed manual, the Safety and Transportation Department does not have a mechanism comparable to that of the SPD for the use of force by CROs. While this is typical of the majority of school law enforcement agencies (as well as most SRO programs where local police and sheriff’s department officers are utilized), through the generous offer of the Chief of the SPD, the SPS has an excellent and unique opportunity to adopt the SPD’s approach and to have SPD personnel review all use of force situations by CROs. As the SPD approach has been approved by the United States Department of Justice, this approach provides a high degree of oversight and prevention steps to help reduce improper utilization of force by police personnel.

11 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xoGEvdhpA6E
The SPS has a variety of options for how armed law enforcement personnel dedicated the protection of students, district employees and visitors to SPS schools and support facilities. We find that some form of full-time preventive coverage by armed officers be developed for the SPS. This coverage should only be provided by personnel who have been carefully screened, trained, and properly equipped. The District can consider several options for deployment of assignment of armed and sworn law enforcement personnel over time including:

a. Using SPS or SPD personnel who are assigned to patrol zones with a focus on coverage at the high and middle school level while unarmed CROs are stationed in a similar manner to that used at present but with improved use of data relating to factors as the crime rate in the neighborhood where the school is located, incidents of trespassing, aggressive behaviors of visitors/intruders, incidents of violence by students, the number of weapons seized, size and complexity of the campus and challenges in properly regulating access control.

b. Using the above approach but moving over time to an approach where armed CROs or SROs are assigned full-time at high and middle schools with higher risk levels based on such factors as the crime rate in the neighborhood where the school is located, incidents of trespassing, aggressive behaviors of visitors/intruders, incidents of violence by students, the number of weapons seized, size and complexity of the campus and challenges in properly regulating access control.

c. Using b above but having a pool of carefully selected and specially trained and supervised SPD officers to use focused and planned preventive patrol coverage on safety zones in higher crime areas surrounding SPS schools.

To help address the concerns expressed by students, employees and members of the community relating to the potential for misuse of deadly force by armed personnel assigned to SPS schools, we suggest the following:

- Regardless of the option above selected, we suggest that use of force concerns be addressed by asking the SPD Chief of Police to provide oversight using the SPD Early Intervention System for all armed and unarmed sworn personnel. We also suggest that SPS policy require that any discharge of a firearm by an armed CRO be automatically investigated by both the SPD and the Washington State Police based on a formal Memorandum of Understanding between both agencies and the SPS. We note that it could be possible for the SPD to determine that an incident should only be investigated by the State Police if an SPD officer were also involved in the use of force.

- We suggest that training and qualification requirements for firearms, less-lethal force options, de-escalation training for armed CROs be higher than the minimum standards established by
Washington State. A special emphasis on regular judgmental use of deadly force training using video, force-on-force or other types of simulations be required.

- We suggest that all officers assigned to SPS schools be evaluated by students and staff using an anonymous survey mechanism that provides protection against people or organizations “stacking” survey results by submitting false survey responses. In our experience, properly run school-based police programs receive strong support from survey respondents while surveys where poorly run programs exist will likewise reveal problems.

- While there are both advantages and disadvantages to their use, the SPS can consider equipping all law enforcement personnel assigned to its schools with body cameras. If this option is utilized, we suggest the SPS adopt an approach in alignment with that used by the SPD. Although likely already addressed by SPD policy, there could be a need to further define the storage and distribution of footage of juveniles recorded on body cameras to comply with FERPA.

- Regardless of the approach used, we suggest increased efforts at public communication to better inform students, staff and the community regarding the screening and training standards, oversight systems, performance evaluations and tasking of officers. We note that this effort should include any unarmed as well as armed personnel. We also note that a CRO has produced an excellent brochure to attempt to achieve this titled Relationships = Safety and Success. We suggest the SPS consider designating an officer as the safety communications officer, providing adequate work time, supportive resources and tasking this officer with communicating not only the care in selection, training, and tasking of Department of Safety personnel, but information that can help students, SPS employees, parents, guardians, personnel from community partner agencies, members of civic organizations and the general public with information on what students and adults can do to enhance the safety of students, employees, and visitors. These efforts should include media interviews, public speaking, information on the SPS website, social media posts and helping to make timely notification when incidents occur. In our opinion, dedicating a talented and experienced CRO to these duties on a full-time basis would serve the SPS well in relation to cost and increased levels of safety and emergency preparedness achieved.

We suggest the following options for consideration for the SPS if it opts to provide coverage by armed personnel:

1. The SPS could establish criteria for a classification of armed CRO, screen, train and equip the number of officers that successfully complete the screening process that are needed.

2. The SPS could enter into an agreement with the SPD to provide coverage by properly screened and trained school resource officers.
3. The SPS could utilize a combination of the above options.

4. The SPS could also utilize option 1 and create an armed CRO position each time a CRO who does not desire to be armed or who does not complete screening or training requirements for an armed CRO position retires or leaves the District. To be clear, we do not suggest the phasing out of any of the current CRO positions to achieve this.

5. Any personnel who are authorized to carry a firearm should be provided with and required to wear soft body armor at all times while on duty unless authorized to not wear armor by a supervisor due to heat conditions, health concerns or when attending classroom training in settings where they could not need to deploy for an emergency. Our rationale on this is because officers who do not have armor are more likely to be neutralized and could experience increased levels of stress when confronted with an armed aggressor.

6. The SPS could also move to an approach utilized in a number of school districts where a combination of armed CRO and/or SRO positions and unarmed CRO positions are used as a long-term approach. If this approach is desired, the SPS could consider replacing unarmed CROs with a new category of unarmed certified security personnel who are not certified police officers at a lower salary level. The SPS could change the position each time a CRO who does not desire to be armed or who does not complete screening or training requirements for an armed CRO position retires or leaves the District. To be clear, we again do not suggest the phasing out of any of the current CRO positions to achieve this.

Any of these options would need to comply with state law, insurance provisions, union agreements or renegotiated union agreements as necessary. We suggest the SPS focus on developing a quality approach with personnel of the appropriate skill sets, temperament, training, and experience matched to the roles they are best suited to fill rather than attempting to achieve the desired approach rapidly.

5.1.4. While we noted some positive and notable practices in the current approach to safety and security for athletic events, as detailed in Section 3 above, the approach can be improved.

In general, we noted that the District lacks structure and formal procedures for safety, security and emergency preparedness measures for athletic events. For example, there is no written standardized document or guideline outlining the process used to determine the level of security or police staffing and to select and task officers at each athletic event that requires security/police coverage. The District also does not currently use diagrams to clearly specify and document the specific locations of officers at athletic events.

Options for Consideration: The District should consider a more structured approach in selecting and assigning security officers and/or police personnel at each athletic event that requires security/police coverage.
Strategic Report for School Safety, Security and Emergency Management Assessment for
Spokane Public Schools, WA

The District should consider:

- Developing a standardized and formalized written process to determine the security and police staffing levels and tasking at each athletic event. The process should include communication between District staff and law enforcement personnel. This process and documentation do not need to be overly complex nor burdensome but should be more structured than the present approach.

- Developing standardized visual diagrams or detailed narrative descriptions to clearly communicate and document that officers know the areas they are supposed to focus on before, during and after an event. This type of diagrams and narrative descriptions provide an excellent tool to make sure officers are clear on their assignments as well as to provide good documentation if it is needed several years after the event. We have seen problems during litigation resulting from security events when school districts and law enforcement agency personnel are unable to document what areas were being covered by officers when an incident is alleged to have occurred. Most commonly, litigation is not filed soon after the security incident and by the time depositions are taken, school staff and officers may have trouble recalling which officers were assigned for specific areas of the venue at the time of the purported event.

- Having District personnel who are assigned to work the events wear visible identifiers such as high-visibility vests or jackets that clearly identify them as District personnel. We do caution not to identify anyone who is not certified as a security officer with verbiage that could identify them as such. If staff wear vests or jackets that say “Security” they should be trained and certified as security officers. We also suggest these staff be provided with portable radios and a whistle for faster and more effective emergency communications. These personnel and their tasking should also be identified in the manner suggested for police officers working athletic events.

- Developing pre-scripted emergency announcements for announcers to provide instructions do during an emergency. We also suggest the District consider having announcers review emergency evacuation procedures before each event. We are advising our clients to emphasize to attendees that running in crowded events and spaces can dramatically slow evacuation in an emergency.

5.1.5. While the District has made considerable efforts and has additional efforts that were in-process to address suicide/self-harm prevention, the approaches that were in place at the time of our assessment were not at the level of the District’s threat assessment and management efforts.

The District still did not have formalized and structured suicide and self-harm prevention and screening approach to prepare staff to promptly detect early suicide warning signs and properly evaluate suicide
risks at a level commensurate to the risk profile of the student population. While a lack of an evidence-based suicide risk reduction for students is rather common among schools around the nation, this deficit does increase the potential risk for on-campus suicide. We have found this to be an extremely important high stakes area for schools. There were 129 deaths from on-campus suicide at public, independent and faith-based schools in the United States from 1998-2013.\textsuperscript{12} We have seen a number of instances where parents of students who commit suicide, even in an off-campus setting, litigate their child’s school claiming that the suicide was a result of situations that occurred at the school. Simply referring students to an outside mental health provider via their parents has proven to be ineffective.

In addition, in our experience, self-harm prevention and screening measures are also among the most important approaches to reduce the risk of active assailant and targeted school attacks carried out by students. Though the majority of individuals at increased risk of suicide do not pose a threat to others, multiple research projects have demonstrated that a number of our nation’s most deadly school shootings have been carried out by individuals who demonstrated significant risk of suicide prior to their attacks. When combined with research by the FBI, United States Department of Education and the United States Secret Service, the following examples illustrate this concern:

- The attack at Columbine High School
- The attack at the Red Lake Reservation High School
- The Sandy Hook attack
- The Arapahoe High School shooting and arson attack
- The attack at Marjorie-Stoneman Douglas High School (though the attacker did not kill himself, the video he made on the morning of the attack as well as other documentation clearly showed that he planned to kill himself.)

We note that this is by far an incomplete list. We also note that many of the eleven educators who have carried out active assailant and targeted school attacks have also either killed themselves or attempted to do so. As with the Sandy Hook Elementary School attack above, a number of adults who were not school employees planned to and did kill themselves during mass casualty attacks. Two examples include the... by a school.

We also find that it is important to note that as the SPS implements important prevention and assessment processes of this and other types, care must be exercised not to create situations were SPS staffing levels are not adequate for personnel who are tasked with implementing them to properly

\textsuperscript{12} \texttt{http://safehavensinternational.org/file/2014/08/Relative_Risks_of_Death_in_U.S._K-12_Schools.pdf}
perform their duties. Our post-incident reviews of the 2013 Arapahoe High School arson and active shooter attack illustrate how a school district with highly sophisticated processes can miss opportunities to prevent an attack because appropriate levels of staffing are not in place to carry out the processes with fidelity.

**Options for Consideration: The District should continue the efforts to improve the current suicide prevention and risk assessment approach.**

The District reports evaluation of improved approaches to self-harm prevention and screening. At the time of our interviews, SPS personnel advised that they were evaluating the Salem-Keiser Model for self-harm prevention. We note that SPS personnel reported that all SPS mental health personnel had been provided with formal training in this area and that training in this area has been offered regularly at the SPS Summer Institute. The SPS also reported that training on the recognition of concerning behaviors as well as the effects of trauma on students have been provide for school bus drivers.

In general, we suggest the District consider the following:

- Adopting an evidence-based suicide risk screening tool for staff to promptly detect early suicide warning signs and properly evaluate suicide and self-harm risks. The staff tasked with this responsibility should be properly trained, use a standardized approach, and document their actions for any suicide screenings they perform. This approach can increase the likelihood of reporting and the accuracy of screening.

- Creating a point of contact for student suicide and self-harm prevention efforts at its schools. This staff member who conduct the evaluation should receive training through evidence-based programs. A number of our clients have spoken highly of the ASSIST (Applied Suicide Intervention Skills Training) model, which provides training on suicide first-aid to help a person at risk stay safe and seek further help as needed. The program also teaches how to use a suicide intervention model to identify persons with suicide thoughts. We suggest that individual staff and building administrators who wish to provide information relating to suicide prevention allow the point of contact to vet the content before disseminating information on suicide prevention to staff and students. As with bullying and threat evaluation and management, we have encountered a number of training programs, information on websites, etc. that are not based on research and could in fact exacerbate these types of situations. Regardless of the training program and tools that are utilized, we suggest the SPS designate a specific point person for this important specialty area.

- Adopting and providing evidence-based suicide prevention awareness-level training to staff and age-appropriate information to students.
As deaths from suicides and medical emergencies are far more common than highly publicized acts of violence at K12 schools, we find that the efforts and investment to have a robust evidence-based suicide prevention capability can be an invaluable resource to help address these and other issues. As mentioned elsewhere in this report, the SPS leadership team should continually assess the staffing levels for the departments tasked with addressing this important life-safety area as well as the overall requirements of the other important mental health support services.

5.1.6. **The District lacks a proper mental health recovery team or partnership.**

While the SPS reports having a robust mental health recovery team, our interviews with SPS mental health staff did not support this view. When we asked about this specifically, ISP mental health personnel we interviewed expressed concerns that the SPS did not have adequate capabilities to address a mass-casualty event. Mental health recovery plans and properly trained team members can be extremely important, especially in mass-casualty events. It is not unusual for a community to experience suicides of involved parties or for family members and friends of victims in the aftermath of a major school crisis event.

**Options for Consideration:** The District should develop a formal mental health recovery team or develop a formal partnership with an organization qualified to provide such services.

We suggest our clients consider developing a mental health recovery team or partnership with the following components:

- A standardized mental health recovery model. Examples of these approaches include: The National Association of School Psychologists, the National Organization of Victim’s Assistance, the American Red Cross, the International Red Cross model.
- Formal training for team members with at a minimum, annual refresher training.
- Written recovery plans that are adequate for mass casualty events.
- The use of tabletop exercises on an annual basis.
- A written memorandum of understanding between school districts when a multi-district team is utilized.

The District is considering the PREPARE model which has an excellent reputation in the field. The District should support the model by addressing each of the points described above. Of particular importance is the development of a written recovery plan with specific mass casualty considerations, as detailed in the section above, as well as training on how to use the plan and tabletop exercises to test the plan. The District may wish to consider the use of our mental health recovery training video to generate ideas for this approach. This video is available at no cost to the District as a value-added
resource. The District is also free to share this video with its community partners and personnel from other schools in the county.

5.1.7. While the SPS does have full-time nurses at all high schools, some middle and elementary schools do not have full-time school nurses.

Though there is a lack of accurate data on deaths from medical emergencies in U.S. K12 schools, our experience has been that deaths of students and staff from medical emergencies appear to be much more common than deaths from violence. In addition, nurses can help address serious injuries caused by school violence. Research by a team of physicians at M.D. Anderson and affiliated hospitals using extrapolated fatality data for school-aged children concluded that deaths from medical emergencies is probably the leading cause of death for K12 schools. We have encountered numerous instances where school nurses have been able to save the lives of students and school employees in K12 schools. The lack of AEDs in some schools also compounds this situation.

Options for Consideration: The District should consider increasing the staffing of nurses for its schools or develop an alternative approach to medical emergencies on its campuses.

In our experience, the benefits of improved staffing of school nurses would provide an enhancement of life-safety that would be reasonable when considering the cost. If this approach is not feasible for District funding levels, the District should consider providing a higher level of emergency medical training for staff at each school. We also suggest the District consider providing “Stop the Bleed” training for members of the crisis team at each school. This program has proven to be effective in reducing the number of fatalities in active assailant attacks.

5.1.8. While we note numerous positive practices SPS pre-employment screening processes, we do note some opportunities for improvement in the current process for employees as well as background check for volunteers and contractors who work in the District.

We note a number of highly positive practices for pre-employment screening in SPS. For example:

- The District conducts a fingerprint-based pre-employment criminal history checks for all full-time personnel and most part-time employees and all substitute teachers. This criminal history check includes a check of Washington State and FBI databases.

- The District has a written minimum standard for hiring eligibility based on types of conviction data that indicate a high degree of risk for personnel who work with children. HR personnel did say they felt this should be updated. HR personnel also advised that currently, a single employee can make the determination for these situations. We suggest that at least two people make these decisions and that this be documented.
• The District also has a formal standardized process for checking of references for candidates and for documenting reference checks. The District also requires letters of work-related references and checks with at least one current supervisor of the applicant. The District uses a ten-question written reference form for this.

• The District has a written code of conduct that addresses the types of misconduct that can serve as potential indicators of attempted child abuse. We suggest the District put this code of conduct forward in the job application to increase the chances that dangerous sexual abusers of children and youth will self-select out of the application process. This practice also provides stronger evidence of notification should the District have to terminate an employee for violation of the code of conduct. In addition, this approach sends a clear message to the majority of school employees who would never abuse a child that they should report violations of the code of conduct by other employees. This can be especially difficult for situations where abusers have effectively won the trust and admiration of their colleagues by grooming them in an attempt to reduce the chances they will be reported for violations of policy.

• The District has a policy that notifies applicants that they can be terminated after they are hired if the District learns that they have been untruthful during the application process. We do suggest this be put forward early in the application form.

• The District does provide training on mandatory reporting and boundaries invasion, harassment, bullying and intimidation during the onboarding training for new hires. The District also uses the highly effective approach of using scenarios to teach how the policies relating to these topics can be applied. Staff we interviewed were not sure if training on sexual misconduct is provided for employees or not. If not, we suggest this topic be added and that scenarios also be used in the training. If it is not currently being done, we suggest that the fact that all employees must complete these training programs if they are hired should be put forward in the job application.

• We also note that the District has developed a specific written reporting procedure for staff and students to report child abuse concerns and allegations. We also find it to be highly positive that the SPS has developed and communicated multiple avenues for students to report these types of concerns. Administrators are trained in this area annually and they in turn provide training on this for school staff. We note that HR reports having and utilizing a system to test compliance with this practice. There were concerns that staff have become bored with the training as the same training is repeated every year. We suggest the District consider using new scenarios for the training each year and that the delivery of these courses be rotated with more advanced/different relevant topics be covered every other year. We note that all new employees should receive the same basic course during onboarding.
The District uses a robust array of viable “red flag” questions on the application to increase the chances that previous concerning behavior might be identified. For example, the application form asks the applicant to disclose:

- If they have ever been placed on a plan of improvement or placed on probation with any employer.
- If they have ever been placed on leave pending investigation or otherwise investigated by an employer regarding allegations of misconduct.
- If they have ever been the subject of a complaint to Superintendent of Public Instruction or any other disciplinary or licensing body. This questions includes positions within or outside of educational organizations.
- If the applicant has ever been separated from any employer in order to avoid being discharged, fired, or non-renewed for employment, threatened with discipline or discharge.
- If the applicant has ever had sanctions placed on their teaching certificate for any reason.
- If the applicant has ever been denied a teaching certificate for any reason.
- If there is currently any disciplinary action pending against the applicant.
- If the applicant has ever had an educational job or related license, permit, or certification revoked or suspended, or been subject to discipline, from a licensing or certification agency, such as the State Board of Education or Professional Educators Standards Board, in Washington State or any other jurisdiction.
- If the applicant has ever been found in any disciplinary action under RCW 13.34.040 to have sexually assaulted or exploited any minor or to have physically abused any minor.
- If the applicant has ever been found by a court in a domestic relations proceeding under Title 26 RCW to have sexually abused or exploited any minor, or to have physically abused any minor.
- If the applicant has ever been found in any disciplinary board final decision to have sexually or physically abused any minor or developmentally disabled person, or to have abused or financially exploited any vulnerable adult? “Disciplinary board final decision” is described in detail in this section of the application.
We note that putting these types of screening questions forward in the application process can not only help to increase the chances that the screening process will more accurately identify applicants who pose an increased risk of child abuse if hired, but also can result in high-risk candidates from “self-selecting” out of the employment process. This is because sophisticated sexual abusers of children and youth tend to prefer work environments where the organization is less aware of effective child abuse prevention measures and which allow a less organized structure which will reduce the chances they will be identified if they attempt to abuse students. We see the above type of screening to be a highly positive protective approach.

These types of screening questions, requirements and processes can be very beneficial as they can result in some applicants who are likely to abuse students withdrawing from the application process or being identified as posing a high risk of abusing students if hired. At the same time, we also noted some opportunities to further improve upon the significant advancements already made in the District’s pre-employment screening processes as well as to increase the likelihood that sophisticated sexual predators will “self-select” out of the District’s application process.

**Options for Consideration:** Due to the inherent limitations on criminal history checks, the District may wish to consider adding additional pre-employment screening steps.

We suggest the following options be considered:

- Adding a fingerprint-based background state police and FBI criminal history check for all volunteers and volunteer coaches who are not currently being checked in this manner. The District should also verify that school bus drivers undergo a comparable screening process. Data from the state department of education reveals that 12% of all K12 employees who have been arrested for child abuse were school bus drivers. While this type of check and the current approach both have limitations, in our experience, the benefits of conducting both types of background checks will outweigh the costs over time.

- Adding a second pre-employment criminal history check with a social security trace feature, a county-by-county criminal history check for the counties where the applicant has lived and worked and a national sexual predator database search. Currently, state law enforcement and FBI fingerprint checks in any state will fail to identify about 50% of all conviction data. In addition, these checks will miss data removed from these databases by some states. For example, convictions for child abuse and other types of sexual violence and other felonious violent crime data is removed by the state of Massachusetts seven years after an offender completes probation. Most of the conviction data that is missed with state and FBI checks is not revealed due to the failure of local criminal justice officials failing to forward the conviction data to their state police. The social security trace helps identify where an applicant has lived for the past seven years and provides a county by county check which significantly increases the chance that conviction data will be identified. Putting forward in the application that these additional screening steps are conducted further increases the chances that sophisticated sexual predators...
and other candidates at high risk for violence will self-select out of the application process. When considering that there have been at least eleven fatal shootings by school employees in the United States to date it is important to note, this approach can also help reduce these types of deadly workplace violence.

- Currently, only contracted therapists undergo periodic post-hire re-background checks. We suggest the SPS consider implementing another leading practice of requiring periodic post-hire re-background checks. An increasing number of non-public schools and school systems have adopted this practice. Some school organizations re-background all personnel every two or three years. Others screen a rotating group of a percentage of 25%, 33%, or 50% of personnel every year to achieve a re-background of all personnel over a given time period of two, three or four years. This approach helps to reduce cost and to spread the cost over a series of years.

- We suggest the SPS consider developing and putting forward in the application, a written policy that requires all employees to report any arrest to their supervisor promptly and in no event, less than a specified number of hours after the arrest. We suggest that the policy indicate that a violation of this policy can result in disciplinary action up to and including termination.

- Establishing and following updated clear “no-hire” standards. Examples of no-hire standards from another client of ours include:
  - A no-hire standard for any misdemeanor conviction within the past five years.
  - A no-hire standard for any felony conviction within the past 25 years.

We note that these are not specific no-hire standards for the SPS but are instead provided as examples of what other clients have used for illustrative purposes.

- Reevaluate and if needed, improving the current positive practice that has been established by the SPS in writing and further Clarifying how indications of a criminal record will be handled. Examples of these include:
  - A practice of requiring court documents for some situations where a candidate is being considered who has a conviction record beyond the mandatory no-hire parameters.
  - A team approach to consideration for candidates who have a conviction record beyond the above parameters.
  - General counsel may be asked to review specific cases where a person who has been convicted before the time frame of above parameters.

- Currently, the SPS purges personnel files of allegations and disciplinary actions every two years. This information is moved to a district data base. We caution the SPS to be sure that a reliable
means to check that databased whenever an allegation of child abuse, threats to carry out violence, harassment, bullying or intimidation by employees is received. One of our client districts in California lost a jury trial with the largest monetary award of its type in the state. A key issue considered by the jury was the fact that the district had purged the employee’s file and that due to turnover at the cabinet level, personnel did not know that information about a number of previous allegations had been moved to another file stored in a warehouse.

- Providing department heads and administrators who will interview applicants and/or references with training by human resources personnel and/or legal counsel on the types of questions they should ask to enhance screening. For example, asking references “red flag” questions such as whether or not they have any reason why the applicant should not be placed in a position of trust with children. There are similar questions that can be asked of applicants that have proven to be useful in more effectively screening candidates. This training should also include guidance on the types of questions that should not be asked during interviews. We suggest these “red flag” questions also include questions that can reveal the potential for workplace violence. For example, asking applicants and references if the candidate has a history of engaging in an unusual number of arguments with co-workers can be revealing. Specific questions about indications of demonstrated intolerance of others related to ethnicity, gender, sexual preference, age, and religion based on words and/or actions is one example. Potential pre-attack indicators for violence can be found in the guide released by the FBI in 2018.\textsuperscript{13}

We also suggest our clients consider adding the following in the application documents and applicants be required to sign a statement that they understand each of these documents:

- All of the positive screening as well as post-hire practices that are already in place in the initial job application phase.

- A requirement in every job description clearly requiring following all state laws and school policies designed to protect students from abuse.

- Notifying applicants that all employees are responsible for reporting violations of the code of conduct.

While the SPS is already doing a far more thorough job of this than most K12 school systems we have assessed, these additional efforts will further demonstrate to a sophisticated sexual predator that if they accept employment with the District, they are going to be entering an educated and attentive environment where the sexual abuser is more likely to be detected if they attempt to groom and otherwise abuse students. This could not only further increase the reliability of the District’s current screening processes but could also increase the likelihood that sophisticated sexual predators will “self-select” out of the application process.

\textsuperscript{13} \url{https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/pre-attack-behaviors-of-active-shooters-in-us-2000-2013.pdf/view}
As mentioned above, we saw numerous indicators that the District is very proactive in the area of pre-employment screening. While the additional options for consideration should be considered, putting the current positive practices forward in the application should help deter some applicants who are at increased risk of abusing students from completing the application process. We note, however, that any of these approaches should be vetted with legal counsel before being implemented.

We also suggest the following free resources for additional information on pre-employment screening practices:


- *Fact Sheet: What You Need to Know about Sex Offenders by Center for Effective Public Policy* (2008).15

- *Staff Screening Tool Kit* by Nonprofit Risk Management Center (2004).16

- *Identifying Child Molesters – Preventing Child Sexual Abuse by Recognizing the Patterns of Offenders* by Dr. Carla Van Dam. This book can be extremely helpful for human resources personnel and district-level administrators.

Finally, we suggest the District consider developing a standard approach to screening contractors who will work on the school campus and all volunteers. The District may wish to consider adding a second background check through a private contractor which may find arrest and conviction data that will not show up on a state police/FBI fingerprint check. The state/police/FBI background checks typically will not be able to find about 40 percent of criminal convictions because local criminal justice agencies fail to submit records as they should.

We caution that it is very common for school employees to assume that once a person has cleared any type of background check, they cannot be a sexual predator. We have also observed that volunteers who have not had a background check and are not authorized to be alone with students end up being left alone with students because they are trusted. We describe the types of sophisticated sexual predators of greatest concern in the school setting as:

- Looking like anyone.
- Being of above-average intelligence (as one of our analysts states it “smarter than we are.”
- They are often extremely competent in their job roles.

• They are often highly regarded because they spend a great deal of time and energy “grooming” the adults around them with a carefully developed persona. They often try to do this by establishing a high level of trust, so others will dismiss red flag behaviors.

• Being very well educated on how to groom adults, groom children, avoid detection, and how to counter allegations via secure internet communications with one another.

• They typically do not like policies, procedures and structure that create a lack of clarity and boundaries.

• They may try to avoid highly informed and properly structured school settings where they realize that their efforts to groom students will be more likely to be noticed. For this reason, they may opt to “self-select” out of the application process or move to another school setting where there is a structure that is not welcoming to those who desire to abuse children and youth.

Any and all options for consideration listed in this section should be carefully vetted by the Human Resources Department as well as the District’s Legal Counsel and insurance/risk management service provider before implementation.

Our analysts find that the HR Department will likely need additional personnel and an increased budget for the costs of additional screening to implement the above enhancements. At the same time, our experience has been that the costs of these personnel and enhancements will prove to be less expensive for the District over time. More importantly, in our experience, based on the size of the SPS, this investment could help prevent the pain and lasting emotional damage resulting from sexual abuse of students.

5.1.9. There are opportunities for improvement in student supervision at some SPS schools.

During the assessment, our analysts observed opportunities for improvement in student supervision during class changes, outdoor activities, as well as arrival and dismissal times at some schools. For example, our analysts noted staff were not in appropriate positions to properly supervise the students they were supervising in the playgrounds and during class changes at a third of schools in the District. We observed that staff tend to walk in front of students, losing sight of the students they supervised during class changes. Staff also tend to be too far away to be able to clearly see and hear their students in outdoor play areas. We also noted students or groups of students around the school campuses without any adult supervision during school hours at 65 percent of the assessed schools. It did not appear that the students had legitimate reason (such as going to the bathrooms) for being out of classrooms at that time.

We also noted deficiency in student supervision during arrival and dismissal times at many SPS schools. Specifically, we noted the following:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Outside areas during arrival/dismissal time</th>
<th>Percentage of SPS schools observed to have staff at the areas to provide student supervision during arrival/dismissal time</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Student drop-off/pick-up areas</td>
<td>65 percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Bus loading/unloading areas</td>
<td>75 percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Crosswalk areas where students, staff and parents often use</td>
<td>55 percent</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Overall, our analysts noted some areas that would benefit from additional student supervision at 61 percent of SPS schools. Of particular concern is that there was minimal and, in some instances, even no student supervision outside during arrival and dismissal time middle and high schools, and limited supervision at elementary schools. Personnel at some schools in the District advised us during the assessment that due to union contract regulation, teachers are not allowed to be assigned to supervising duties. The District, therefore, has to use paraprofessionals for student supervision during arrival and dismissal times, recess and lunch time. It appeared that the District did not hire paraprofessionals for student supervision at middle and high schools during arrival and dismissal times.

Options for consideration: The District should consider strategies to enhance student supervision at its schools, particularly during arrival and dismissal times.

As many safety incidents happen at schools with inadequate student supervision, the need for improved student supervision is even more urgent. Improving student supervision can reduce the risks of almost any type of school safety incident, including bullying, sexual assaults, drug use, traffic fatalities, abduction of students, weather-related emergencies, and active shooter events. Improve supervision also helps prevent many types of safety incidents like fights and the management of reverse evacuative measures in response to catastrophic events like hazardous weather events and even rare events like active shooter incidents. In our experience, effective student supervision can also help to decrease casualties if a major school crisis situation such as a fire, tornado or an act of violence.

The District should consider providing training or briefings to school staff on techniques for effective student supervision, particularly for those at elementary schools. Documenting these efforts properly tends to significantly improve the level of student supervision and student safety. This, in turn, reduces the organization’s exposure to civil liability by preventing incidents and improving documentation when incidents do occur. Focusing intently on this goal at the building and District level would provide an excellent ratio of improvement in relation to the effort expended. Please see Appendix V for more information on effective student supervision techniques.
The District should also consider hiring and assigning more paraprofessionals for student supervision duties during arrival and dismissal times at the middle and high schools. Though this approach is extremely expensive, school districts that cannot require teaching staff to supervise students must often utilize this approach to provide a reasonable level of student supervision. The District should also enforce that students be limited to some areas in the schools with adult supervision (such as library, cafeteria, etc.) after arrival and before schools start. We also suggest that staff who supervise students in outdoor areas be issued high-visibility vests, whistles, and when possible, provided with portable radios.

5.1.10. Administrators at some middle and high schools expressed concerns relating to student supervision and safety, security, and emergency preparedness for school facilities during after-school activities.

Like many other public-school systems, the SPS works to make its schools available for student sporting practices and a variety of community groups’ activities during after-hours. District officials report regular usage of its schools by community groups and students for after school activities such as athletics, choirs, band practice, etc. While this type of usage has many positive benefits for both the District and the community it serves, a number of middle and high school administrators we interviewed expressed concerns about the District’s ability to address student supervision and safety, security, and emergency preparedness for the facilities used for after-school activities. As with other school systems and non-public schools, we have found that it can be very difficult for school officials to balance these sometimes-competing objectives.

Options for consideration: The District should carefully consider strategies to address the concerns regarding student supervision and safety, security, and emergency preparedness measures for after-hours activities at its middle and high school buildings.

The District may wish to consider the following:

- **Increased student supervision for after school programs.** Regardless of access control approaches for after-hours events, supervision of students and non-students is an important area. The District should consider finding ways to create effective adult supervision by District staff when schools are open to public use.

- **Proximity cards for students at after school programs at the high school.** While the approach has a number of limitations, the District might benefit from issuing proximity cards to students to provide them access to specific areas during specific time frames in the early evening. This could help maintain locked exterior doors at least to an extent. This would be a similar approach to that used by many hotels where the guest’s room key can unlock side doors. While this approach will not eliminate doors being left open, students allowing non-students from following them into the school, etc., it would enhance security. If adopted, this approach should
• **Roving CROs or school security officer(s).** A number of public-school systems have had success in utilizing contracted or in-house school security personnel to provide roving coverage for schools during after-hours events. While not suggested for large events that might require assigned officers, this approach can help enhance safety and security for the school districts that do not have funding to provide officers for each activity. Our preference has generally been for schools to utilize employees of the districts though we have seen some excellent quality contract security companies. The District may also wish to consider using multiple part-time personnel who provide coverage on different days. This can provide the benefits of having additional personnel who can be called in when extra security is needed. Many districts utilize unarmed personnel for this function while some utilized armed personnel. If armed personnel are desired, the same standards listed for armed officers we described earlier would apply. In many instances where this approach is utilized, carefully selected retired law enforcement officers are often selected for these types of positions.

• **Designating a District employee to be in charge in the event of an after-hours emergency.** Another approach that has been helpful to many of our clients involves requiring that at least one District employee be on-site and designated as having authority to shut down an event or take other appropriate actions if they determine that the event is not reasonably safe. Most often, schools pay stipends or overtime for the employees who are brought in to provide these duties. In other instances, schools have been able to utilize personnel who will already be on site when activities occur. Such personnel should not be expected nor instructed to provide security duties that require special training. For example, a school custodian who is tasked with these types of duties should not typically try to physically remove an intoxicated and unruly participant in an event but should instead be trained to call 911 and request police assistance.

• **Emergency call phones.** One challenge that can arise in some school can be the ability of visitors to make an emergency call during after-hours activities. For example, it is not uncommon for portable phones to be unreliable inside some school buildings. This can result in a delay in notification of emergency services personnel. Therefore, installing emergency call phones around the facilities could be helpful. One option to address this is the installation of emergency call phones such as those commonly seen on higher education campuses. Telephones that are enabled only to call the District’s alarm monitoring company or 911 can also be used if complimented by high visibility signage. Ideally, this type of phone will automatically dial if the handset is lifted off of the receiver. It is also wise to locate these types of devices in an area covered by security cameras.
5.1.11. It did not appear the District had a written procedure to regulate who can review, record, and distribute security camera footage.

It appeared that the District is informal in how it controls and supervises the copying and distribution of security camera footage. We have seen a number of serious problems for school districts that have occurred from a lack of proper written guidance regulating who can retrieve camera footage, who can receive copies of footage, and how the use of video footage can be used.

Options for Consideration: The District should consider developing written protocols to regulate who can access, review, record, and distribute security camera footage, including local police agencies personnel.

The District should consider developing written guidelines that define who can have access to security camera footage, who can capture footage, and how and when they can be shared with internal and external personnel. It is important to remember that a portable phone can be used to film security camera footage and that policies should specifically address this concern. We also suggest the SPS develop a written agreement between the District, the bus company and local law enforcement which clearly spells out when security camera footage from buses (and district facilities) can be copied and/or distributed. This document should clearly address the filming of video footage as well as capture via the camera system. We have seen some extremely troubling situations where school employees and law enforcement officers have copied and released footage. There have been cases where footage has been posted on websites and gone viral, other instances where footage has been aired on national news programs and in one very alarming case, a school district police chief providing the family of a child who died in a school with the camera footage for the entire school. In this instance, the police chief was the uncle of the student who died, and the family used the footage to litigate the District in a federal civil action. The District was unable to terminate the school police chief because they did not have a written policy prohibiting the practice.

5.2. Emergency Communications, Access Control, and other Security Technologies

5.2.1. While significantly increased and meaningful efforts have been made in the past two years, the SPS is currently

**RCW 42.56.420 Safe Schools Planning — Content Redacted Here. If Disclosed, Would Identify Specific Safety Vulnerabilities**

life-safety implications. Although Safe Havens is not qualified to perform and has not performed a **RCW 42.56.420 Safe Schools Planning — Content Redacted Here. If Disclosed, Would Identify Specific Safety Vulnerabilities**

we do have an adequate professional background to determine that the SPS has some significant vulnerabilities to **RCW 42.56.420 Safe Schools Planning — Content Redacted Here. If Disclosed, Would Identify Specific Safety Vulnerabilities**

For this reason, we suggest the SPS make **RCW 42.56.420 Safe Schools Planning — Content Redacted Here. If Disclosed, Would Identify Specific Safety Vulnerabilities**

that can be **RCW 42.56.420 Safe Schools Planning — Content Redacted Here. If Disclosed, Would Identify Specific Safety Vulnerabilities**

school systems, we are becoming

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increasingly concerned about. Many of our clients are reporting. For example, school districts and non-public schools have reported. For example, someone school. While we were working on this report. In another even more alarming case,®

Other types of situations of concern include but are not limited to the following plausible scenarios:

• systems.
• systems to schools.
• and perhaps even practices.

Of considerable additional concern is the the District access to as has already occurred in a concerning number of school systems. The SPS has dedicated some funding for limited for a practices.

And while SPS report generally effective practices across the District in this area, there are still instances where decisions to personnel. This could prevent standpoint. As but one example of how critical this can be this it was determined that all of the Government officials were concerned not only that the, but also that this information

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The SPS currently lacks written policy and staff development to properly.

Options for Consideration: The SPS should consider making ongoing an

In addition to, we advise our clients to develop and enforce

While Safe Havens does not perform and did not perform a as part of this assessment, we do have a level of familiarity with these types of risks and the need for districts to develop a systemic way to address them. While feedback from District personnel was that most in the District. We also suggest the SPS evaluate the District’s level of as part of this effort. In addition, the SPS should consider development of a systemic staff development and awareness effort to help SPS personnel understand proper but the reasons they are so critical. As with suggested options for consideration for and other important functional areas, we suggest that SPS are an integral part of these discussions. The SPS has already been evaluating options to address these types of and would of course be tasked with implementing these types of enhancements.

5.2.2. There are opportunities for improvement in the current radio system at SPS.

While all schools in the District have portable radios, the radios are primarily issued to key school personnel and administrators. Twenty percent of schools in the District reported that they do not have enough radios for staff and that teachers to take with them while on duty outdoors (such as traffic monitoring, student supervision, etc.). In fact, during the assessment, our analysts noted inconsistency in staff carrying radios while on duty outside at many schools in the District.

Additionally, the current radio system does not have interoperable communication capability with first responders (fire, police, EMS, etc.), and therefore, does not support the National Incident Management System (NIMS) framework. The 911 center also does not have the capability to communicate directly with school officials via radios. Currently, only specific CROs and CRO command staff have radios with interoperable capability, and not all schools in the District have CROs. This could result in significant delays and increased chances for miscommunication during an emergency. In addition, even CROs do not have fully interoperability with school radios.

Options for Consideration: The District should consider providing some schools with additional portable radios, requiring staff who are supervising students outdoors to carry a radio, and working with local public safety partners to explore the steps needed to provide its schools with radios that have interoperable capability with local first responders.
The District should first provide additional portable radios to some schools and verify to make sure that all schools have adequate radios for staff and teachers to take with them while on duty outdoors. The District should then consider requiring staff and teachers to have a radio with them during outdoor duty and emphasizing the importance of this practice. During the assessment, some school administrators expressed the concerns about how to communicate with students and staff for an emergency when they are outdoors while others stated that their staff would rely on cellphones for emergency communications. While there are a variety of emergency communications technology options for schools, we still find that portable radios and PA systems are among the most reliable, rapid and effective means for school staff to communicate in a crisis event. In our experience providing post-incident assistance for more than 300 school crisis events, we find that:

- Communications via PA systems and portable radios are much faster and more reliable than portable telephones and phone applications. In our experience, these systems are faster, more reliable and less prone to simple but potentially deadly errors that can occur with seemingly more robust systems. We have found during our crisis scenario simulations and actual events that personnel who attempt to use phone apps (such as the RAVE app currently in use in the District), emergency warning systems that have pre-recorded messages to implement lockdown, and other emergency protective actions can actually take longer. The results of our scenario simulations have revealed that these systems are far more prone to human errors, which can have catastrophic results. For example, a staff member pressing the wrong button and communicating to students and staff that they should lockdown in classrooms when they should actually be moving to severe weather sheltering areas. Conversely, this type of mistake could easily result in hundreds of students and staff moving into hallways when they should be implementing a lockdown. While they can have benefits as a supplemental means of communications, we do not recommend mobile apps as the primary means of communicating in an emergency unless there is not a viable alternative.

- Portable radios are much easier for staff who are experiencing the very common problem of diminished fine motor skills during an emergency to use, and the problem of staff sending out the wrong alert for the situation is much lower with radios. Because it is common for people who are under extremes stress to experience degraded fine motor skill loss as their heart rate escalates above 115 beats per minute, it can be extremely difficult for them to dial a portable telephone. This can create significant limitations in reliability for emergency phone applications. Portable radios do not require as much fine motor skill utilization for people who are under extreme stress.

- The ability of school staff to successfully make life-saving communications goes up considerably if they have portable radios with them when supervising students outside during arrival/dismissal time or in outdoor areas such as playgrounds, nature trails and athletic fields. Radios not only allow staff to summon emergency assistance much faster than portable telephones, but they also provide faster notification of school personnel who can provide
important emergency assistance. For example, if a student experienced sudden cardiac arrest while on the athletic field, a staff member could notify the office of the situation immediately. This notification could help emergency responders arrive at the scene faster because School staff could call an ambulance, send the School nurse and arrange for a staff member to meet responding fire and ambulance personnel to guide them to the exact location where the child is located. When a staff member in this type of situation calls 911 directly as their first action, two of these three functions will typically be delayed, and the staff member will be tied up on the line while talking to the 911 operator.

- It is a positive enhancement of safety when school staff who are supervising students in cafeterias and gymnasiums carry portable radios for the same reason. Our post-incident evaluation of the 2013 Arapahoe High School active shooter incident revealed that the actions of a school custodian who was able to initiate a lockdown of the school via a radio when he observed a student exit his vehicle with a shotgun saved many lives. We have encountered many more typical incidents where the rapid request for emergency assistance via portable radio has saved lives.

- The consistent use of portable radios also creates a backup emergency notification system for staff who are working outside their school.

- Unlike many options, portable radios can be used for a wide array of prevention measures such as communicating where staff should move to enhance student supervision, the need to lock a gate, or to report the presence of a suspicious vehicle on or near a campus.

- Portable radios are not prone to false alerts that have been problematic with some emergency notification systems.

- Portable radios are not prone to the serious risk of sending the wrong emergency voiceover announcements that can easily occur with systems that provide a variety of verbal prompts for different protective actions. For example, accidentally ordering severe weather sheltering when a lockdown is needed.

- Portable radios can provide a deterrent effect that is not achieved with other communications systems because bad actors can readily see that school staff can rapidly summon public safety assistance when staff are carrying portable radios. Having staff carry portable radios can demonstrate to an individual who is surveilling the school as a potential attack site that emergency assistance can be summoned quickly in an emergency. Having maintenance personnel, administrators, and other personnel move about the campus constantly can enhance safety considerably.

- Portable radios often remain operable when portable phone systems become unreliable.
• When properly trained, the user of a portable radio can drown out background noise by pressing the radio to their throat. This can allow a school employee in a loud environment to communicate without leaving the area to seek a quieter environment. This technique is often unreliable with portable telephones.

We suggest the District consider a comprehensive approach combining technology, training and drills to prepare staff to use approaches that combine low-tech as well as modern technology approaches. We note that it is extremely important to train staff on proper portable radio usage. Of special importance are:

• Training staff to use short transmissions to prevent tying up the radio.

• Training staff to repeat critical information such as the type of emergency, assistance needed and location. This should be done quickly and can reduce the chances that the wrong type of assistance will be sent or that it will be sent to the wrong location. For example, in one instance at a university, campus police officers where shot at from a distance and were returning fire. When an officer called for assistance for a “firefight” the dispatcher called the fire department. As the fire trucks approached, they were also fired upon. This of course caused a severe delay in police assistance for the officers who were now out of ammunition and exposed fire fighters to danger. As an example, “This is Mr. Sanchez, I have a student who is not breathing in room 106, I need an ambulance, an AED and the nurse. I repeat, this is Mr. Sanchez, I have a student who is not breathing in room 106, I need an ambulance, an AED and the nurse.” In this example, calling in the information once takes approximately 7.5 seconds. When the information is repeated, it takes only an additional 6.25 extra seconds but could save two to five minutes that could be lost if the nurse responded to room 306 because the location is misunderstood. To help further reduce this type of danger, staff should be taught to rapidly repeat back to the staff member what they understand to be the problem. For example: “Mr. Sanchez, Nurse Brennan and coach Norris are on the way to room 106 with an AED and we are calling an ambulance.” This extra step adds about 7.5 seconds to the time it takes but could make save considerable and precious time if it prevents a police officer being dispatched to the school instead of an ambulance.

• With proper practice and training, staff can often make an intercom announcement while transmitting the need to implement emergency protective actions via radio or telephone the same time. For example, a properly trained school employee can key a microphone to make an internal and external PA announcement to lockdown while also broadcasting via portable radio to provide redundant communications for staff who have a radio but may only be able to hear one or the other communications due to their location. In some cases, staff can dial 911 and then make a ten to fifteen second intercom announcement for lockdown while the phone call is processing. If a 911 operator picks up before the staff member has finished the announcement, they will likely hear the lockdown announcement and realize what the call is about. If the call is
from a school phone, the 911 operator may know the street address of the school via enhanced 911 capabilities.

- We note that many school phone systems can be programmed to send text messages and/or e-mail alerts to key staff such as building administrators, police and security personnel, school security directors and other district level staff. While this technology does not show the specific problem, it does alert key personnel that 911 has been called and what phone the call came from.

- Many of our clients have had good success with the use of rescue whistles. Originally designed for hikers and as a means for college students to sound an alert if they are approached by a potential attacker, these whistles, can be used by a staff member to more rapidly communicate to students and other staff in outdoor areas in an emergency and can dramatically reduce the amount of time that it takes to evacuate students from a cafeteria or auditorium. If staff and students are trained that these whistles can be used to prompt students to stop talking, look at and listen to the instructions of staff members who blows this type of whistle, even large numbers of students can be warned of the need to move to safety far more rapidly. Training staff and students on the room clear and reverse evacuation procedures can further reduce the time that it takes to move students to safety.

5.2.3. It appeared there was confusion in the perceptions of some staff regarding the functions of the

Our interviews with school staff during the assessment show that each SPS school is

However, while administrators and office staff at approximately two-thirds of schools in the District reported that the

In fact, while the administrators at some schools told our analysts that their

office staff at the same schools told our analysts that

The results of our crisis scenario simulations with administrators and staff at all SPS schools also indicate that it appeared that school personnel at these schools are confused about

Options for Consideration: The District should consider providing school personnel with clarification in the form of improved training and conduct fidelity testing to verify that staff understand

The District should first consider verifying that all of its schools are

In order to improve the

We suggest the District utilize periodic fidelity testing to continually gauge how well-prepared staff are to use these valuable systems.

5.2.4. While all SPS schools have a vestibule by the main entry doors, the setup of the vestibules at the majority of the schools do not channel visitors to the main office to reduce the risk of a visitor bypassing the visitor screening process.

As stated on the District’s website, and as our analysts noted during the assessment, all SPS schools in the District now have a single point of entry (SPE) through the implementation of a vestibule by the main entry doors. However, the vestibules at 80 percent of the schools do not provide a second layer of security to more effectively channel visitors to the main office for proper visitor screening. With the current vestibules design at the majority of schools in the District, a visitor can bypass the office once they are buzzed in. While the enhancements made at each school have significantly increased security, the current vestibule design at these schools is not as secure as a design which channels visitors through the office before they can enter the main areas of these schools.

Options for Consideration: The District may wish to consider strategies to retrofit the vestibules at the schools that currently do not channel visitors directly to the main office during future renovations.

We note that the cost of these upgrades should be reviewed in balance with other opportunities to enhance school security. The cost to retrofit or modify a vestibule to a school that currently does not channel visitors directly to the main office varies widely based on current building designs, the layout main office and lobby areas. Therefore, the District should consider the benefits for this type of retrofit in relation to the cost. The District should first consider getting a cost estimate to modify the vestibules that are not set up to channel visitors directly to the main office to see if it is cost-effective to move forward with retrofitting the vestibules or wait until future renovation projects to make this type of upgrade. We caution that some building designs such as the campus of Lewis and Clark High School have significant inherent limits to the utilization of SPE.

5.2.5. There are significant opportunities for improvement in visitor screening process at many SPS schools.

According to District personnel, the District currently does not have a uniform visitor management system (VMS) for its schools. At the time of the assessment, the District was piloting BadgePass, a computer-based VMS at middle and high schools, while the elementary schools were still using a paper-based visitor check-in system. The results of our interviews with office staff at all SPS schools showed that 78 percent of schools in the District were using a paper-based visitor check-in system. This means that A robust office staff to
robust, and it... However, District personnel advised us during the assessment that there was some concern
about the impact on staff time required to maintain this system and that the union contract might not
provide for these duties.

Additionally, our analysts noted that office staff at the majority of schools in the District... This practice can be dangerously ineffective
schools. This approach allows... students and staff. We note that
this approach is not only unreliable but would...

We have been consulted on a number of abductions of students and murders of students and/or
employees that have occurred where visitor management failures are alleged. Our analysts also noted
that visitor sign-in/sign-out sheets/terminals were also often not under the control of front office staff
to prevent people from stealing them, and that ready-made visitor/volunteer badges were often within
the reach of visitors. This significantly increases the risk that someone can steal the badges for
unauthorized use later. For example, a parent who is involved with a custody battle may steal a ready-
made visitor badge while they are still legally able to visit their child’s school so they can use it to abduct
the child if they end up losing custody in court later.

Options for Consideration: The District should consider improving the current visitor screening
approach at all of its schools.

The District should consider equipping all of its schools with a comprehensive computer-based VMS
system. A good computer-based VMS should have some of the following features:

- Screening against the registered sex offender databases in all 50 states.
- Checking visitors against custom databases set by each school which can contain custody alerts
and/or banned visitors.
- Keeping accurate and reliable records for every visitor that enters the school.
- Quickly and easily creating reports for individual schools or the entire district.
- Including a volunteer management system that automatically tracks the hours of a volunteer in
the school.
- Automatically submitting a limited criminal history check on volunteers and short-term
contractors.
- Keeping the vital information volunteers for use in the event of a major crisis event.
• Having the capability to screen groups of visitors, referred to as batching, to speed up the screening process for scheduled events.

• Printing badges with a clear picture.

• Badges should be properly secured from tampering. For example, school systems can face problems on the

The District should also consider enforcing the practice of office staff checking all visitors for their IDs, whether the schools are using a computer-based or paper-based visitor check-in system. We suggest the District communicate with all building administrators and staff who perform these functions that visitors not be allowed to check themselves in. The District should also consider providing office staff with training and/or clear written guidance on how to properly screen visitors. Effective visitor screening processes have successfully averted a number of planned school shootings including a number of attempts at elementary schools. These have most typically involved ex-husbands, ex-boyfriends, domestic partners, and non-custodial parents who were trying to kill an employee they have been involved with or in some cases, to kill their own child to exact revenge on an ex-spouse, girlfriend, etc. We also note that shootings by ex-wives and ex-girlfriends have occurred with two transportation supervisors having been shot in their offices by their ex-wives in the State of Georgia. The following are some measures to help improve a visitor screening process:

• Checking visitors for their government or District issued IDs.

• Whenever possible, checking all visitors against court orders before allowing them to enter the school interior.

• In the case of some visitors who do not possess a government issued ID, the visitors should be limited at the vestibule or office areas only, or if the visitors do have a need to get into the school buildings, they will need to be escorted.

• Having a standardized procedure for releasing a child.

• Implementation of a proper formal student sign out process which includes checking the government issued ID of adults picking up students.

• Whenever possible, checking all visitors against court orders before allowing them to enter the school interior.

• Enforcement of 100 percent staff and visitor badge wear would during the school day increase the chances that an intruder would be quickly spotted.

• Maintaining sign-in books, visitor badges, and other components of the visitor screening system under the control of office staff.
5.2.6. Schools should also consider having AEDs, such as those used in other states. These devices were observed at only 78 percent of SPS schools. During the assessment, our analysts did not observe AEDs at 22 percent of SPS schools. It is possible that in some cases, schools may not have an AED. However, during the assessment, our analysts did not observe AEDs at 33 percent of SPS schools. Therefore, the District may wish to consider checking to verify that all schools have AEDs. They can provide emergency response personnel with greater access to emergency equipment. If indeed there are schools that currently do not have AEDs, the District should consider installing them in all school buildings. 

The District should also consider the logistics of an active assailant event. We have repeatedly seen situations where schools have used this approach, resulting in the same problems described above. In addition, we note that officers have lost valuable time at great expense. For this reason, we suggest the logistics of an active assailant event.

5.2.7. AEDs were observed at only 33 percent of SPS schools. During the assessment, AEDs were noted in visible locations at only 33 percent of schools in the District. While it is possible that some schools may have AEDs, they were not in visible locations. School officials told our analysts that they do not have an AED when our analysts asked about this type of device during the assessment.
the assessment. AEDs are proven to have saved many lives and are a necessary medical device at most schools in the nation. The lack of this important medical device at two-thirds of schools leaves the District and individual schools under standard of care in this area. We note that it is highly unusual for us to encounter schools that do not have an AED as this is has become a very standardized approach to life safety in the majority of schools we have assessed.

Options for Consideration: All schools should be equipped with at least one AED to be mounted in visible and readily accessible locations in the campus.

In our experience, AEDs are one of the most important pieces of safety equipment for K12 schools. The District should consider verifying all schools have at least one AED in or near the main office and providing AEDs to the schools that currently do not have this device. In addition to the front lobby area, other areas that would benefit from an AED include the gyms, weight rooms, athletic fields, etc.


5.3.1. There are opportunities for improvement in traffic safety during arrival and dismissal times at some SPS schools.

During the assessment, our analysts observed some unsafe driving practices such as:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Unsafe driving behaviors</th>
<th>Percentage of SPS schools noted this type of driving behaviors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Children exiting/entering vehicles on traffic side.</td>
<td>43 percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Children and/or parents crossing midblock (without marked crosswalk), in between vehicles waiting to pick up students or vehicles dropping off students.</td>
<td>41 percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Vehicles parking with engine on while waiting to pick up students during dismissal time.</td>
<td>31 percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Vehicles obstructing/blocking traffic to pick-up or drop-off students.</td>
<td>31 percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Vehicles picking-up/dropping-off students at the loading/unloading areas for buses while buses are present.</td>
<td>27 percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Attended/unattended vehicles parking in no parking zone.</td>
<td>22 percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Children and/or parents crossing midblock (without marked crosswalk), in front of or between buses.</td>
<td>18 percent</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Our analysts also observed some traffic safety issues, such as:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Traffic safety issues</th>
<th>Percentage of SPS schools noted this type of issues</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>There is a congestion created by vehicles dropping-off/picking-up students.</td>
<td>37 percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>There is a conflict between vehicles dropping-off/picking-up students and buses during arrival/dismissal times.</td>
<td>25 percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>There is a conflict between vehicles dropping-off/picking-up students.</td>
<td>14 percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>It would be difficult for emergency responding vehicles (fire, police cars, etc.) to get into the school buildings during arrival/dismissal times.</td>
<td>10 percent</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In fact, administrators from 14 percent of schools in the District responded that traffic safety was among their primary safety concerns. At the same time, as detailed above, our analysts noted that there was significant lack of student supervision outside during arrival and dismissal times, especially at middle and high schools. As mentioned above, school-related transportation incidents have been the number one verifiable cause of death for school-age children, as shown in the chart below:

### School-Related Fatalities from 1998-2012 (B)

- **Unknown**: 10%
- **Severe Winds**: 2%
- **Other Homicides**: 26%
- **School Transportation**: 40%
- **Active Shooter**: 5%
- **Suicide**: 10%
- **Robbery**: 0%
- **Accidents**: 1%
- **Bullying**: 0%
- **Gang-Related**: 2%
- **Hate Crime**: 0%
- **Interpersonal Disputes**: 4%

These fatalities include people killed in school parking lots and driveways.
Options for Consideration: The District should consider developing a multi-faceted strategy to improve traffic safety at its schools.

In order to improve traffic at its schools, the District should consider using a multi-faceted strategy that involves not only improvement in the utilization of policies, practices, operations, and traffic devices and signage but also cooperation from local public safety and traffic engineering department partners. Specifically, the District should consider the following options:

- Consider developing a standardized approach for local or state police officers with traffic direction and control experience to observe traffic flow during morning arrival and afternoon dismissal at each school on an annual basis. A number of our client districts have implemented an annual traffic safety assessment process utilizing police officers. These districts have been able to implement these assessments with little and in most cases no additional costs to the districts. While these types of processes do not replace traffic safety engineering studies, they can help to identify and correct many of the types of hazards that result in student and staff injuries and deaths. Prior to this assessment project, the District has not formally evaluated traffic safety at its schools in a consistent and district-wide manner. The evaluations conducted in the assessment project are a good first step in this area. We find that the District would benefit from an annual process to evaluate and, when appropriate, improve traffic safety practices at its schools.

- Coordinate with local or state police officers and/or local traffic engineering offices to conduct a traffic study at the schools that experience traffic problems and, where possible, optimize the capability for traffic signal queue times and green times to allow adjacent traffic to clear the intersection before stop movements.

- As discussed above, consider hiring and assigning more paraprofessionals for student supervision duties during arrival and dismissal times at the middle and high schools.

- When possible, designate separate pick-up/drop-off areas from bus loading/unloading areas as well as times for school buses and parent/private vehicles. Our analysts noted that 22 percent of schools in the District did not have bus loading/unloading areas separated from student pick-up/drop-off areas.

- In the event of future new construction or renovation projects, design parking lots that will allow for dual lane traffic flow with specific measures to regulate smaller groups of vehicles, much like the concept of dual lane access of a fast food drive-through.

- When and where possible, consider using speed limit signs, traffic calming devices, markings, and signage to help prevent or reduce unsafe traffic behaviors. Unification and compliance with local laws and regulations on the devices, markings, and signs should also be considered.
5.3.2. Most SPS staff did not wear high-visibility vests while on duty outside the schools (to supervise students in the playgrounds/playfields, to assist with traffic monitoring and student supervision during morning arrival and afternoon dismissal times).

The use of high-visibility vests not only helps reduce danger to staff from vehicles but also enhance the deterrent effect of the staff and make staff recognizable to students and parents who need assistance. This approach also makes it easier for administrators who supervise the staff to visually verify that staff are properly positioned while on duty. High-visibility vests also make it easy for administrators to visually scan camera views to verify staff’s location remotely.

**Options for Consideration:** The SPS should consider equipping staff on duty outdoors with high-visibility vests and requiring them to wear the vests while they are performing the duty.

The SPS should consider issuing high-visibility vests to staff assisting with directing traffic or supervising students outside on the playgrounds/playfields. The standardized high visibility vests are recommended. Some of our client school districts also have their logos printed on the back to the vests. While the cost of purchasing such a significant number of vests would at first appear to be a costly endeavor, a single serious injury by an employee who is struck by an automobile may cost the SPS more than the total purchase of these vests. When the added benefits of this expense are considered, it becomes an even more cost-effective measure. In addition, staff at all schools should be aware of the use of the vests and are required to wear them when they are on duty outside of the schools.

The SPS should also consider issuing standard whistles, or even better, rescue whistles to the staff who are on duty outdoors. Whistles can help staff members notify large groups of students to move to shelter, evacuate, or take other protective actions. Staff members with whistles can communicate emergency instructions to students faster, which can prevent mass casualty loss of life. Whistles are also significantly helpful in gaining the attention of a motorist in a congested school parking lot.

5.3.3. **Staff at 43 percent of SPS schools did not receive documented training on traffic safety before being assigned to the task.**

The results of our interviews with school personnel during the assessment show that 43 percent of schools in the District did not provide the staff who are tasked with directing traffic and assisting with student supervision during arrival and dismissal times at their schools with training on how to properly and safety perform the task. This indicates that SPS does not have a standardized training for all staff who are assigned to this type of tasks.

**Options for Consideration:** All staff assisting in traffic directing and monitoring should receive proper training before being assigned for these tasks.

While using school staff to direct and monitor traffic during pick-up/drop-off times is a good use of staff time, staff should be properly trained before being assigned for the work. Training will not only help staff work more efficiently and safer but also is recommended as a safety precaution. Therefore, the SPS should consider a standardized training for all staff on how to properly and safely monitor and direct
traffic before assigning them to the task. This type of training can be conducted by local police
departments. This training should be properly documented and tracked by the SPS.

5.3.4. **There are significant opportunities for improvement in space management practices at most of SPS schools.**

During the assessment, we noted numerous instances of space management issues at all three assessed
schools during school hours. We noted numerous interior rooms (such as classrooms and custodial
Closets) left unlocked when not supervised. Space management is another extremely important point
for student safety. While it is important to create and maintain good perimeter access control and
secure exterior doors to keep potentially dangerous people out, it can be just as important to secure
interior spaces that are not occupied by an adult.

Unlocked spaces can be used by students to engage in illicit behaviors such as bullying, consensual
sexual activity, rape, drug use, vandalism, and theft. Unlocked space allows an attacker to have a space
to victimize staff and students. Unlocked space can also be used by students to engage in illicit behaviors
such as bullying, consensual sexual activity, rape, drug use, vandalism, and theft. For example, in the
2008-2009 school year, two rapes were reported during school hours in a single high school in
Pennsylvania in rooms that were left unlocked. Unlocked space can also allow students to become
injured, or even killed, when they tamper with equipment in a boiler room or gain access to a roof.

**Options for Consideration: The District leadership should consider addressing the issue of space
management via staff development and a written policy.**

Providing school staff with standardized and well-documented training with quality content on effective
space management strategies is a good start. Creating a culture within the District where staff routinely
lock rooms that are not occupied by an adult will dramatically reduce the level of risk for staff and
students. The improvement in school security gained by this approach would be significant in relation to
the cost and effort expended to achieve it.

The District should also consider improving space management by creating clear expectations through
the development of a district-wide written policy on space management to help administrators and staff
at all schools understand the importance of securing unsupervised interior spaces.

5.3.5. **Staff at 55 percent of schools in the District do not practice good physical security when it
comes to securing dangerous items.**

During the assessment, our analysts found dangerous items (e.g., knives, scissors, etc.) left in unsecured
unsupervised rooms at 55 percent of SPS schools. There have been cases where staff and students were
harmed by students who used unattended dangerous items as weapons.

**Options for Consideration: The District should consider staff development to help educate
administrators and school staff on these risks.**
5.3.6. **We observed various types of hazards at most of SPS schools.**

Gravity hazards were observed at 65 percent of SPS schools during the assessment. Televisions that are not secured to carts by safety straps, bookshelves that were not secured to floors or walls, ladders that were not secured by safety straps, and items stacked up too high are among the gravity hazards commonly found. Our analysts also observed other hazards such as fire at 41 percent of the schools. We also noted fire/secondary/emergency exit doors obstructed at 20 percent of the schools and hallways leading to an emergency exit blocked at 14 percent of the schools. While we must point out that our assessments do not include OSHA or fire code inspections, we do note obvious life-safety hazards.

**Options for Consideration: Enhanced staff development and improved supervision of personnel is recommended.**

In many cases, these simple hazards could easily be fixed when there is a focused effort by staff to reduce these types of hazards. In addition to life safety, many of these hazards also commonly result in minor to serious injuries in staff that lead to increased worker’s compensation claims and costs along with reduced instructional time with quality educators. Classroom instruction suffers when experienced teachers are replaced by substitutes due to a long-term injury. Standardized, quality, and well-documented training on school safety for all SPS employees is recommended. Creating a culture and climate in the organization that is intolerant of these unsafe practices can also help to address these issues.

5.3.7. **Classroom and office door locks at 49 percent of SPS schools cannot be locked from the inside, and teachers at the majority of the schools do not practice teaching with classroom doors close and locked.**

It appeared that schools in the District do not have a standardized type of door lock for classrooms. During the assessments, we noted that classroom doors at 49 percent of schools in the District have traditional door locking hardware that can only be locked from the outside of the classroom. This can pose challenges for staff to quickly secure doors during a lockdown if staff do not practice locking their classroom doors or do not teach with their classroom doors closed and locked, as noted at 88 percent of SPS schools during the assessment.

**Option for Consideration: The District should consider reminding teachers the importance of teaching with their classroom doors locked or pre-locking their classroom doors every time they are in the classrooms.**

To address the issues of classroom doors that cannot be quickly locked from the inside, we often advise teachers to teach with classroom doors locked. This is not only a more cost-effective means to improve
lockdown practices, but also reduces disruption of teaching. Feedback from many educators has been that this also helps to reduce disruption of teaching time as teachers tend to become more selective in issuing hall passes to students during class. This in turn helps to improve student supervision and reduces the opportunity for victimization of students during class periods. While often thought of in relation to active shooter events, reducing the frequency of students being allowed to leave classrooms without adult supervision also reduces the risk of other far more common school security incidents.

We have seen an increasing number of schools requiring teachers teaching with classroom doors locked around the nation. Another option is to pre-lock the doors every time staff are in their classrooms or offices. We are currently providing post-incident assistance for two active shooter events where school officials report that the loss of life would have likely exceeded the number of fatalities at Sandy Hook Elementary School if teachers had not been following the practice of teaching with classroom doors locked. While this practice involves a significant cultural change, it is highly recommended for schools without armed security or law enforcement personnel and/or for schools with open campus designs.

If, or when, the District decides to replace all classroom door locks with a standardized type of lock, the District should consider maintenance door locking systems which cannot be left unlocked. This system requires that a key be used to unlock the door each and every time.

5.3.8. There are opportunities for improvement in the use of at SPS schools.

Our interviews with school administrators during the assessment show that 92 percent of schools in the District and 45 percent of the schools. The administrators at 55 percent of the schools stated that they use schools. These interview results indicate that 1) is not a standardized system in terms of use by administrators at all SPS schools, or 2) administrators at 45 percent of schools in the District are . Additionally, feedback we have often heard from school officials and public safety agencies can be considered a valuable ready reference guide that includes photographs of the exterior and interior of the school as well as floor plans. They can be extremely important for school crisis situations involving active shooter or hostage situations, or after crisis events that result in severe damage to the building. There have been a number of situations where this could have been or was helpful. For example, when a group of terrorists took hostages at an elementary school in Holland, the Royal Dutch Marines were able to conduct an amazing hostage rescue without the loss of life of any of the students or staff being held by multiple terrorists armed with fully automatic weapons and hand grenades. The tactical team used detailed building plans to plan the rescue. The types of pre-plans we describe provide even more detail and accuracy for this type of precision high-risk effort. As hostage
situations occur with about the same frequency (or rarity) as active shooter events in U.S. K12 schools, this is a more common type of events than most educators and law enforcement officers realize. There have also been two hostage situations at U.S. K12 schools carried out by individuals who espoused militia beliefs (Cookeville, Wyoming and Tuscaloosa, Alabama).

Other scenarios where this type of pre-planning capability include but are not limited to partial building collapse such as the deadly incident in East Goldenham, New York in 1989 which killed seven children and seriously injured another 19 victims. There have also been quite a few fatal incidents involving tornado strikes on schools including a 1978 event in a Pinellas County Florida Elementary school where firefighters did not know where in the ruble to dig to rescue elementary children due to the extensive damage to the school. These types of pre-incident plans have been in use by many K2 schools since the late 1990s and are required state-wide for public schools in Washington State. More than 50 percent of Ohio and Pennsylvania public schools now have this type of pre-planning, and many of our clients utilize this approach.

Options for Consideration: The District should consider developing simple printed photo tours for each facility and evaluating the practicality of updating, continuing to use, and becoming proficient in the use of the Rapid Responder web-based system for its schools.

All schools can benefit from having a [word processing software is a low-cost option and is, in some ways, more effective and practical than the more proprietary offered by some vendors. We also advocate that schools have even if they have . We have seen some excellent tours of this type developed by local school and public safety officials.

Additionally, the District should consider evaluating the currently in use at many schools in the District. If after evaluating the system, the District feels it would be beneficial to continue to use the system, the District should consider verifying that the system is updated and available for all of its schools, and that all school administrators in the District should be aware of the system and its usage.

5.3.9. All schools in the District would benefit from improved of emergency diagrams.

Though our analysts noted fire evacuation diagrams at all but two schools in the District, we did not note severe weather sheltering diagrams or maps at any of the schools. We also noted inconsistency in the utilization of emergency diagrams among SPS schools. We noted that some schools had evacuation in the form of text instructions while others had diagrams with arrows. This indicates that there is not a standardized emergency diagram for use by all schools in the District. Additionally, the diagrams were often not properly oriented to the viewers and not easy to navigate. Properly oriented diagrams help
students and staff rapidly determine where they are in the school and how they can quickly exit the
school under extreme stress in emergency situations.

Options for Consideration: The District should consider improvement in the utilization of emergency
diagrams at its schools.

As the proper use of emergency diagrams is designed to reduce the likelihood of a mass casualty fatality,
correcting this issue would be a wise use of limited fiscal resources. Schools should be encouraged using
a standardized format of evacuation diagrams or maps that include directional arrows, text instructions,
and, in some cases, photographs and other enhancements to make maps easier to understand.

The diagrams or maps should also be positioned, depending on their location within the building, so
they are properly oriented to the viewer in each room. Specifically, the positioning should consider the
viewer and their accessibility needs. Each classroom, auditorium, media center, gymnasium and office
area would benefit from diagrams for fire evacuation and severe weather sheltering. Please refer to
Appendix V for sample emergency diagrams.

5.3.10. The majority of schools in the District do not have two emergency evacuation kits.

Emergency evacuation kits are easily portable containers which have supplies, equipment, and
information needed by school administrators who need to evacuate a building or shelter inside the
school for an emergency. Each school should have two emergency evacuation kits to be stored in two
different locations in case the primary kit is not accessible during an event.

Options for Consideration: The District should consider furnishing all of its schools with two
emergency evacuation kits to be stored in separate locations.

Ideally, each school should be equipped with two emergency evacuation kits, one clinic/first aid kit, and
one special needs kit. At the minimum, each school should be equipped with two emergency evacuation
kits. Suggested items in an emergency evacuation kit, a first aid kit, and a special needs emergency
evacuation kit are provided in Appendix II, III, and IV, respectively.

The two emergency evacuation kits should also be stored in two different locations in the school as a
backup kit can be a life-saving resource in the event that the area where the primary kit is located is
directly impacted by an emergency. For example, the primary kit might be unavailable if a hostage
situation occurs in the main office area and the sole kit is stored in that location. Staff should also
practice taking the kits with them for any drills requiring movement, such as a fire drill or severe
weather sheltering drill, to increase the likelihood that they will remember to take the kits with them
under the stress of an actual crisis.
5.3.11. We noted some interior windows covered at 75 percent of SPS schools.

We have seen a significant increase in the practice of covering interior door windows in K12 schools after some active shooter incidents in American schools in recent years. While the temporary covering of interior windows during lockdown situations is something that should be considered, prepared and practiced as appropriate, this should be part of the staff members lockdown procedures rather than daily practice. There have been instances around the nation where staff members have used the added privacy, achieved by covering windows in this manner, to engage students with increasingly inappropriate behaviors, such as stroking of hair, touching, etc. before moving on to more serious types of inappropriate behavior. This process is called “grooming” by child abuse experts and is commonly an integral part of the process of a sexual predator seducing a child or youth.

We note that while many staff who have no intention of abusing students may cover classroom and office windows, this is an extremely common practice among sexual predators who work and volunteer in the K12 setting. Allowing staff to cover windows in this manner also increases the difficulty in clearing the name and reputation of school employees and the schools when false allegations are made relating to misconduct of a sexual or non-sexual nature. Legal costs for incidents arising from this type of behavior can be significant and overwhelming. The practice of covering of classroom and office windows by school staff also reduces natural surveillance which can, in turn, increase the risk of security incidents, such as assaults on school employees and students.

Options for Consideration: The District should consider addressing the issues of covering classroom and office windows at the majority of its schools.

The District should consider addressing this issue through staff development and written guidelines. Requiring employees at all levels in the organization to obtain limited permission from a district-level supervisor before covering office or classroom windows in this manner should be considered. These types of situations have been problematic at management as well as line levels in school districts around the nation. Staff should not be allowed to cover doors and windows in a manner that is likely to result in their being left unsecured. When permission is given for staff members to cover windows on a day-to-day basis, careful consideration should be given before exceptions are made.

5.3.12. Natural surveillance through exterior windows was impeded at 67 percent of SPS schools.

During the assessment, our analysts noted some exterior windows at 67 percent of schools in the District were impeded because staff closing window shades or blinds in a way that they cannot see out, thereby reducing natural surveillance. Research shows that natural surveillance has a very powerful deterrence effect on crime because aggressors are typically afraid that people can see their activities from the buildings. People also often feel safer in locations with optimal natural surveillance.

Options for Consideration: The District should consider developing strategies to improve natural surveillance for all of its schools and support facilities.
The District should consider strategies to help staff aware that it is safer for them to have windows with optimal natural surveillance where staff and students can see out while outsiders cannot see in. We should note that we do not recommend this approach for interior office and classroom windows due to competing concerns about sexual abuse of students by students or adults as detailed above.

5.3.13. None of SPS schools has exterior doors numbered for easy navigation.

Our analysts noted during the assessment that none of schools in the District has exterior exit doors numbered for easy navigation for emergency responders. We note that this enhancement can also help new students, parents and staff better understand where they should enter a building for after-hours and special events as well as serving the primary purpose of helping public safety responders navigate schools in emergency situations.

Option for Consideration: The District may wish to consider the utilization of standardized numbering and directional markers for all exterior door as well as facility entrances for all of its schools.

A campus could use numbers and directions to indicate each entrance; for example, “1W” could indicate the front door at a school which faces West. This can help emergency responders provide assistance faster, make it easier for investigators to interview witnesses, and provide the daily benefits of improved location direction and customer service for parents and other visitors. It should be noted that while we advocate that schools consider numbering exterior doors for faster navigation in an emergency, we suggest classroom windows not be marked with exterior numbers as this could allow an aggressor to identify a classroom where a staff member or student they wish to attack could be found.

5.3.14. were found at the majority of schools in the District.

He attempted to at the school. Because the school had recently.

Commonly found at schools are classrooms the staff. During the assessments, our analysts found that classrooms at 92 percent of schools in the District classroom aggressors to classrooms. If a violator can indicators. For example, a
manner. In another real-life example, an individual killed a victim without an aggressor. This is also very important for the

In addition, our analysts also found that staff at 31 percent of schools in the District are not

Aggressors have been seen by the

Attacks are a concern. In fact, this type of signage has proven to be extremely beneficial even in low risk settings like elementary schools.

**Option for Consideration: The District should consider ways to reduce the**

**Student, staff or student, and other. Without**

**The schools where**

**The use of this type of signage can be a powerful deterrent measure and help school and police officials recover drugs, weapons, and other contraband from violators. Many school districts around the nation have had success in utilizing this type of signage as a powerful tool for school safety, particularly when gang activity is a concern. In fact, this type of signage has proven to be extremely beneficial even in low risk settings like elementary schools.**

**Options for Consideration: The District may wish to consider developing standardized consent to search signage for postage at every vehicular access point at all of its schools.**
The language of the signage and specific ways that school officials and law enforcement personnel would utilize these signs to conduct searches are of considerable importance. The size of the letters on the signage and the locations to post the signs should also be considered.

5.3.16. **There are opportunities for improvement in the use of instructional and directional signage at SPS schools.**

For example, our analysts noted that 78 percent of schools in the District did not have signage at the drive entrance directing visitors to appropriate parking spaces. This might be because 59 percent of the schools did not have clearly marked visitor parking spaces. Our analysts also noted that none of the schools have signage at the visitor parking areas instructing all visitors to report at the main office before visiting other parts of the school campus.

**Options for Consideration:** The District should consider developing standardized, district-wide instructional and directional signage for use at all of its schools.

Proper signage is very helpful for visitors, new students, and staff in finding their way around school campuses as well as to inform them of the school’s policies. From a customer-service perspective, signage also helps show that the schools (and the District) care about the people they serve. We also note that they will have less of a basis to contend with. For example, if a school has

*Options for Consideration: The District should consider developing standardized, district-wide instructional and directional signage for use at all of its schools.*

 visitor parking spaces can be located where they can be seen from the school – especially from the office, potential violators are sometimes nervous about being spotted before they can commit a crime. In addition, there have been a number of situations where criminal acts at schools have been prevented because a school staff member or student noted the suspicious behavior of a person who had come to a campus to commit a crime.

5.3.17. **Forty-five percent of SPS schools have**

In fact, administrators at 39 percent schools in the District, one school district with which Safe Havens has worked experienced

*Inappropriate Inappropriate Inappropriate Inappropriate Inappropriate Inappropriate Inappropriate Inappropriate Inappropriate Inappropriate Inappropriate Inappropriate Inappropriate Inappropriate Inappropriate Inappropriate Inappropriate Inappropriate Inappropriate Inappropriate Inappropriate Inappropriate Inappropriate Inappropriate Inappropriate Inappropriate Inappropriate Inappropriate Inappropriate Inappropriate Inappropriate Inappropriate Inappropriate Inappropriate Inappropriate Inappropriate Inappropriate Inappropriate Inappropriate Inappropriate Inappropriate Inappropriate Inappropriate Inappropriate Inappropriate Inappropriate Inappropriate Inappropriate Inappropriate Inappropriate Inappropriate Inappropriate Inappropriate Inappropriate Inappropriate Inappropriate Inappropriate Inappropriate Inappropriate Inappropriate Inappropriate Inappropriate Inappropriate Inappropriate Inappropriate Inappropriate Inappropriate Inappropriate Inappropriate Inappropriate Inappropriate 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other types of incidents that could result from building staff. Other clients have experienced fatalities.

District experienced an event where a school.

Options for Consideration: The District should seek out areas of known, suspected, and possible vulnerabilities, and these changes should be supported by evidence.

where were noted in each site report as appropriate. In many cases, administrators are already aware of vulnerabilities if they exist. These vulnerabilities are often addressed through RCW 42.56.420, Safe Schools Planning — Content Redacted Here, If Disclosed, Would Identify Specific Safety Vulnerabilities should also be properly addressed.

5.3.18. There are opportunities for improvement in the utilization of positive territoriality at 61 percent of SPS schools.

Decades of research have demonstrated that the utilization of crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED) can reduce crime and the fear of crime in K12 schools. The effectiveness of CPTED principles is so well documented that CPTED has been admitted as evidence by courts in all 50 states. Positive territoriality is one of the three basic tenets of CPTED. It is the use of student artwork, awards display, positive signage, murals, inviting color schemes, and resilient flooring patterns enhance the school climate and reduce the fear of crime by fostering improved connectivity between staff, students, and parents. These building design enhancements can significantly improve the connection between students, staff, visitors, and parents and their respective schools, and thereby can have a significant and positive impact on student and staff safety. Pervasive positive territoriality can also help to tone down and soften the potential negative effects of increased security measures.

During the assessment, while our analysts noted many instances of the use of murals and student artwork to enhance the positive body language at all schools in the District, we see that the majority of the schools have opportunities for improvement in the use of positive territoriality. We noted that areas such as student bathrooms, stairwells, hallways, etc. at 61 percent of SPS schools could improve in the utilization of additional positive body language.

Options for Consideration: In our experience, educating support department personnel, building administrators, parents, and students on the power of CPTED in general, and positive territoriality in particular, can be an important first step in the thoughtful, long-term application of these research-based concepts.

It has been our experience that most school and law enforcement officials are often not fully aware of the positive impact that CPTED can have on school climate and security. While CPTED should never be
viewed as a replacement for physical security measures such as security cameras, visitor management systems, security policies, and personnel, they should be viewed as being just as important to a safe and effective school environment. In our experience, the greater the need for physical security, the greater the need for CPTED, especially positive territoriality. We suggest that school administrators and department heads with relevant responsibilities be provided with an overview of CPTED information and encourage to increase the utilization of positive territoriality at their schools. In addition, it has been our experience that the use of positive territoriality is even more important when the use of physical security measures in schools is increased. Given the many positive security enhancements being made in the District, we suggest that the use of positive territoriality be considered as an integral part of security upgrades.

5.4. Other Areas of Concerns We Were Asked to Opine On

During the assessment, we were asked to evaluate and opine on the practicality of specific school security measures that concerned students, staff and parents have asked the District about. Below are our opinions regarding each of these suggested security measures.

5.4.1. Entry point metal detection

Students, school employees and parents often ask school officials to consider entry point metal detection when school shootings occur. In this context, entry point metal detection refers to the approach used in commercial airports, many courthouses and some other government and private sector facilities and venues. We were asked to provide opinions on the feasibility of entry point metal detection for schools in the District.

The observations relating to weapons screening in this section are based on the experience of multiple members of the assessment team as practitioners who have used various types of metal detection in the K12 school setting as well as:

- Our experience helping many school systems establish and improve their metal detection processes.
- Our experience providing post-incident assistance for multiple school shootings and edged weapons attacks where metal detection has been defeated by attackers
- Our experience working with school districts that have found that students have been able to get guns and other weapons into schools with entry point metal detection
- Our experience defeating entry point metal detection checkpoints during penetration tests requested by our clients (attempting to get weapons into schools at the request of clients).

Generally speaking, reasonably effective entry point metal detection is extremely difficult to achieve in most K12 schools due to budget, staffing requirements and the level of intrusiveness that this approach requires. We will explain the challenges that lead us to that opinion later in this section. However, it may be helpful at this point to mention that the cost of even the most expensive metal detectors pales...
in comparison to the cost of personnel required to maintain an effective entry point metal detection program. We feel that it is also important to note that walk-through metal detectors do not detect guns and other metal weapons specifically, but instead detect metal in or on a person's body. This makes effective metal detection an extremely human-dependent process. As we will point out, effective entry point school metal detection also requires that some people be patted down by hand and requires that security X-ray equipment be used to screen purses, bookbags, books and other hand-carried objects for weapons.

While entry point metal detection can be a viable option for some special school situations such as alternative schools serving youth with a demonstrated and elevated risk for violence, some middle and high schools with specific design features and/or which serve high percentages of students who are gang members, some support facilities and special events, our experience has been that daily entry point weapons screening in the form of airport style metal detection is not feasible for the majority of U.S. K12 schools. Entry point metal detection for traditional middle and high schools is often most practical with schools where there are indications that students are carrying weapons to school on a regular basis and some students are carrying weapons repeatedly. In our experience, entry point metal detection can be more effective at deterring gang members or students who carry weapons out of fear. This is because a student who attempts to repeatedly carry a weapon to school will be more likely to eventually be caught and face a consequence such as arrest, alternative placement or expulsion. With a notation that entry point weapons screening has significant limitations, even in these situations, the balance between the cost and level of intrusiveness can make entry point weapons screening more practical in those specific situations.

In contrast, attempting to deter an attacker who does not fear incarceration, being killed by responding law enforcement officers or especially those who plan to commit suicide is much more difficult. This type of attacker is more likely to be able to circumvent the entry point metal detection process easily and only needs to do so once to carry out their planned attack. If the main goal of entry point metal detection is to prevent a planned active assailant attack, we find that few school districts have the funding and the community support required to implement the costly, time intensive and intrusive level of weapons screening required to obtain a reasonable degree of reliability of deterring this type of attacker.

Entry point metal detection requires a high degree of supplemental physical security measures and personnel to support, has much higher personnel costs than most people realize and must be supported by security X-ray screening of all purses, bookbags and other hand-carry items to be reliable. Finally, reliable entry point metal detection requires screeners to physically pat down some people being screened to determine whether or not a person being screened is carrying a weapon or not. Current weapons screening technologies all require this screening step to prevent the approach from being easily defeated.
While many schools, sporting venues, museums and tourist venues use entry point metal detection, our experience has been that a moderately intelligent teenager or adult can find a way to smuggle a firearm or other weapon into many of these venues without much difficulty. This has repeatedly been demonstrated by successful attacks on venues with metal detection checkpoints, including K12 schools. While the failure of any specific prevention measure should not be taken as proof that the concept cannot work reliably, patterns of gaps should be considered when evaluating the benefits of the measure in relation to the time, energy, and fiscal resources required as well as the level of intrusiveness. The potential benefits from other prevention measures that could be implemented with comparable time, energy, fiscal resources and intrusiveness should also be weighed.

For example, during an assessment of a school district in Illinois, our analyst was easily able to smuggle an official test piece (simulated firearm of similar weight and size of an average weight and mass of the three smallest commercially available handguns) through entry point weapons screening stations where both walk through metal detectors and X-ray equipment were being used. Each of these schools had more than two dozen full-time school security personnel and extensive perimeter security measures, an advanced and robust security camera system, a full-time camera monitor and a police officer per school. While we were able to help the district improve the reliability of their metal detection program through the assessment, the screening approach still has some gaps that could be exploited. In this instance, the client has opted to continue the use of walk-through metal detection due to the unusually high level of gang violence in the region. However, this client district was also able to implement and maintain many other supportive measures to offset the limitations of the weapons screening program.

As another example, we find that the school systems we have assessed that utilize entry point metal detection have reported to our analysts that with the exception of some smaller alternative school programs (with much more invasive screening processes), some students have been able to get firearms and other weapons into their schools on a periodic basis. Our experience has also been that when this type of failure occurs, school officials who have made a good-faith and concerted effort to implement these programs are then criticized for being incompetent when in reality the public has not been willing to provide adequate budget for the approach nor allow the level of intrusiveness that the approach requires to have a reasonable degree of fidelity.

However, entry point metal detection can still help reduce the number of weapons students bring into their schools on a regular basis. For example, the Illinois school district entry point screening with metal detectors and X-ray equipment described earlier has reduced the number of weapons seized at district schools. This is why we advise clients that this approach is most often logical to reduce the chances of gang violence, students using weapons during a fight and other situations where students are more likely to use a weapon because they carry it to school every day. However, as also mentioned previously, it is important to understand that deterring, reliably detecting and thwarting a determined attacker who does not fear incarceration or, in many cases, even death, with entry point metal detection is far more difficult. The most successfully implemented school metal detection programs we
have seen have been thoughtfully developed with considerable opportunity for meaningful education of and feedback from students, parents and school personnel. There are a number of considerations for a reasonably reliable entry point metal detection program include:

- **Staff who conduct screenings must be properly trained, and the processes used should be described in writing, vetted by legal counsel and communicated effectively to the public.** While it is beyond the scope of this project to attempt to address the many logistical details that must be addressed, we caution that the logistics of effective entry point weapons screening are important and require considerable attention to detail.

- **For reasonably reliable entry point screening, security X-ray equipment must be utilized.** This expensive equipment requires considerable space and a staff member who is dedicated to the operation of the equipment at all times the checkpoint is operational. Visual examination of the contents of purses, bookbags and other hand-carried items, has some benefit, but is less effective than screening with security X-ray screening by properly trained personnel.

- **Pat downs of people who have artificial joints, pins and other bodies of metal implanted in their bodies is required unless bulky, time consuming, extremely expensive and highly invasive backscatter body scanning equipment is utilized.** The pat down in this instance often involves only specific areas such as the right knee of a person who has an artificial knee as long as a multi-zone walk through metal detector is used to pinpoint on the person being screened where the metal object(s) setting off the detector is located.

- **Robust security coverage of each screening station and process should be considered.** To protect screening personnel as well as students and others who are screened, video recording of the screening process is desirable. As demonstrated by data from the U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Capitol Police and the Transportation security administration illustrate, when weapons screening is done properly, weapons and other contraband will periodically be discovered. It is not unusual for people who are caught with contraband to claim that screening personnel “planted” the contraband on them or in their belongings. There have also been allegations of screening personnel inappropriately touching people who have been screened, other forms of staff misconduct and complaints that screeners and people who are being screened have stolen property from people during the screening process. Proper utilization of cameras to document the process combined with periodic viewing of screening processes by supervisors for quality control can help to reduce the chances that these types of misconduct will occur and to bring clarity when allegations are made.

- **Penetration testing should be implemented if entry point metal detection is utilized.** This approach involves periodically providing selected students and visitors with a standardized “test piece” which is made of metal but does not resemble a weapon. Screeners are trained on what
the test pieces look like, so they can recognize them. People selected to conduct penetration testing are tasked with attempting to find a way to smuggle the test piece into the school in a non-alarmist fashion. This is the most reliable means to determine the effectiveness and reliability of entry point metal detection for any environment. This method can also help school officials identify and correct gaps exploited during the penetration tests.

- As with airports and many courthouses, the decision to screen school employees must be considered for a comprehensive approach to violence prevention. As with any other setting, workplace violence incidents involving attackers who are current or former employees should be considered. We note a significant number of planned school shootings by school employees. These include a number of multi-victim school shootings carried out by teachers and school administrators in the U.S., Canada and Austria. Examples of other planned attacks by school employees include but are not limited to:

  - California, 1940: A middle school principal in Pasadena shot and killed three employees at the school district office before going to his school and killing two more school employees.
  - Indiana, 1960: The Principal at William Reed Elementary School shot and killed two teachers in front of their students.

More recently, one school superintendent and one headmaster of a Lutheran school have been shot and killed by school employees in Florida. While most of the above concerns can be addressed with a fair degree of reliability, the recurring costs associated with these approaches are beyond the reach of most school systems. Depending on the quality and capabilities for security X-ray equipment, multi-zone walk-through metal detectors, hand wands for secondary screening, additional security cameras to document the screening process at each station, tables and stations to guide people being screened typically cost an estimated range of $45,000 and $65,000 per screening station. However, as mentioned, it is critical to remember that the major expense for reasonably reliable weapons screening approach is for the personnel to conduct the metal detection, X-ray screening of bags, secondary screening, roving armed security personnel to patrol the screening checkpoints and to provide additional patrol coverage to mitigate the risk of attack for students gathered outside and waiting to be screened and finally, for supportive access control personnel to reduce the chances that people can bypass the screening stations. At this point, the most accurate estimate we can provide for the cost of and screening personnel daytime, evening screening for most middle and high schools is between $500,000 and $1,000,000 per school per year, depending on the quality of weapons screening, supportive security measures, building configuration, hours of operation at each school site, and the number of students attending each school. This cost is based on the assumption that one metal detection and security X-ray is used per 500 students. Note that these figures do not include screening for athletic events, ceremonies, and other special events.
These types of considerations should be addressed if entry point weapons screening were considered to be desirable at middle and high schools on a district-wide basis at any school district. While each of these limitations can be addressed with some degree of reliability with adequate budget, the recurring costs associated with these approaches are beyond the reach of most school systems. The fact that secondary screening must be conducted on a significant percentage of people being screened and that on regular occasions, screeners will need to physically pat down students and visitors will also be objectionable to many students, staff, and parents. We also note that the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has now largely discontinued the use of hand-held metal detectors for secondary screening and has moved to pat downs of a higher percentage of passengers. This change resulted because screeners were missing simulated firearms and explosives during the majority penetration tests.

Due to the limitations of entry point weapons screening and the requirements for a quality program, random surprise weapons screening is more common in American middle and high schools. The surprise screening program is far less expensive, does not require students and staff to arrive 20-30 minutes earlier each day as is the case with daily entry point screening, and has been helpful in achieving significant reductions in student weapons violations in a number of districts using this approach. We note that this approach can also help address the risk of weapons assaults on school buses when school buses are included in the random screening program. There are numerous important points to the legal, effective, and unbiased use of random metal detection programs and there are ways to address these important concerns. Policies, specific procedures, training, and fidelity testing can help to create verifiably random selection of people who are selected for screening. Safe Havens can provide additional information on these considerations if the District determines at this time or in the future that this type of prevention approach is desirable.

In our experience, the District would provide far more reliable protection by improving and maintaining effective school security measures as outlined in this report. In the experience of our analysts who have helped to successfully avert a number of planned K-12 school shootings and one bombing while serving as practitioners, behavioral approaches are more sustainable, less intrusive, offer a variety of additional benefits relating to successful schools and in our experience, can be more effective. Unlike physical security measures such as entry point metal detection, these approaches are not contingent upon a particular weapon type, attack method or specific locations and timing of the attack. This means that these approaches offer a reasonable level of protection whether an attacker plans to use a firearm, explosives, edged weapon, fire, vehicle ramming attack, fire, or a combination of weapon types. These measures are also useful to help avert attacks regardless of where they are planned to occur – in a classroom, cafeteria, media center, athletic event, nearby public area, on a school bus or other school-related setting. These approaches include but are not limited to student threat assessment and management, suicide prevention, increased awareness of concepts such as pattern matching and recognition and visual weapons screening. Please see our training video Secrets of the Weapons Violator Exposed – Visual Screening segment (we will be shipping to the District as a value-added
resource) and our free training video segment *Pattern Matching and Recognition* (available at [http://safehavensinternational.org/resources/staying-alive/](http://safehavensinternational.org/resources/staying-alive/)).

5.4.2. **Arming of teachers and other SPS employees who are not screened, trained, equipped, and tasked by the SPS as security or law enforcement officers.**

The issue of arming teachers and other school employees who are not screened, trained, equipped, and tasked as school security or law enforcement officers has been and will likely increasingly be an issue of considerable passion and debate. While Safe Havens has suggested to some of our U.S. K12 clients to consider arming carefully screened, trained and properly equipped “civilian” support personnel, this has only been for some very unusual situations where response times for law enforcement were unusually long (in one case 4-8 hours if weather was suitable for aircraft to fly in an officer) and where the client had non-instructional personnel who had substantive law enforcement, high-level security and/or experience in an armed role. In actuality, we have been more prone to suggest arming of school personnel in other countries where the rates of violence and/or terrorism are far higher than in any region of the United States.

Among the most ardent supporters of the concept of arming school personnel, even the National Rifle Association (NRA) has voiced a strong preference for having carefully, vetted and properly trained sworn law enforcement personnel to provide armed protection with carefully vetted and trained security professionals as their second choice and school employees with either law enforcement, other public safety or military experience being armed if neither of these options are possible. Based on our last conversations with NRA representatives, while the NRA has advocated for school personnel to be armed when these options are not possible, they still urge that psychological testing, criminal history checks and advanced training for anyone who will be armed on school property.

In the case of the SPS, we do not recommend that school system personnel who are not carefully screened, trained, equipped and tasked as security or law enforcement officers be armed.

5.4.3. **Door barricade devices**

While calls for their use have increased in the past year and a half, there has been increased interest in door barricading devices designed to allow teachers and other school employees to rapidly secure their classrooms. Many school security experts have significant concerns that most of the door blocking devices on the market are not in compliance with the National Fire Protection Association Life Safety Code (NFPA). While some manufacturers claim that the devices they sell meet NFPA requirements, we caution our clients that the burden of proof and due diligence require that school officials validate these claims to at least a reasonable degree. While we have seen one device that may meet revised NFPA requirements, we have not had the opportunity to validate the manufacturer’s claims and cannot suggest the device. In addition, regardless of whether they meet NFPA requirements or not, we are concerned that...
a classroom or office. Of even greater concern, there are multiple scenarios where other approach which loss of life. These scenarios are . For example, there have been at least firearms. A number of these types of attacks have occurred in. Sexual assaults and other types of assaults also have concerns that in our experience, many school staff have experienced difficulty in rapidly when we have asked them to do so in real time. We have also seen many instances where school staff have been While the public perception is often that gunmen frequently force their way into locked classrooms and attack staff and students after entering the room, the reality is that there previously has been one attack in U.S. history at a K12 school where victims have been killed in this manner. Safe Havens Executive Director Michael Dorn served as an expert witness on this case which occurred at the Red Lake High School in Minnesota. While the attacker in the deadly Sandy Hook Elementary School attack did make entry to the school by breaching the main entryway glass, the Connecticut State Police Report on the event documented that the attacker did not force entry to any interior office areas or classrooms.

Inaccurate social media and media discussions combined with the use of emotive descriptions and inflated data on active shooter incidents of this type by a variety of security product vendors and training companies has created a perception that students and staff are frequently killed because an attacker forces their way into a locked classroom in active assailant events. While this attack method has been used in one of our nation’s most deadly school shootings and could easily be repeated, we have found no other K12 active assailant attack of this type. We note that this includes a review of all known active assailant attacks dating back to our nation’s first mass casualty school shooting at a Parochial school in Newburgh, New York in 1891.

In our experience providing post-incident assistance for seventeen active shooter and targeted school shootings in U.S., Canadian and Mexican K12 schools, we suggest that our clients carefully consider making it a practice to teach with the door locked. While this is a significant cultural shift, we have seen many school districts and non-public schools adopt this practice. Unlike the use of door locking devices, this approach provides a significant improvement in the level of preventive protection for no-notice acts of violence. We note that the majority of no-notice attacks in classrooms are not active shooter events.
and this practice can help prevent these far more common types of acts of violence such as the abduction of students, acts of domestic violence against staff and students in the classroom setting.

5.4.4. Ballistic glass protection

While properly installed high-quality ballistic glass protection products can offer significant levels of protection, our experience has been that these products are extremely expensive in relation to the protection they offer in the K12 setting. For example, spending several hundred thousand dollars or more to install glass products with ballistic protection which are rated for handguns only for all ground floor doors and windows of a large school provides no protection for a school shooting carried out by a student in a classroom, hallway, cafeteria, gymnasium, media center or parking lot. In addition, these products often degrade in effectiveness over time requiring replacement lifecycles of 5-9 years for most products of this type if they are used on outside doors or windows. For this reason, we advise our clients to consider whether their budget will also provide for replacement windows as required. More often, we find that the use of these products can be logical for limited situations such as windows for areas where office staff can retreat to if they feel threatened (known as safer rooms).

In our experience, a better option for most schools is the use of security glazing products that provide protection from forced entry but do not provide ballistic protection. While these products do not provide ballistic protection, they can delay an attacker who is trying to force entry by breaking windows. In our experience, a wider use of security glazing is more likely to reduce the risk of violence than the limited use of ballistic protection for fewer windows. We note that this is the approach that was determined to be the best course of action prior to our assessment.

We also note that there are a number of highly technical considerations that must be taken into account when ballistic or impact rated glass (security glazing) products are used. For example, some ballistic products may stop several projectiles but can then easily be pushed or knocked out by an attacker because the window’s integrity is compromised to the point where the window is not rigid. This is but one of dozens of important technical points that must be considered to prevent a false sense of security and/or easily exploited gaps in protection.

5.4.5. Communications with the public on incident reporting and notification of parents, students, and staff of school safety incidents.

The District also tasked us with providing suggestions on how the District should regulate incident reporting and establish an effective approach to public information regarding school safety incidents. The fidelity testing approach we described in another section can help improve the clarity of reporting requirements once they have been clearly established and personnel have been trained on them. Properly conducted fidelity testing can be extremely effective not only in improving overall life safety, reducing civil liability exposure, and improving the confidence level among school employees, but also in demonstrating a high degree of commitment and integrity for safety efforts to students, parents, community partner agencies and organizations and the general public.
Increasingly, some school districts are building in a public oversight function for school safety measures. This typically involves an oversight committee comprised of district personnel, public safety agency representatives, parents and in some cases, students. This type of committee is tasked with reviewing the data, fidelity testing results, survey data and other measures and reporting back to the school superintendent and school board. Though this approach is far from a common practice at this time, it has proven to be extremely effective for large multi-national corporations, major universities, hospitals, and other large and complex organizations. In its most advanced form, this type of oversight is one important component of the Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) or Enterprise Security Risk Management (ESRM) recommended as a best practice for the nation’s 70 largest public school systems by the Council of Greater City Schools in a 2016 report of findings based on a one-year study by the Council. The Broward County Public Schools in Florida became the first public school system in the nation to formally adopt the ERM in September 2019 based on the recommendations of Safe Havens in our comprehensive school safety, security, and emergency preparedness assessment report for the district.

The SPS could consider using the school safety task force as a mechanism to help review and if found to be appropriate, revised guidelines on internal incident reporting and public communications regarding school safety incidents. If this approach is desired, we suggest that relevant departments, building administrators, CROs, SPD command staff, SPS public information staff, and others who might be affected and tasked with modified guidelines be asked to provide feedback on any suggested changes in reporting or public communications. This is because there are a number of well-established legal, technical, and logistical considerations. For example, the CRO and SPD personnel will have concerns about the potential for public awareness efforts to jeopardize an investigation.

With this option for an overall mechanism to develop specifics, some general observations of our analysts may be helpful:

1. The District must be careful not to develop internal reporting guidelines that conflict with statutory or governmentally regulated guidelines.

2. The District should be careful not to commit to public communications strategies that it cannot support under fast-moving conditions and staffing levels. For example, when an incident occurs, school and public safety officials should exercise care not to release seriously flawed information in an effort to push out timely information.

3. The District should take care not to inadvertently cause emotional distress for school and public safety employees directly affected by a crisis event. For example, it is not helpful for a school employee to learn from media reports that a colleague or student they know has died. While the District and public safety agencies do not always have control of this type of information, the District should not cause this type of problem. The District’s mental health and communications personnel should be consulted on operational guidelines for the release of information following these types of situations.
4. In our experience, parents, students, and school personnel generally expect to be made aware of very serious situations that have occurred or in some cases have been alleged to have occurred at a school, on a school bus or at a school event. Though investigative and student or employee privacy concerns can sometimes impact this, our experience has been that the following are typical examples of the types of incidents members of the community expect to be notified about at least in terms of basic information:

- Allegations of sexual misconduct involving school employees.
- Allegations of sexual assaults of students, employees, or visitors.
- Allegations of serious criminal misconduct involving school system personnel. A few examples from cases we are familiar with but are not limited to include: participation of a ring of sexual predators, child pornography, trafficking of children, school employees who are prostitutes, drug distribution, operating a moonshine still on school property, involvement with a terrorist organization, participation in violent extremist activity, arrest for having a firearm on school property or at school events, embezzlement, accepting bribes and other forms of public corruption.
- Any assault involving a weapon regardless of weapon type.
- Recovery of one or more firearms.
- Anonymous threats of school violence (bomb threats, threats of shootings, beheadings, etc.). We note that it is not unusual for law enforcement personnel to request that only limited information be released to prevent interference with investigations and prosecutions.
- Abductions or attempted abductions of students.
- Suicide on school property, school bus or at a school event.
- Hate crimes, terrorism, any other type of violent extremist violence or attempted violence of this type.
- Public health situations that could have implications relating to communicable diseases which can result in permanent disability or death.
- Situations involving trafficking of drugs, firearms, explosives, or human beings.

We also suggest the SPS work with the task force to develop an approach to educate parents and guardians about the significant problems that have been resulting from misuse of social media by students nationally and in fact, internationally in recent years. One concern expressed by educators around the nation is that school systems are not adequately staff nor qualified to serve as the “social media police” and that parents should take a very active role in monitoring the electronic communications of their students. While students, parents should be taught to report electronic
communications that can indicate risk of harm to students and staff, they can also benefit from information that clarifies the types of communications that are outside of the scope of school officials to address.

As is typically the case for school districts we work with, members of the SPS leadership team, CROs, student services, and building administrators we interviewed frequently expressed that the challenges relating to inappropriate social media communication by SPS students has been creating a significant drain on staff time and resources. For example, Student Services personnel reported that they are facing significant challenges in tracking and evaluating a significantly increased number of reports of bullying, threats, intimidation, harassment, and self-harm involving SPS students. Personnel in multiple departments expressed concerns that the sheer volume of concerning social media communications involving students can overtax the limited personnel available to address these concerns. While media reports of shootings, suicides and other tragedies frequently allege the school and public safety personnel have missed clear indications of danger communicated on social media, the sometimes-staggering number of highly concerning electronic communications makes it extremely challenging for these personnel to properly investigate, evaluate and assess these situations. As with other areas addressed by this report, our analysts will be glad to further assist the SPS with free telephone and e-mail consultation if needed beyond the life of this project.

5.4.6. Clear bookbags

We were asked to provide an opinion on the requirement of clear bookbags to reduce the risk of shootings on school campuses. We have been reluctant to recommend clear bookbags for most K12 schools. While we have had some positive feedback on the use of clear bookbags for very young children, our experience has been that they are not as effective in preventing students at the upper elementary, middle, and high school level from concealing firearms. While students who have limited developmental ability to think in terms of defeating security measures have been caught with items they did not realize they should bring to school through the use of clear bookbags (one example was a kindergarten student who tried to bring his pet turtle to school in a clear bookbag), we have found that students and etc. Safe Havens analyst Chris Dorn has

A number of our clients have adopted and then discontinued policies requiring clear bookbags because they found that the ease students had in hiding weapons and other contraband in them combined with the inconvenience they posed for students and parents did not make them a logical option. As with many other measures, clear bookbags may make people feel safer without actually achieving the level of safety they provide. In addition, once one or more incidents demonstrating how unreliable this approach is, students, staff and parents feel even more vulnerable.
5.4.7. Phone apps

We were asked to opine on the use of phone applications (apps) for emergency communications. One of the schools we assessed was piloting one of these apps. In our experience, these phone apps are not as reliable as landline phones and are more prone to simple but potentially deadly errors. We have found during our crisis scenario simulations and actual events that personnel who attempt to use phone apps or emergency warning systems that have pre-recorded messages to implement lockdown and other emergency protective actions can actually take longer. The results of our scenario simulations have revealed that these systems are far more prone to human errors, which can have catastrophic results. For example, a staff member pressing the wrong button and communicating to students and staff that they should lockdown in classrooms when they should actually be moving to severe weather sheltering areas. Conversely, this type of mistake could easily result in hundreds of students and staff moving into hallways when they should be implementing a lockdown. While they can have benefits as a supplemental means of communications, we do not recommend mobile apps as the primary means of communicating in an emergency unless there is not a viable alternative.
6. Implementation Plan

Below are suggested options for consideration for the short-term (first twelve to eighteen months) and long-term (over the next five years) implementation plans to address the opportunities for improvement identified in this report. There are also some opportunities that should be addressed in the first twelve month to eighteen months (short-term) but may need a long-term plan, such as drill and exercise programs. Please note that there are times when the District can work on multiple tasks at the same time, and the priority of these tasks may change depending on the District’s available resources. In addition, the District may have opportunities to address items listed in the long-term priorities earlier than we indicate. If this were the case, it would be acceptable for the District to make the decision to do so.

The reader should understand that it is not possible to accurately and mathematically rank all safety, security, and emergency preparedness concerns. The wide range of factors makes many of the opportunities for improvement interdependent. Additionally, availability of short-term and long-term funding is a reality that must be taken into account when these types of decisions are made. For this reason, this ranking should be viewed as providing general guidelines rather than as absolute rankings of priority. With each decision, the reader should keep in mind that there is a point when the costs of safety and security, both in monetary and intangible forms, can overtake the ability of the organization to accomplish its core mission of education.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Opportunity for Improvement</th>
<th>Ranking</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>Revising the DSEP and SERP to clearly specify how they are related to each other, when staff should use which document, etc.</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>Improving the content and format of the DSEP.</td>
<td>S</td>
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<tr>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>Improving current protocols in the SERP as well as adding additional important protocols.</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>Developing a more robust mental health recovery plan.</td>
<td>L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.5</td>
<td></td>
<td>L</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Legend:**
- **S**: Should be addressed in a short-term plan;
- **L**: Should be addressed in a long-term plan;
- **S/L**: Should be addressed within the first twelve to eighteen months but will also require a long-term plan.
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<tr>
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<th>Opportunity for Improvement</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>Developing a comprehensive school planning – Content Redacted Here - Identify Specific Safety Vulnerabilities</td>
<td>L</td>
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<tr>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>Re-evaluating the benefits as well as potential pitfalls of the current approach in emergency plan distribution.</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>Implementing a more robust progressive drill and exercise program.</td>
<td>S &amp; L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>Implementing drill, exercise and training programs that are based on a more comprehensive all-hazards approach to school safety, security and emergency preparedness and appropriate fidelity testing to properly evaluate and measure outcomes.</td>
<td>S &amp; L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.10</td>
<td>Implementing a comprehensive fidelity testing system in place to continually evaluate the level of alignment between actual practices and written policies, plans, programs, staff development approaches, drills, and exercises.</td>
<td>L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.11</td>
<td>Providing additional training on pre-attack indicators based on behavioral approaches for employees.</td>
<td>L</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 5.1. Student Welfare and Behavioral Prevention Measures

<p>| 5.1.1 | Continuing the efforts of the School Safety Task Force and organizing internal multi-disciplinary meetings to identify ways to enhance efforts to address the concerns relating to increased risk levels of the student population expressed by building administrators and support staff. | S &amp; L   |
| 5.1.2 | Restructuring and staffing to provide proper oversight of critical functions such as school safety, security, and emergency preparedness; school resource and security officers; and transportation. | S &amp; L   |
| 5.1.3 | Developing an approach to provide armed prevention coverage of District schools, support facilities and, as appropriate, athletic, and special events. | S &amp; L   |
| 5.1.4 | A more structured approach in selecting and assigning CROs and/or SPD police personnel at each athletic event that requires security/police | S &amp; L   |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Opportunity for Improvement</th>
<th>Ranking</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>5.1.5</strong></td>
<td>Continuing the efforts to improve suicide prevention and risk assessment approach.</td>
<td>S &amp; L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>5.1.6</strong></td>
<td>Developing a formal mental health recovery team or a formal partnership with an organization qualified to provide such services.</td>
<td>L</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>5.1.7</strong></td>
<td>Increasing the staffing of nurses for its schools or develop an alternative approach to medical emergencies on SPS campuses.</td>
<td>L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>5.1.8</strong></td>
<td>Adding additional pre-employment screening steps.</td>
<td>L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>5.1.9</strong></td>
<td>Developing strategies to enhance student supervision at SPS schools, particularly during arrival and dismissal times.</td>
<td>S &amp; L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>5.1.10</strong></td>
<td>Developing strategies to address the concerns regarding student supervision and safety, security, and emergency preparedness measures for after-hours activities at its middle and high school buildings.</td>
<td>S &amp; L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>5.1.11</strong></td>
<td>Developing written protocols to regulate who can access, view, record, and distribute security camera footage, including local police agencies personnel.</td>
<td>L</td>
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**5.2. Emergency Communications, Access Control, and other Security Technologies**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Opportunity for Improvement</th>
<th>Ranking</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>5.2.1</strong></td>
<td>Making</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>5.2.2</strong></td>
<td>Providing school staff with more radios and improving the practice of staff taking a radio with them while supervising students outside.</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>5.2.3</strong></td>
<td>Providing school personnel with clarification in the form of improved</td>
<td>L</td>
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<tr>
<td>Item</td>
<td>Opportunity for Improvement</td>
<td>Ranking</td>
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<tr>
<td>5.2.4</td>
<td>Considering strategies to retrofit the vestibules at the schools that currently do not channel visitors directly to the main office during future renovations.</td>
<td>L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2.5</td>
<td>Improving the current visitor screening approach at all schools.</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2.6</td>
<td>Verifying that all schools have school building as well as considering school safety.</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2.7</td>
<td>Verifying that all schools have at least one AED mounted in a visible and readily accessible location in the school building.</td>
<td>S</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### 5.3. Safety, Security and Emergency Preparedness Practices and Other Campus Safety Approaches

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Opportunity for Improvement</th>
<th>Ranking</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5.3.1</td>
<td>Developing a multi-faceted strategy to improve traffic safety at SPS schools.</td>
<td>S &amp; L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.3.2</td>
<td>Equipping staff on duty outdoors with high-visibility vests and requiring them to wear the vests while they are performing the duty.</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.3.3</td>
<td>Verifying that staff assisting in traffic directing and monitoring have received proper training before being assigned for these tasks.</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.3.4</td>
<td>Addressing the issue of space management via staff development and a written policy.</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.3.5</td>
<td>Providing staff development to help educate administrators and school staff on the risks of leaving dangerous items in unsecured, unsupervised rooms</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.3.6</td>
<td>Addressing the issue of common safety hazards at schools.</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.3.7</td>
<td>Encouraging teachers to teach with their classroom doors locked or pre-locking their classroom doors every time they are in the classrooms.</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.3.8</td>
<td>Developing simple printed emergency photo tours for each school and evaluating the practicality of updating, continuing to use, and becoming</td>
<td>L</td>
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<tr>
<td>Item</td>
<td>Opportunity for Improvement</td>
<td>Ranking</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>5.3.9</td>
<td>Improvement in the utilization of emergency diagrams at SPS schools.</td>
<td>L</td>
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<tr>
<td>5.3.10</td>
<td>Furnishing all schools with two emergency evacuation kits to be stored in separate locations. We note that these kits should be taken out and utilized during emergency drills.</td>
<td>L</td>
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<tr>
<td>5.3.11</td>
<td>Addressing the issues of covering classroom and office windows at many SPS schools.</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.3.12</td>
<td>Improving natural surveillance for exterior windows.</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.3.13</td>
<td>Numbering exterior doors with standardized numbering and directional markers.</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.3.14</td>
<td>Developing standardized consent to search signage for postage at every vehicular access point at all schools.</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.3.16</td>
<td>Developing standardized, district-wide instructional and directional signage for use at all schools.</td>
<td>L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.3.17</td>
<td>Developing strategies to identify and address the issue of roof top access by unauthorized people.</td>
<td>L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.3.18</td>
<td>Encouraging the use of CPTED in general, and positive territoriality in particular, at all schools.</td>
<td>L</td>
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7. Conclusion

We found that the SPS and its community partners have been working diligently to address significantly increased risk factors among the student population served by the District. Although the SPS and its community partners often face significant challenges due to limited resources and an ever-changing community landscape, the levels of interest, collaboration, and desire to support those in other departments, roles, and organizations was both impressive and helpful. The firm commitment by the SPD to support the SPS in spite of challenges police agencies face in recruiting and retaining high-caliber law enforcement officers in recent years, and the high degree of interest among elected school board members, the superintendent and senior leadership team were also quite impressive.

Although numerous opportunities for improvement are identified in this report, we see that the District is ready and willing to take actions to effectively address the issues noted in this report. Our personnel who worked on this project found the direct feedback, passion and suggestions for ways for the SPS and its community partners to build upon the many enhancements described in this report. We found the District’s leadership team, employees, School Safety Task Force members and local public safety officials we interacted with to be eager to share viewpoints, learn new concepts and to be highly focused on improving school safety while taking care not to damage school culture and climate.

As with past improvements, we urge that efforts to address the opportunities for improvement outlined in this report be made with a focus on effective implementation of the changes rather than the speed of implementation. While we do not advocate delays in action, we urge our clients to focus on quality above speed in making long-term adjustments in safety. This will be especially important in the area of emergency plan revision and development.

We also routinely advise our clients not to take the options for consideration listed as specific mandates. Therefore, the District should consider a variety of factors including available resources and an emphasis on making quality improvements rather than an emphasis on simply trying to address all of the recommendations in this report in a checklist fashion. While we feel each finding and option for consideration is valid, the most effective school safety strategies involve thoughtful approaches based on a blend of options for consideration we describe. Clients should also keep in mind that their efforts to address one option for consideration sometimes affect how beneficial other enhancements will be. For example, improvements in student supervision and increases in the number of security personnel may decrease, at least to a point, the impact of some physical security upgrades.

We have emphasized the areas where improvements can be achieved, but once again remind all who read this report of the substantial successes already achieved in the area of security, climate, and culture in the School. We at Safe Havens International consider it an honor to work with the District on this important and worthwhile initiative and applaud the efforts of the District leadership to seek ways to improve the level of safety for the precious human beings that make up Spokane Public Schools community.
Appendix I: Improving the Positive Body Language of Schools via the Use of Murals, Artwork, and Color Schemes

While many parents, students and staff have expressed a desire for target hardening approaches, we caution our clients that target hardening efforts can increase the risk of violence in K12 schools if care is not taken to maintain the positive school climate that has been demonstrated to be one of the most effective ways to prevent school homicides in multiple studies including a 2016 research project by the Rand Corporation.17 Researchers have noted in multiple studies that the use of use of color schemes, resilient flooring patterns, artwork, and thoughtfully done murals to create “positive territoriality” (one of the aspects in the concept of Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED)) in K12 schools can enhance the school climate and reduce the fear of crime by fostering improved connectivity between staff, students, and parents. Pervasive positive territoriality can also help to tone down and soften the potential negative effects of increased security measures. The combination of positive interaction between staff and students and excellent use of a series of murals artwork and color schemes can help school officials create a higher degree of connectivity, improved school climate, and improved security at a school. While the use of this approach is not in any way designed to replace good physical security measures, they are in our experience at least as important. Thoughtful efforts to improve positive territoriality can help to improve school climate while improving school security. Of considerable importance, significant enhancements of physical security can and often do result in damage to school climate that is so important to the reduction of school violence.

This excellent utilization of positive territoriality is in a school designed by a Safe Havens client after the security director attended safe-school design training by Safe Havens. The charter school company’s Security Director worked with the company’s marketing director to come up with the visual features of this school, which are depicted in all three topical areas of CPTED in this section.

17 https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1400/RR1488/RAND_RR1488.pdf
The pleasant visuals combined with excellent natural surveillance of the visitor parking area, main approach routes, and single point of entry create a warm and open appearance while providing increased threat detection capabilities and greater deterrence for potential intruders who realize they are unlikely to be able to approach the school without being detected.

This Georgia middle school serves an extremely high-risk student population in a neighborhood with intensive gang violence. However, the pervasive use of bright colors, murals, and photo murals combined with good physical security measures and an emphasis on polite and respectful interaction of staff with students and parents combined to make this one of the safest schools in the community when this photo was taken.
This is the view of the opposite side of the cafeteria in the same school. The community served by this school is known as “Bloomfield,” which has been incorporated as a theme into the culture of the school.

Positive territoriality can be and is often utilized to increase a feeling of ownership and belonging for students. Generally, this approach has been found to reduce vandalism, increase the likelihood that students will report concerns to school staff, reduce fear, and soften the impact of target-hardening security measures.
Thoughtful and pervasive use of positive territoriality not only improves school climate and connectivity but can dramatically reduce the risk of creating a “prison-like” environment when schools ramp up security. This international school in New Delhi has intensive security measures compared to most U.S. K12 schools due to the country’s pervasive problems with abduction of school girls for ransom, torture, and repeated sexual assault by numerous attackers combined with a greater risk of homicide and terrorism than in the U.S. The pervasive use of pleasant design features, bright colors, and extensive murals and photo murals tone down the presence of more than 30 security officers, aggressive rake-topped security fencing, and other intensive security measures needed to protect students and staff from the risk of violence in their city.
This large, vivid, and beautiful photo mural is one of many to capture the diversity of the school that can be found in every major area of the building. We note that the company that operates this school operates international schools in more than a dozen countries with high rates of crime and violence. The company’s effective combination of extensive security combined with warm, welcoming school climates has enabled them to successfully operate schools serving affluent children at high risk for victimization. Prospective parents feel comfortable with the emphasis on good physical security while seeing that their children can still find school to be a pleasant and fun place to spend their days.
It has been our experience that most school and law enforcement officials are not fully aware of the positive impact that CPTED can have on school climate and security. While CPTED should never be viewed as a replacement for physical security measures such as security cameras, visitor management systems, security policies, and personnel, they should be viewed as being just as important to a safe and effective school environment. In our experience, the greater the need for physical security, the greater the need for CPTED – especially the use of positive territoriality. In our experience, educating building administrators, teachers, support personnel, parents, and students on the power of CPTED can be an important first step in the thoughtful, long-term application of these research-based concepts.
Appendix II: Suggested Contents for an Emergency Evacuation Kit

All schools should develop at least two Emergency Evacuation/Management Kits to be taken from the school during all drills and emergency evacuations and/or to the alternative school site. It is essential that this kit is kept updated. One kit should be located in the administrator’s office, and a second in an easily accessible but secure location in another part of the building. The principal or designee will take the kit whenever the building is evacuated. Information in the kit will allow the administrator to quickly implement the emergency plan and provide critical information to first responders.

- A copy of the school emergency operations plan, along with quick reference guides to all the protocols and emergency telephone numbers of assistance agencies
- Student release/sign-out sheets. (Each teacher should have a sign-out form/current roll.)
- A copy of the school’s most recent Security Threat and Vulnerability Assessment (Site Survey Checklist or Safety Audit)
- A building floor plan and/or photo tour with utility shut off locations marked and detailed instructions on emergency shutoff and operation procedures
- Site plan information highlighting mobile units, fenced areas, fuel storage, etc.
- A list of assigned roles of school personnel and district personnel
- Recent lists of students who ride buses, organized by bus/route number
- Bus routes and driver contact information
- Emergency telephone numbers of assistance agencies
- Copies of photographs of the facility (exterior and interior photo tour)
- A copy of a video, CD-ROM or jump drive with photos depicting exterior and interior of the building
- Copies of all student and staff emergency contact/release/medical information cards
- A copy of the school or district personnel directory with phone contact information
- A copy of the most recent school yearbook
- Student/staff photo sheet (check with yearbook photographer – some yearbook companies provide these photos free of charge for emergency use as a value-added service)
☐ Special needs student information
☐ Special needs information for staff members
☐ Keys
☐ One or more extra radios capable of operating on the same frequency as district staff and/or first responders.
☐ A flashlight and extra batteries
☐ A bullhorn and appropriate batteries
☐ School response team vests and/or badges
☐ An AM/FM Radio with extra batteries
☐ An extra Laptop/iPad/etc. with extra batteries (if feasible/available)
☐ A current county phone book
☐ City/County maps
☐ A First Aid Kit
☐ Light Sticks
☐ Cell phones and/or portable two-way radio. If possible, include a charger and extra batteries for each device
☐ Telephone numbers for district office personnel, local law enforcement partners, emergency medical services representatives, local fire department liaisons, and contacts with other agencies that specialize in crisis management
☐ List of professional and community contacts for organizing a crisis response team
☐ (10) legal pads
☐ (10) ballpoint pens
☐ (10) felt tip markers
☐ (500 to 2,000) plain white peel-off stickers to be used to identify injured students/adults at emergency site
Appendix III: Suggested Contents for Special Needs Emergency Evacuation Kits

In addition to the primary “standard” evacuation kits, kits designed to assist students with special needs are also needed. Depending on the needs of each of these students in your building, the contents of this kit will vary. It is very important that this kit be maintained and updated any time a student’s needs change as well as if a student with special needs enrolls or leaves the school. Remember this kit is in addition to the standard emergency evacuation kit and does not replace it.

- Disposable non-latex gloves
- Plastic garbage bags
- Disposable diapers and wipes
- Antibacterial hand cleaner and tissues
- Emergency information cards for each student with the following information:
  - Student’s name, address, phone number, and date of birth
  - Parent/guardian with workplace and number
  - Additional emergency contact numbers
  - Diagnosis
  - Current medications with instructions
  - Physician’s name and phone number
  - Communication/mobility needs
  - Special instructions for: lifting, diet/feeding, respiratory aids, toileting/ catheterization, emergency procedures

As needed:

- Feeding equipment
- Respiratory equipment
- Catheterization equipment
- Food, formula, water
☐ Towels and blankets

☐ Paper cups

☐ Cooler or insulated bag for refrigerated items

Please be certain that local Emergency Medical Services are aware of any special considerations needed for your students with special needs. This will enable them to provide the appropriate care for these students when responding to a crisis at your school.
Appendix IV: First Aid/Clinics Suggested Kit Contents

First aid kit inventory sheet should be included in the kit.

- Ammonia inhalants
- Paper tape
- Splints (2)
- Oral thermometer (1) and covers
- Disposable sterile gloves
- Cotton balls
- Emergency medications for students
- Scissors
- Tweezers (1)
- Hand soap/sanitizer
- 4”x 4” sterile gauze pads
- Tongue depressors
- Moistened wipes
- Penlight
- Portable cabinet to transport medicine

- Vaseline gauze (2)
- Pocket mask (2)
- Plastic cling wrap
- Blankets (2)
- Neosporin ointment
- Safety pins
- Band aids (all sizes)
- Hydrogen Peroxide
- Cleaner – spray bottle or wipes
- Distilled water
- Medical alert list
- Large flashlights
- Small paper cups
- Kwik Kold type ice packs
Appendix V: Helpful Tips for Emergency Diagram Design

One of the most basic and often overlooked preparedness tools is the emergency diagram. We create them, and they get moved, fall down, or misplaced. They end up getting mixed up over time. As building modifications are made, floor plans go out of date. A good diagram design will use common software that can be used to make updates over time as needed. Source diagrams can be pulled from floor plans, created from scratch using design software, or even hand-drawn and scanned. If you are having trouble locating your floor plans, one place to look is the building’s server room, or your district IT department. Copies of building blueprints are often stored in these locations for wiring placement.

Here are a few tips to consider when you are creating or updating your emergency diagrams.

1. **Clarity.** Are your diagrams clear, easy to read and understand? Use easy to read fonts, only include information that is absolutely necessary, and use helpful icons to help the viewer quickly determine where they are and where they should go.

2. **Orientation.** Are all diagrams oriented properly to the viewer? For example, if you are reading the diagram and your emergency route takes you out the door and to the left, does the arrow on the diagram guide you to the left.

3. **Universal language.** Are you using terminology that anyone can understand, including regular users as well as visitors and first responders? If using special location names, are these communicated through corresponding signage as well? For example, if a diagram refers to “D Hall” does “D Hall” have paint or signage saying it is such? This is something to consider in your emergency planning as well.

4. **Stay up to date.** Are your diagrams current? Include a version number and/or date on your diagram. This also makes it easier to make sure all diagrams are updated when changes are made.

5. **Fire codes.** Do they meet the requirements of your local fire code? Ask your first responders to review them. They are often going to be the ones using them.

6. **Here are some diagram features we look for when we are doing a school safety assessment:**
   - Are emergency evacuation diagrams placed in all occupied areas?
   - Are severe weather sheltering diagrams posted?
   - Are diagrams oriented properly to the viewer? This means that the diagram is easy to read and when an arrow points to the left, the viewer should go to the left, as opposed to traditional diagrams which are all rotated in the same direction (usually whichever way the
text is printed on the page). Could a user memorize a route based on the diagram and follow it while crawling through smoke or other reduced visibility?

- Does the diagram design have icons to indicate your location, evacuation routes, etc.? One of the easiest to read diagrams we have seen is a hotel diagram that uses logos to represent nearby restaurants and two antique cannons that are easily recognizable to anyone on the property. This small feature of the diagram is incredibly useful for wayfinding.

- Do diagrams use text instructions? For example, “Exit the room and go left to exit through the door at the end of the hall. Assemble at the soccer field.”

- Do diagrams include photos to help convey evacuation routes and assembly areas? For example, a photo of the piece of playground equipment that the class is supposed to assemble at. This can be especially helpful for younger students or some populations with special needs.

These photos depict an example of excellent school emergency diagrams.

Sample Emergency diagram icons

One of the basic components of a good diagram is a good set of icons. These icons have been created based on general standards and fire code requirements for emergency diagrams. To download these icons as individual files or in PSD (Photoshop) format, visit

http://safehavensinternational.org/emergency-map-icon-samples/.
Appendix VI: Helpful Techniques to Improve Student Supervision

Improving student supervision is one of the most effective school safety strategies available to school officials. Therefore, school districts should consider providing training or briefings to school staff, particularly those at elementary schools, on techniques for effective student supervision and the obligation of school employees to supervise students. Documenting these efforts properly tends to further improve the level of student supervision, significantly improve student safety, and can help reduce the organization’s exposure to civil liability by preventing incidents and improving follow up when incidents do occur.

The following are some of the key techniques for effective student supervision:

- Minimizing instances where individual students or groups of students are left unsupervised. These situations should be a rarity in every school.

- Effective use of line of sight when staff supervise students.

- Proper positioning of staff in relation to students they are supervising. For example, having staff take a position that allows them to monitor two hallways rather than just one during passing time or having a teacher walk at the back of a line of students when they move them through the school.

- Assign enough staff to create appropriate proximity of staff in relation to students they are supervising. For example, a teacher watching students on a playground should be close enough to see and hear all students. Two teachers supervising a large group of students should be positioned to maximize coverage rather than allowing staff to congregate and face away from students deep in conversation.

- Proper pacing of students as they move through an area. For example, not letting students spread out as they move as a group or with a teacher down a hallway.

To address the issue with student supervision during drop-off and dismissal time due to high volume of parents and cars, administrators and staff should make a concerted effort to properly supervise students and to communicate with parents relating to turning off their engines, not talking on portable phones, driving slowly, and other critical actions during these time periods. The bus loading areas also require thoughtful and effective supervision as well as close collaboration between school and transportation personnel.

Teachers should also be provided written guidance as to when students should be issued a hall pass with a requirement that the teachers verify that the students reached the destination they were sent to or
returned from the restroom, locker, etc. These efforts can be enhanced via geographic information system (GIS) mapping surveys of students to identify times and locations where students feel additional supervision is needed. These surveys involve students marking GIS maps of their schools with dots of different colors to show where they have seen bullying, fights, gang activity or other problem behaviors. This has shown remarkable results in one of our client districts in Nevada.
Appendix VII: Helpful Sources of School Safety Resources and Information

As a non-profit organization, we encourage schools and school districts to try to use as many quality free school safety resources as they can. Below are the sources that provide a variety of quality free helpful resources and information to help improve school safety, security and emergency preparedness:

Office of Safe and Drug-Free Schools (OSDFS) of the United States Department of Education

The OSDFS administers, coordinates, and recommends policy for improving quality and excellence of programs and activities that are designed to:

- Provide financial assistance for drug and violence prevention activities and activities that promote the health and wellbeing of students in elementary and secondary schools, and institutions of higher education. Activities may be carried out by State and local educational agencies and by other public and private nonprofit organizations.

- Participate in the formulation and development of ED program policy and legislative proposals and in overall Administration policies related to violence and drug prevention; drafting program regulations.

- Participate in interagency committees, groups, and partnerships related to drug and violence prevention, coordinating with other Federal agencies on issues related to comprehensive school health, and advising the Secretary on the formulation of comprehensive school health education policy.

- Participate with other Federal agencies in the development of a national research agenda for drug and violence prevention.

- Administer the Department's programs relating to character and civics education.

The OSDFS provides a number of high quality free resources to schools that are available on their website at http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/osdfs/index.html.

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)

FEMA offers a number of free online and live training programs relevant to school safety. FEMA offers free high quality school safety planning training and training on the National Incident Management System at its training facility at Emmetsburg, Maryland. FEMA also offers good quality, and free online training on the same topics via the agencies website. We highly recommend that school officials avail themselves of this valuable and free training. Visit the training section at www.fema.gov.
Stop Bullying Now
This campaign funded by the United States Government has numerous free resources for schools. Though directed more for middle school aged students, many high school administrators have found information from the program to be helpful. Please visit their website at www.stopbullyingnow.hrsa.gov for more information.

Olweus Bullying Prevention Program
This program is evidence-based and has a very well-established track record of success. We have had consistently good feedback from our clients on the effectiveness of this program. Though there are many bullying prevention programs available to schools, we feel that this is the most reliable and effective program currently available. Please visit their website at http://www.olweus.org/public/index.page for more information.

Safe Havens International, Inc.
Safe Havens International is the world’s leading non-profit global school safety center. Our mission is to make children, and those who dedicate their lives to educating them, safer no matter where in the world they happen to be born and live. Our analysts have published more than 25 books on school safety, have filmed, edited and produced more than 100 school safety training videos and have work experience in more than two dozen countries. Our analysts have worked on hundreds of major school safety projects for state and federal agencies and have provided expertise to the United States Departments of Education, Justice and Homeland Security as well as for the FBI, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms Enforcement, Israel National Police, Vietnam National University and a host of other organizations concerned with school safety.

As a nonprofit center, we work diligently to provide high quality free school safety resources and to serve as a clearinghouse for free school safety resources. We estimate that we will be adding more than 500 free guides and manuals to our resource section this year. On our website, you can find the following free resources:

- Free school safety e-book
- Topical papers and articles
- School safety training video clips
- Emergency planning tools
- Tactical site survey tools

Please visit our website at www.safehavensinternational.org for more detailed information.
Appendix VIII: Biographies of Analysts who Conducted the Assessments and Analysis for this Report

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<td>Michael Dorn, Safe Havens Executive Director &amp; Senior Analyst</td>
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<td>Project Assignment: Overall project manager, conducted off-site document review and on-site district-level assessment, and assisted with report writing.</td>
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<td>Director Michael Dorn is one of the most respected, widely recognized, highly credentialed and trusted school safety experts in the world. During his campus safety career of more than 36 years, Michael’s work has taken him to numerous regions including Mexico, Honduras, Canada, Vietnam the U.K., Kenya, South Africa, Israel and Mozambique. Michael has provided post-investigative assistance to law firms, school systems, state agencies and insurance carriers for 16 active shooter and targeted school shooting incidents in K12 schools in the United States, Canada and Mexico. A leading school safety malpractice expert witness consultant, Michael served as an expert witness consultant for superior and federal court cases in eleven states and the District of Columbia. Michael was an expert witness consultant in multiple school and school bus shootings including the school safety malpractice litigation following the Red Lake Reservation School Shooting, the nation’s third most deadly K12 school shooting prior to 2018.</td>
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<td>Published by four major publishing houses, Michael has authored and co-authored 27 books on school safety including Innocent Targets – When Terrorism Comes to School, the peer reviewed 450-page Jane’s Safe Schools Planning Guide for All Hazards and Staying Alive – How to Act Fast and Survive Deadly Encounters which was released by Barron’s in May of 2014. Michael is currently co-authoring a 600-page university textbook Extreme Violence: Understanding and Protecting People from Active Assailants, Hate Crimes and Terrorist Attacks for Cognella due for publication in 2019.</td>
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<td>Michael also served on the authoring team for the IS 360 Preparing for Mass Casualty Incidents: A Guide for Schools, Higher Education, and Houses of Worship training program</td>
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<td>Division – Georgia Emergency Management Agency.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Senior Analyst for Public Safety and Emergency Management – Jane’s (top expert for the renowned 105-year-old British defense, intelligence and school safety publisher with offices in nine countries).</td>
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During his ten-years of service as the Chief of Police for the Bibb County Public School System in Macon, Georgia, his officers developed what is believed to be the nation’s first multidisciplinary threat assessment team for a K12 school system. This approach and other innovative measures helped the district prevent a number of planned school shootings, one planned school bombing and a planned double suicided. Michael helped the Georgia Department of Education develop the nation’s first 24 hour a day, seven days per week, year-round hotline. The state hotline was launched in August of 1998 and was based on a similar live monitored hotline developed in 1990 in his school system police department. Michael also assisted in launching the e-mail-based reporting feature for this hotline while he was serving at the state level. The Bibb County Public School Police Department was widely utilized as a model program by dozens of organizations including the United States Departments of Education and Justice, the FBI, International Association of Chiefs of Police and National Association of School Resource Officers. Michael has presented nationally and internationally on student threat evaluation for more than twenty years and has personally helped avert a number of planned school shootings and one school bombing incident.

| Russell Bentley, Safe Havens Senior Analyst | Project assignment: Conducted on-site district-level and school-level assessments. |

Russell Bentley is a 28-year police veteran with 23 years of experience in executive positions with campus police agencies. Mr. Bentley is a 2001 graduate of the FBI National Academy and has received extensive formal training in LE and emergency management. He holds a Master of Science Degree in Administration and a Bachelor of Science Degree in Child Development and Family Life Education, both from Georgia College and State
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<td>University. Mr. Bentley is currently a contributing author for a 600-page university textbook <em>Extreme Violence: Understanding and Protecting People from Active Assailants, Hate Crimes and Terrorist Attacks</em> for Cognella due for publication in 2019. During his law enforcement career spanning more than three decades, he has:</td>
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<td>• Served as police chief for ten years at both the K-12 and post-secondary levels.</td>
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<td>• Served for five years with the Macon Police Department working undercover narcotics, patrol division, crime prevention bureau, communications division, housing authority unit and was promoted to police sergeant.</td>
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<td>• Served for eight years as the Deputy Chief of Police and for ten years as the Chief of Police for a Georgia Board of Education Campus Police Department. The department has been widely featured as a model school LE partnership by many agencies including the U.S. Department of Education, the International Association of Chiefs of Police and the U.S. Department of Justice.</td>
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<td>• Served as Chief of Police for the Fort Valley State University Police Department for two years.</td>
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<td>• Has completed more than 1,600 hours of advanced level LE and emergency management training at the state and federal level.</td>
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<td>• Served in the development and final review of the Jane’s Safe Schools Planning Guide for All Hazards, the Jane’s School Safety Handbook and the Jane’s Teacher’s Safety Guide.</td>
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<td>• Serves as an adjunct faculty member teaching police and security technology at Central Georgia Technical College.</td>
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<td>Mr. Bentley has extensive experience in conducting school safety assessments and school safety assessment train-the-trainer programs. He has presented at state, national, and international professional conferences across the nation.</td>
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<td>Phuong Nguyen, Safe Havens Analyst</td>
<td>Project assignment: Conducted on-site district-level assessment and assisted with report writing. A trained and skilled researcher, Ms. Nguyen has analyzed assessment data, prepared documents, and provided oversight for reporting for all Safe Havens school safety assessment projects since 2010, including major projects for the Center for Safe Schools funded by Pennsylvania Department of Education, the Hawaii Department of Education, the Wisconsin Homeland Security Council, the Indiana Department of Education, the South Carolina Department of Education and the Maine Department of Education, Ms. Nguyen has helped conduct assessments, provide coordination and oversight and prepare reports for more than 3,000 public, private, charter, independent, Jewish, Baptist, Lutheran, Episcopalian, Buddhist and Catholic schools. Ms. Nguyen has also conducted on-site school security and emergency preparedness assessments for public, independent, and faith-based K12 schools in 20 states, the District of Columbia and has assessed public, international and faith-based K12 schools in India. Ms. Nguyen served as the content editor for the book <em>Staying Alive – How to Act Fast and Survive Deadly Encounters</em> which was released to bookstores by Barron’s in May 2014. Ms. Nguyen also co-authored the IS 360 <em>Preparing for Mass Casualty Incidents: A Guide for Schools, Higher Education, and Houses of Worship</em> web training program on active shooter prevention and preparedness for the United States of Education as part of the 2013 White House School Safety Initiative. Ms. Nguyen has also served as a co-author for six web courses on the prevention of and preparedness for active shooter events and six terrorism web courses for Scenario Learning Inc. Ms. Nguyen is also currently the lead co-author for a 600-page university textbook <em>Extreme Violence: Understanding and Protecting People from Active Assailants, Hate Crimes and Terrorist Attacks</em> for Cognella due for publication in 2019. Ms. Nguyen holds the following degrees:</td>
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### Roles and Relevant Skills

- Bachelor of Arts Degree in English Linguistics, Quinhon University, Vietnam.
- Master of Arts Degree in Mass Communications, Texas Tech University.
- Master of Science Degree in Cyber Security, University of Maryland University College.

### Project assignment: Conducted on-site school-level assessment.

Well-known and respected in the field, Chris Dorn has presented at conferences in more than two dozen states and at Vietnam National University in Saigon. Chris has served as a trainer for the U.S. Office of Homeland Security, FEMA, Israel National Police, International Association of Chiefs of Police, National Association of Pupil Transportation, Bureau of Justice Assistance, and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms and numerous state departments of education, LE and emergency management. Chris has presented and keynoted for hundreds of state, national and international professional conferences.

Chris has authored and co-authored five books on school safety, including *Innocent Targets – When Terrorism Comes to School* and *Staying Alive – How to Act Fast and Survive Deadly Encounters* which was released by Barron’s in May of 2014. He is currently a contributing author for a 600-page university textbook *Extreme Violence: Understanding and Protecting People from Active Assailants, Hate Crimes and Terrorist Attacks* for Cognella due for publication in 2019. Chris has co-authored numerous school safety papers and authored a peer-review paper on schools and terrorism in the Journal of Emergency Management, the most widely circulated peer-reviewed journal in the field of emergency management. Chris co-authored the IS 360 *Preparing for Mass Casualty Incidents: A Guide for Schools, Higher Education, and Houses of Worship* web training program on active shooter prevention and preparedness for the United States of America.
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<td>Chris Prater, Safe Havens Analyst</td>
<td>Education as part of the 2013 White House School Safety Initiative. Chris has co-authored seven active shooter web training programs for Scenario Learning Inc. one of the largest providers of school safety web courses. Chris has more than ten years of experience assisting with and performing school safety, security, climate culture and emergency preparedness assessments for schools across the country. He has conducted the assessments for more than 500 K12 schools in 38 states. He was one of the team leaders in our assessment project for all 201 schools for Orange County Public Schools (Florida). Chris holds a bachelor’s degree from Georgia Institute of Technology.</td>
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<td>Stephanie Prater, Safe Havens Analyst</td>
<td>Project assignment: Conducted on-site school-level assessment.</td>
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|                                      | Ms. Stephanie Prater has thirty years of LE and security experience and has worked for a public-school district for the last twenty-one years. During those thirty years, she spent seven years in the United States Air Force as a Security Specialist, worked as an undercover narcotics agent, return to school (truant) officer and is the first female in her department to be promoted through the ranks to her current position as Deputy Chief. She also serves as an adjunct instructor for the Criminal Justice Technology degree and certification programs for a local technical college. During her 25-year career of LE, Stephanie has completed hundreds of classroom hours on public safety training on the use of force, school violence, school search and seizure, emergency operations planning, exercise design and evaluation, etc. She has more than 10 years of experience in conducting school safety assessments for hundreds of K12 schools in six states, including the climate, culture, safety, security, and emergency preparedness assessment project for 201 schools operated by Orange County Public Schools as well as for the assessment project for 232 schools and 21 support facilities for the Broward County Schools in Florida. Stephanie has also assisted in the development of school safety and emergency plans and procedures for school districts and train-the-
### Name & Title

*Steve Satterly, Safe Havens Analyst*

### Roles and Relevant Skills

trainer programs. Stephanie has a BS in Criminal Justice Administration from Park University and a Master of Public Administration from Georgia College and State University.

**Steve Satterly, Safe Havens Analyst**

**Project assignment: Conducted on-site school-level assessment.**

A nascent writer on school safety issues, Steve Satterly is well known locally and in the Midwest as a school safety practitioner and for numerous presentations at state, regional, and national conferences on school safety topics. Mr. Satterly co-authored the IS 360 *Preparing for Mass Casualty Incidents: A Guide for Schools, Higher Education, and Houses of Worship* web training program on active shooter prevention and preparedness for the United States Department of Education as part of the 2013 White House School Safety Initiative. He also co-authored *Staying Alive — How to Act Fast and Survive Deadly Encounters* which was released by Barron’s in May of 2014. Mr. Satterly is currently a contributing author for a 600-page university textbook *Extreme Violence: Understanding and Protecting People from Active Assailants, Hate Crimes and Terrorist Attacks* for Cognella due for publication in 2019.

Mr. Satterly has provided post-incident assistance for active shooter and targeted school shootings in North Carolina, South Carolina, New Mexico, Colorado and Florida. Mr. Satterly also provided research support for the Safe Havens assessment of a Christian School in Kenya in the wake of the deadly terrorist attack at the Westgate Mall. Two of the school’s students were severely wounded by machine gun fire and a grenade, two parents of students were killed and fourteen students, a teacher and her husband survived the attack.

Mr. Satterly has also authored or co-authored numerous magazine articles, such as a cover story for Campus Safety Magazine entitled 14 Severe Weather Survival Tips in April of 2012. He also wrote a cover story for School Planning and Management Magazine entitled *After the Storm: Recovery Planning for Disasters in Schools* in May of 2012.
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<td>has written other articles for School Planning and Management Magazine, as well as The Safety Net, an electronic publication of Safe Havens International. He recently completed a project as a subject matter expert in tornado preparedness for the American Clearinghouse of Educational Facilities.</td>
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<td>A twelve-year veteran of the United States Army, Mr. Satterly uses his experiences as an Infantryman to drive his desire to protect others. He has taken numerous LE training courses and has received certification in the Active Shooter Doctrine from the Indiana Law Enforcement Academy. He is a graduate of the 2007 FBI Citizen’s Academy through the Indianapolis Field Office and holds certification as a Gang Specialist through the National Gang Crime Research Center in Chicago, which awarded him a Certificate of Appreciation in 2008 for his anti-gang work in his local district. The Indiana School Safety Specialist Academy, the Indiana Association of School Principal, the Hancock County School Safety Commission, and the Hancock County Emergency Management Agency have routinely used Mr. Satterly’s expertise.</td>
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<td>Since joining Safe Havens assessment team, Mr. Satterly has conducted school safety, security, and emergency preparedness assessments for nearly one hundred schools from various school districts around the nation, including the climate, culture, safety, security, and emergency preparedness assessment project for 201 schools operated by Orange County Public Schools in Florida in 2014 and the assessment for 232 schools and 21 support facilities for Broward County Schools in Florida.</td>
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<td>Ulric Bellaire,</td>
<td>Project assignment: Conducted on-site school-level assessment.</td>
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<td>Safe Havens Adjunct</td>
<td>Bellaire is a 14-year police veteran with four years of experience in supervisory positions. He began his career in LE with the Macon Police Department as a Patrol Officer and as a Neighborhood Police Officer with the Americorp Cadet Program. After two years with the Macon Police Department, he accepted a position with his current school system police department where he has received extensive formal training in school policing, youth</td>
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<td>Mr. Bellaire</td>
<td>intervention, anti-terrorism, school security and school emergency preparedness. Mr. Bellaire has extensive experience working in the prevention of youth gang violence. Mr. Bellaire is a certified Field Training Officer, who trains officers on using proactive approaches when policing school settings, is the Field Training Supervisor, and oversees the department's Field Training Program. He has certifications in LE supervision and management. He also served in the Army Reserves with the 921st Field Hospital in Sacramento, California, and received an honorable discharge after fulfilling his commitment. He holds a Bachelor of Science Degree in Computer Information Systems from Mercer University and has a Master’s in Business Administration from Wesleyan College. Mr. Belaire is currently serving as a contributing author for a 600-page university textbook <em>Extreme Violence: Understanding and Protecting People from Active Assailants, Hate Crimes and Terrorist Attacks</em> for Cognella due for publication in 2019. Since joining Safe Havens assessment team, Mr. Bellaire has conducted school safety, security, and emergency preparedness assessments for various school districts around the nation, including the climate, culture, safety, security, and emergency preparedness assessment projects for hundreds of public, independent, boarding and faith-based schools in eight states. These projects include the school safety, security, climate for 201 schools operated by Orange County Public Schools in Florida in 2014 and a comparable assessment for 232 schools and 21 support facilities for Broward County Schools in Florida.</td>
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